Concept
Near v. Minnesota
Prior restraint
Near v. Minnesota
Near v. Minnesota is the foundational prior-restraint case. The Court held that a state could not suppress a newspaper in advance by calling it a nuisance, and it rested the holding on the purpose of the press guarantee: the chief purpose is to prevent previous restraints upon publication.1 No licensing board stood behind the restraint in Near. A court of equity issued an injunction, and the Court treated it as censorship all the same. That is why the case anchors the later treatment of injunctions against speech as well as permit systems.
The sections below follow the case in the order it unfolded: the statute and the paper it silenced, the holding, the truth defense and the three labels that failed to save the statute, and the dissent that read the same statute as an ordinary equity remedy.
The Minnesota Statute
In 1925 Minnesota declared it a nuisance to engage in the business of regularly producing, publishing, or circulating a “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory” newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, subjected that nuisance to abatement by injunction, and authorized the county attorney to bring the suit.2 A nuisance is a continuing condition that a court of equity may order ended, and the legislature borrowed that remedy for a publishing business. The state court explained why: libel prosecutions, it said, did not produce “efficient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal.”3 The legislature wanted a remedy that stopped the paper itself, and a verdict after publication could not do that.
Floyd B. Olson, the county attorney of Hennepin County, used the statute against J.M. Near and the other publishers of The Saturday Press in Minneapolis.4 His complaint rested on nine issues, the first dated September 24, 1927, and the rest on eight later dates in October and November. The articles attacked a special law-enforcement officer, the mayor, the chief of police, the county attorney himself, members of the grand jury, and others. They charged in substance that gangsters controlled gambling, bootlegging, and racketeering in the city and that the officials responsible for stopping them were neglecting their duties. The chief of police took most of the fire, accused of neglect, illicit relations with gangsters, and graft.
The case moved through the courts in stages, and each stage added a restriction. On November 22, 1927, the trial court ordered the defendants to show cause why a temporary injunction should not issue and, in the meantime, forbade them to publish, circulate, or possess the editions from September 24 through November 19, or any future edition containing similar matter.5 Near demurred and challenged the statute's constitutionality, the trial court certified that question, and the Minnesota Supreme Court sustained the statute. Near then answered. He admitted that he owned the paper and had published the issues, denied that they were malicious, scandalous, or defamatory, and invoked the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At trial the state offered the verified complaint and the nine issues, Near objected on constitutional grounds, and he offered no further evidence. The court abated The Saturday Press as a public nuisance and perpetually enjoined the defendants from producing, editing, publishing, circulating, or possessing any malicious, scandalous, or defamatory newspaper.6 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, and Near appealed.
Chief Justice Hughes looked past the nuisance label to what the statute did. It was aimed not simply at scandalous statements about private citizens but at the continued publication of charges against public officers of corruption, malfeasance, or serious neglect of duty, and such charges by their nature create a public scandal.7 Its object was suppression of the offending periodical, and ordinary punishment was not the aim, so calling the business a public nuisance did not obscure the substance of the proceeding.8 The publisher also stood worse off than a libel defendant. Beyond the risk of an adverse verdict, he faced a determination that his paper was a nuisance to be abated, and abatement would follow unless he came forward with legal evidence of truth and of good motives and justifiable ends.9
The last observation explains why an action prompted by earlier articles belongs in a chapter on prior restraints. Once a periodical is suppressed as “malicious, scandalous and defamatory,” resuming publication is punishable as contempt by fine or imprisonment, so the publisher lives under a continuing censorship.10 The decree laid a permanent restraint on the publisher, who could escape it only by satisfying the court about the character of any new publication, and whether he could again print matter derogatory to the same or other officers depended on the court's ruling.11 The nine issues supplied the proof for the injunction, but the injunction governed every issue that might follow. A libel action over the same nine issues would have looked backward and left the next issue free. The statute reversed that sequence by making the lawfulness of the next issue turn on a judge's advance approval, which is what the timing test from the opening section identifies as a prior restraint.
