Concept
Putting the Doctrines Together
Public school students
Putting the Doctrines Together
The compelled-speech cases and the cases about minors in this chapter start with the same question: what is the government doing to the speaker’s expression? The government’s reason comes second. Barnette and Reno show why. Barnette treated compelled affirmation as a harm beyond silence,1 and Reno accepted that protecting children is a real interest while holding that it does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.2 Courts respect both aims, so an analysis that stops at the worthiness of the goal has not yet begun. The government’s method selects the test, and the chapter has presented three methods to keep apart: compelling a person to affirm a message, restricting speech addressed to a general audience, and restricting a student’s speech inside a school.
Compulsion does more damage than prohibition because it takes over the expression itself. A prohibition silences a speaker. Compulsion coerces the speaker into betraying his or her convictions, and forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning. Barnette, the landmark compelled-speech case, drew the consequence: a law commanding “involuntary affirmation” of objected-to beliefs requires “even more immediate and urgent grounds” than a law demanding silence.3 Modern doctrine turns that principle into a rule about scrutiny, and the rule opens with a threshold question. If a law does not compel speech, as the provision upheld in PruneYard did not, rationality review suffices. If it does compel speech, the law is analyzed as a law forbidding speech would be, so a law compelling speech of a particular content, like those in Barnette, Wooley, and McIntyre, is content-based and receives strict scrutiny.4
The second method is a content-based restriction on speech addressed to a general audience, and it draws strict scrutiny for a different reason: the law discriminates on the basis of what is said. A content-based law is presumptively invalid, and the government must justify it by showing narrowly tailored or necessary means to a compelling interest.5 Protecting minors supplies the interest, so Reno turned on the means. The Communications Decency Act reached indecent speech that is not obscene and therefore remains protected for adults, and the government may not “reduc[e] the adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.”6 The breadth of that content-based restriction imposed an especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective, and the Government did not carry it. The alternatives pressed on the Court included tagging indecent material to facilitate parental control, exceptions for messages with artistic or educational value, some tolerance for parental choice, and different rules for commercial Web sites than for chat rooms.7 The interest stays bounded even when minors themselves are the audience. Minors are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and a State’s legitimate power to protect children from harm does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.8
The third method, a school’s restriction of student expression, requires a sort of the speech itself, because the Court has pulled in two directions. Students and teachers do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, yet the Court has also affirmed the comprehensive authority of the States and school officials to control conduct in schools, and it has generally sided with the government when regulating expression in the military, in prisons, and in schools.9 Tinker marks the baseline for ordinary student opinion. It adopted none of the traditional standards for reviewing content regulation. Instead it required government to prove that the regulated speech “materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” or “impinge[s] upon the rights of other students,” which is not the language of strict scrutiny.10 The record in Tinker also showed that school authorities had singled out one symbol, the armband, while students wore campaign buttons and even the Iron Cross,11 and the Court warned that state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.12
Three kinds of in-school speech receive more deference than Tinker gives. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a 17-year-old senior delivered a nominating speech full of humorous sexual innuendo at a school-sponsored, student-run assembly, and the Court sided with the school that disciplined him. Indecent speech in ordinary civil society is protected, but in the school context the First Amendment interest does not weigh heavily in the balance, because the school pursues its educational mission and protects other children.13 Second, for school-sponsored expressive activities the Hazelwood standard replaces Tinker’s test with a much more deferential one: educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.14 Third, in Morse v. Frederick students unfurled a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” and the principal, construing it as advocacy of drug use, ordered it down and suspended the student who refused. The Court upheld the suspension, holding that the special characteristics of the school environment and the interest in preventing student drug use allow schools to restrict expression they reasonably regard as promoting drugs. Justices Alito and Kennedy, concurring, regarded such regulation as standing at “the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits.”15
Barnette and Fraser form the sharpest pair, because both arose in public schools and the school lost one case and won the other. The difference lies in the verb. West Virginia compelled pupils to salute, and the compulsion ran into the rule against involuntary affirmation.16 The school in Fraser punished a student for what he chose to say at a school-sponsored assembly, and the discipline stood because indecent speech carries little weight in the school context.17
Setting changes the test even when the words stay constant. Indecent speech in ordinary civil society is constitutionally protected, while in the school context Fraser gave it little or no protection, or only minimal weight in the balance.20 Adults keep their right to receive indecent speech that is not obscene, so a legislature may not shrink their discourse to what suits children.21 The interest in children appears in both places. What differs is the setting: the special characteristics of the school environment justify deference there, while a statute that regulates the Internet and burdens adult speech must pass strict scrutiny.22
The first step does the most work, since every later step depends on classifying the government’s action correctly. The common error lets the justification choose the test. Protecting children figures in both Reno and Fraser, yet the first draws strict scrutiny and the second deference, because the method and the setting differ.28 A school setting does not earn deference by itself, either. A demand for affirmation falls under Barnette’s rule even in a school, and ordinary student opinion stays under Tinker’s burden on the school.29