Concept
Proving Retaliatory Motive
Public employment
Proving Retaliatory Motive
Protected speech does not win a retaliation claim unless the employer acted because of it, so the last stage of the analysis is proof of motive. Connick v. Myers fixed the order of proof when it sent the case back to the lower court. That court was to decide whether the questionnaire could reasonably have been expected to interfere with the operation of the office. If so, it was to decide whether the questionnaire was a substantial or motivating factor in the discharge. Even if it was, the district attorney was to have the opportunity to show that he would have reached the same decision without the protected conduct.1 The Court had already said that the close working relationships in a district attorney's office called for greater deference to the employer's judgment.2 The last two steps come from Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, whose burden-shifting test governs causation.3 This unit takes up that test first, then asks whose view of the facts the employer's motive is measured against.
Mt. Healthy Burden Shifting
The employee carries the first burden. A public employee who challenges an adverse employment action must show that the conduct was constitutionally protected and that it was a “substantial factor,” or in other words a “motivating factor,” in the government's action.4 The burden then shifts to the government to show “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct.”5 The challenger's burden is considerable, and a government employer that makes the same-decision showing defeats the claim.6
Causation is a question for the trier of fact, but only if the court has first resolved the first two elements of the claim in the employee's favor.7 Connick shows the question going to the jury. The district court submitted whether the campaign-pressure question was a motivating factor in the discharge, and the Supreme Court held that the record amply supported the verdict.8
The same-decision defense exists so that an employee who would not otherwise have been retained does not end up in a better position merely because the employee also engaged in protected conduct.9 An employee who would have been fired anyway does not deserve special protection because of the speech.10
Mt. Healthy itself shows the defense at work. An untenured teacher was not rehired after several speech-related incidents: he argued with another teacher, made an obscene gesture to students, and told a local radio station about the principal's memorandum on teacher dress and appearance.11 The call to the radio station was the speech at issue. The argument and the gesture gave the board independent reasons to point to.
Two different motives should not be confused here. An employee whose own motives were mixed, combining personal interests with a desire to help the public, may still speak with protection.12 The causation inquiry asks about the reason behind the employer's decision.
The Employer's View of the Facts
Protection often depends on the exact words an employee used, and those words are frequently disputed, so a retaliation case must decide whose account of the facts counts. In Waters v. Churchill a public hospital fired a nurse for remarks the hospital concluded she had made, and she disputed that account. A badly divided Court held that the hospital's action should be judged not on what the nurse actually said but on what the hospital reasonably concluded after an adequate investigation.13
Justice O'Connor wrote for a four-Justice plurality. She reasoned that the government's interest in efficient operation “is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer,” and that someone who is “paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's effective operation” cannot expect to “do or say things that detract from the agency's effective operation.”14 Balancing the employer's interest in an effective discipline system against the employee's First Amendment interests, she concluded that courts should not second-guess an employer's fact findings so long as the employer has made a reasonable investigation.15
Waters is a plurality opinion. The other Justices wanted either more deference to employers or less, so the plurality's view operates as the rule, though an exam answer should still label it a plurality.16 Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissented. They argued that nondisruptive speech on a matter of public concern is protected, and that its protection should not turn on whether the employer believed it was protected.17
The rule has a limit. A government employer must have a reasonable and good faith belief about the substance of the employee's speech before it disciplines the employee. If it does, and it then shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision without the protected conduct, the claim fails.18
Heffernan v. City of Paterson turns on the employer's understanding of the facts in the opposite direction. Heffernan, a police officer in Paterson, New Jersey, was asked by his bedridden mother to go downtown and pick up a sign supporting the mayoral candidate she favored. While doing so he was seen talking with the candidate.19 He was demoted for what his employer took to be political activity, although the errand was his mother's and not his own. The Court held, 6-2, per Justice Breyer, that when a government employer demotes an employee to prevent him from engaging in political activity protected by the First Amendment, the employee may challenge the demotion under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983, even when the employer is mistaken about the nature of the employee's activity.20
Read together, Waters and Heffernan make the employer's understanding of the facts the critical variable. In Waters the employer's reasonable belief about what was said, formed after an adequate investigation, controlled the analysis, whatever the factfinder later determined the nurse actually said.21 In Heffernan the employer's mistaken belief that the officer was engaged in protected political activity did not defeat his claim.22 The usual error is to ask only what the employee in fact said or did. In this setting the question is what the employer believed and why it acted.