The Court's Holding
Near holds that the Minnesota nuisance statute, as used against The Saturday Press, infringed the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.13 Two features of that judgment deserve attention at the outset. The Court applied the press guarantee to a state, reading the press clause into the liberty the Fourteenth Amendment protects, as it had already done for speech in Gitlow v. New York, so Minnesota's legislature faced the same limit that binds Congress.14 And the judgment rests on the statute's operation and effect, with the truth of the charges expressly set aside.15
Hughes began with what the statute did in practice. Public authorities could bring the owner of a periodical before a judge on a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter. Where the matter consisted of charges of official dereliction, the paper was suppressed and further publication became punishable as contempt unless the publisher persuaded the judge that the charges were true and published with good motives and for justifiable ends. The Court called that arrangement “of the essence of censorship.”16 A label is not a holding, so the Court then asked whether such a proceeding squares with press liberty as historically conceived. It answered from the purpose of the guarantee: the chief purpose is to prevent previous restraints upon publication.17
Two historical steps supported that premise. The English struggle against the licenser ended in renunciation of the censorship of the press, and Blackstone described the resulting liberty as consisting “in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”18 Madison supplied the American refinement. Under constitutions that stand above ordinary law, press freedom requires exemption “not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also.”19 The second step defeats any claim that a statute is a safer device than a royal licenser, because Minnesota's restraint began in a legislature.
The press remained answerable for what it printed. Public officers whose conduct stays open to debate find their remedies for false accusations in libel laws providing redress and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain publication.20 Minnesota's libel laws already afforded public and private redress for whatever wrong the paper had committed, and the Court declined to say how far subsequent punishment may go.21 The statute under review provided no punishment except contempt for violating the court's order. It provided for suppression and injunction, which is restraint upon publication.22 The same nine issues could therefore support a libel action after publication, but they could not support a decree that put every later issue under threat of contempt. State courts applying their own constitutions had approved the same principle in many decisions.23
The Court closed by stating that its decision rests on the operation and effect of the statute, without regard to whether the charges in the particular periodical were true, and that officials who might be impeccable could not alter the conclusion that the statute restrains publication.24 The reason follows from the way the statute worked. The government acts before any court has looked at the next issue, so the accuracy of earlier charges cannot decide whether that advance power may exist. Falsity matters in a libel action, but the preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true.25
The holding does not make the press immune from every injunction. Hughes, quoting Schenck, noted that the guarantee does not “protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force,” and he set aside any question about the authority to prevent publications in order to protect private rights under the principles of equity jurisdiction.26 Neither limit applied to a statute used against charges of official dereliction, so neither rescued Minnesota's.27 The recognized exceptions, including national security, obscenity, and incitement to violence, receive their own section below.
Truth and Good Motives
The Minnesota statute did not condemn every scandalous periodical automatically. Before an injunction issued, the publisher could show that the charges were true and had been published with good motives and for justifiable ends, and the state offered that chance as a reason to uphold the law.29 A provision that spares truthful, honestly motivated speech looks like a careful safeguard. The Court nonetheless held that the statute could not be justified on that ground, because a legislature entitled to demand proof of truth and motive before publication would hold the censor's power.30
The Court reached that conclusion by following the state's premise to its end. If a statute may authorize suppression unless the publisher proves truth and good motives, the legislature could equally provide that the publisher of any newspaper may at any time be brought before a court, or even an administrative officer, and required to prove the truth of what was published, or of what he meant to publish, together with his motives, or stand enjoined.31 The reference to an administrative officer matters because the Court added that the constitutional protection does not rest on mere procedural details, so moving the demand from a courtroom to an agency would change nothing. With such machinery in place, the legislature could decide for itself what counts as a justifiable end and restrain publication to match, and the Court described that result as “but a step to a complete system of censorship.”32
The device fails because it reverses the usual order of burdens. Ordinarily the speaker speaks first and the government must justify any penalty afterward. The statute made the publisher satisfy an official in advance, so the freedom to publish lasted only as long as a judge stayed persuaded. The state did not have to prove the charges false, and the publisher alone had to establish that truth was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.33 The standard of justifiable ends left the court's own view of acceptable motives to decide who could keep publishing.
