Concept
Denials Based on Association
Licenses or benefits
Denials Based on Association
Government may deny a public job because of a person's group affiliation only where it could punish that affiliation directly. The limit on punishment comes from Scales v. United States: government may punish membership only on proof that the person actively affiliated with the group, knew of its illegal objectives, and specifically intended to further them.1 The Court applies that test in many other settings, including public employment and loyalty oaths. A state may deny a job, or require an oath about group ties, only in situations where the individual actively affiliated with the group, knew of its illegal activities, and specifically intended to further its illegal goals.2
The Court treats punishment and loss of public employment as a single question. An individual may not be punished or deprived of public employment for political association unless he is an active member of a subversive organization, joins with knowledge of its illegal aims, and has a specific intent to further those illegal ends rather than a general support of the organization's objectives.3 Federal and state loyalty-security requirements for employment parallel each other closely on all three points.4 The parallel follows from the preceding section: once the loss of a public job counts as a penalty rather than a withheld privilege, the loss must satisfy the standard that governs direct punishment of the same conduct, and here the conduct is belonging to a group.
Each element answers a different weakness in a rule that reaches membership alone. Active affiliation separates a participant from a name on a roster. Knowledge of the illegal objectives separates a person who joined for one reason from a person who also understood the group's unlawful purpose. Specific intent separates the member who shares those purposes from the member who supports only the group's lawful objectives.5 The third element does the most work, because without it the penalty falls on association that government has no power to punish.
The Court's standard for compelled disclosure, which this chapter takes up later, shows the same demand for justification. Significant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest.6 The State's subordinating interests must survive exacting scrutiny,7 and there must be a substantial relation between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed.8
Steps three through five carry the weight whenever the group has unlawful aims, and proof of the first two without the third does not suffice.9
Noto v. United States, decided the same day as Scales, shows the test from the other side. The Court reversed a conviction for Communist Party membership because the proof showed no illegal advocacy: the speech advocated abstract ideas, and nothing showed that the defendant specifically intended to further any illegal activity.10 The distinction between advocating abstract ideas and illegal advocacy echoes the line that Brandenburg v. Ohio draws between advocacy and incitement. Government's power to deny a job to a member of a group with unlawful aims is therefore no wider than its power to punish that member.
State loyalty oaths and statutes fail at the same steps. Elfbrandt v. Russell and Keyishian v. Board of Regents tested state measures against these requirements.11 Absent scienter and specific intent, civil penalties cannot be imposed solely because an individual has exercised the right of association,12 so a measure that disqualifies members without asking about either one sweeps in association that may not be proscribed along with association that may.
United States v. Robel shows a denial failing from another direction: breadth. Congress barred members of Communist-action organizations from working in defense facilities regardless of the sensitivity of the position, so the cryptographer and the cook were treated alike.13 The Court did not balance the government's interest against the burden. It held the law unconstitutionally overbroad.14 The statute turned on membership alone, without scienter, specific intent, or regard for the job.15
Robel does leave an indication that national security may, on occasion, override associational rights, depending on the sensitivity of the employment. Government may be able to deny a position with a demonstrable relationship to important national security interests where it can show only active, knowing membership, the individual may potentially adopt illegal means, and circumstances may offer no adequate opportunity to thwart them.16 Sensitivity of the position is thus the one variable the Court has flagged as able to enlarge government's room.
Licensing follows the same pattern. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, the state relied on an applicant's past Communist Party membership as grounds for questioning his loyalty. As Justice Black's majority opinion noted, the membership had not even been illegal when it occurred. Fifteen years of evidence of the applicant's loyalty showed the affiliation to be too attenuated from his present life to justify relying on it.17 The questions a bar examiner may ask about membership are taken up later in this chapter.
Association-based dismissals can also fail on procedural grounds. Decisions of the Court proscribe summary dismissal from public employment without the hearing or inquiry that due process requires, and an oath provision that falls within those decisions cannot stand.18 That ground is separate from the overbreadth analysis above, and a hearing would not cure a substantively overbroad rule.
The problem reaches beyond subversive groups. Political party affiliation raises it for ordinary public jobs, and the Court extended the broader principle against conditioning employment on political affiliation to the hiring, promotion, transfer, and reinstatement of most regular government employees in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois.19 The principle also applies to government contracting practices with independent contractors.20 The exceptions rest on the nature of particular jobs and are the subject of the next section.