Beneath that reasoning lies a principle the Court took from Patterson v. Colorado: the preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true, while subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false.34 The sentence assigns truth and falsity to different stages. Before publication, the question is whether the government may stop the speech at all, and the accuracy of the message does not decide it. After publication, accuracy can decide whether anyone owes damages or faces a penalty. The Minnesota statute collapsed the two stages by importing a post-publication inquiry into the decision whether publication could happen.
Truth proved after publication is ordinary libel law, which Near treats as the proper answer to abuse, while truth proved before publication operates as a license. The tempting error is to defend the Minnesota statute by observing that truthful, well-motivated publishers could escape it. That observation overlooks when the proof is due. The escape required advance approval, and the demand for advance approval is the censor's authority that the constitutional guarantee was written to bar.
Nuisance, Crime, and Scandal
The Court rejected three further arguments for stripping The Saturday Press of the immunity. Each took a label and treated it as though it removed the protection: the paper was a business, its charges described crimes, and exposure of official misconduct provokes disorder.
Chief Justice Hughes began with the setting in which the press works. Reckless assaults on public men deserve the severest condemnation in public opinion, but the abuse is no greater, and is believed to be less, than in the period when American institutions took shape. Meanwhile government has grown more complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, and crime has reached serious proportions, which emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities.36
The business label came first. The statute reached a “business” of publishing, and the argument for it was that a periodical issued over many weeks is an enterprise that can be abated as a nuisance. The Court answered that a publisher with a right to print charges of official derelictions without previous restraint does not lose the right by exercising it, so the right covers nine editions as well as one.37 If previous restraint were permissible, it could be imposed at once, since the wrong may be as serious in one publication as in several. It also made no difference that the periodical was found to be “largely” or “chiefly” devoted to such charges, because the right to publish them cannot depend on what else the publisher prints. Characterizing the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity.38 Sustained coverage of official misconduct is how a press does its work, so a rule that withdrew protection from the publisher who pursued the subject most thoroughly would shrink the guarantee in proportion to how well the paper used it.
The crime label fared no better. Freedom from previous restraint is not lost because the charges concern derelictions that constitute crimes, and the reason lies in how much conduct the criminal law now covers. Penal codes, municipal charters, and ordinances carrying penal sanctions have multiplied until the conduct of public officers is very largely within the reach of criminal statutes.39 A privilege limited to criticism outside the penal law would protect almost nothing about official behavior, and the Court added that history supplies no such limit and that the limit would contradict the reason the privilege was created.40 Graft by a police chief, tolerance of racketeers by a mayor, and neglect of duty by a prosecutor are accusations that some statute makes criminal, and they are the accusations a press is most needed to make.
The scandal label rested on a true premise. Charges of official dereliction by their nature create a public scandal.41 The Court also answered the argument that such scandal provokes violence. Quoting an earlier decision, it asked what limit would remain if a township could prevent the circulation of a newspaper for no reason other than that some inhabitants might violently disagree and resort to physical violence: “there is no limit to what may be prohibited.”42 The danger of violent reaction grows as defiant groups organize against exposure, so the people with the strongest motive to resent a story would gain the strongest claim to have it suppressed. If that consideration warranted interference with the initial freedom of publication, the constitutional protection would be reduced to a mere form of words.43
The three labels fit almost any sustained attack on officials, which is why they fail together. A newspaper that keeps reporting is a business, serious official wrongdoing is usually criminal, and exposure usually angers someone. If any of the three could remove protection, the guarantee would shelter only criticism that no official minds.
The same decision shows what does change the outcome. Near recognized that the guarantee does not protect words that may have all the effect of force, and it left open questions about preventing publications to protect private rights under equity principles.44 The harm in the first category flows from the words themselves. The harm claimed against a paper that exposes corruption is injury to officials' reputations and the anger of their supporters, which libel law and the criminal law can address after publication. A town that bans a newspaper because some residents might respond violently to charges of police corruption therefore has only a label and a prediction about audience reaction, and it has no category of harm that Near recognized. The recognized exceptions are treated in their own section below.
Justice Butler's Dissent
Justice Butler wrote for four dissenters, joined by Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland.46 He began from the premise that it is of the greatest importance for the states to remain untrammeled and free to use all just and appropriate measures against abuses of press liberty,47 and he argued that the Minnesota statute does not operate as a previous restraint “within the proper meaning of that phrase.”48 The dissent matters beyond its vote count because it states the state's best case. The disagreement between Butler and Hughes over what an injunction does to a publisher returns in the later treatment of the collateral bar rule and of injunctions entered after adjudication. Butler built his argument in four parts.
The first part is history. Butler distinguished the licensers and censors of the older cases, who exercised administrative control in advance, from the Minnesota statute, which prescribes a remedy enforced by a suit in equity.49 He also quoted a reading of the press guarantee under which it secures a right to publish without prior restraint, so long as the publisher does not injure others in their rights, person, property, or reputation and does not disturb the public peace, an expansion of the libel doctrine that one may publish what is true, with good motives and for justifiable ends.50 The statute's defense used that same formula,51 which lets the dissent present the statute as enforcing a limit consistent with the historical understanding. Hughes's answer, set out above, is that a legislature allowed to demand that showing in advance holds the censor's power.
The second part describes the statute's operation. There had been previous publication, made in the course of a business of regularly producing malicious, scandalous, and defamatory periodicals, and nothing in the statute purports to prohibit publications that have not been adjudged a nuisance.52 Butler called it fanciful to compare such a decree with the control the licensers exercised.53 His distinction turns on the order's relation to adjudication. A licenser decides before the first issue is printed and treats every manuscript alike, while a decree follows a proceeding about one publisher's past conduct.
The third part presses on consistency. Butler read the majority as conceding that clause (a) of the Minnesota law, which reaches a business of regularly publishing an obscene periodical, may be enforced by injunction. He saw no distinction bearing on constitutionality between that clause and clause (b), the defamation clause used here, because both nuisances offend morals, order, and good government, and he asked why a regular business of malicious defamation may not be enjoined if a lewd periodical may.54 The majority's reason for treating the two differently belongs to the discussion of recognized exceptions below.
The fourth part is practical. The state court had defended the statute on the ground that libel prosecutions do not efficiently suppress the evils of scandal,55 and Butler warned that the majority's doctrine exposes the peace and good order of every community, and the private affairs of every individual, to constant and protracted false and malicious assaults by an insolvent publisher with the purpose and the capacity to contrive a scheme of oppression, blackmail, or extortion.56 The mechanism behind that worry is easy to follow. A damages judgment deters only a publisher with assets to lose, and a prosecution arrives after the reputational harm is done. An injunction was the one remedy that stopped the next issue.
The majority replied that this remedy is the danger. Hughes described the arrangement as one in which officials bring a publisher before a judge, the paper is suppressed, and further publication is punishable as contempt unless the publisher proves truth and good motives, and he called it “of the essence of censorship.”57 Butler looked at who acts and by what procedure, a court in a suit in equity, while Hughes looked at what the order does to the next issue. The adjudication concerned past issues, yet the decree laid a permanent restraint on the publisher, who could escape it only by satisfying the court about the character of any new publication.58 That answers the dissent's point that the statute prohibits only what has been adjudged a nuisance: the adjudication covered nine issues, and the order controls issues no court has seen.
Butler's institutional point nonetheless has force. Later decisions on film licensing insist that only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression.59 Judicial involvement makes a restraint safer, but it does not stop the order from being a restraint, and a decree backed by contempt can bind as firmly as a censor's refusal. In Walker v. Birmingham, decided 5-4, the Court held that marchers could not defend against contempt charges by asserting the unconstitutionality of the ordinance or the injunction, because court orders must be obeyed until “reversed for error by orderly review.”60 Under a rule of that kind, a publisher bound by a decree like Minnesota's would generally have to win relief from the court before publishing, because contempt would follow otherwise. To argue that Minnesota's decree is no prior restraint because a judge issued it is to repeat Butler's position, and that position lost.