Concept
Fair-Trial Gag Orders
Prior restraint
Fair-Trial Gag Orders
Two guarantees that are fundamental to a free society sometimes collide in a courtroom. The accused is entitled to a fair trial, and a free press promotes self-government by exposing judicial or prosecutorial corruption or incompetence, yet the two guarantees do not always coexist harmoniously.1 A judge who fears that news coverage will taint the jury may be tempted to stop the coverage before it runs. Every such decision inevitably requires a balancing of the defendant’s right to a fair trial against the First Amendment rights of individuals and the press,2 and the balance tips differently depending on who is silenced. An order against the press meets a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality and is virtually impossible to sustain.3 An order against a lawyer meets a far more forgiving standard.
Orders Against the Press
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart is the leading decision on orders aimed at the press. Members of the state press association challenged a judicial order that barred them from publishing confessions made by an accused in a murder prosecution (other than those made directly to members of the press) and other facts “strongly implicative” of the accused.4 The press, not a litigant in the criminal case, challenged the order directly, relying on the First Amendment’s hostility toward prior restraints.5 The Court unanimously held the order invalid.6
The order was a textbook prior restraint, which the Court has described as a judicial or administrative order forbidding communications in advance of the time they are to occur.7 Courts disfavor such orders because they act at once and cannot be undone. If a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication “chills” speech, a prior restraint “freezes” it, at least for the time.8 The damage is greatest when the restraint falls on news and commentary about current events.9
The Court did not resolve the conflict by ranking the two rights. It was unwilling to assume that the Sixth Amendment overrides the First, and it insisted on protecting both.10 Pretrial coverage in the case did pose a severe danger to the neutrality of the trial, but publicity fatally infects the judicial process only in a rare circumstance, and the trial court had not shown that the procedures outlined in Sheppard v. Maxwell would be insufficient to forestall the danger.11 Those procedures protect the trial without touching the press: a continuance or postponement to let public attention subside, a change of venue, intensive voir dire of prospective jurors, sequestration of jurors, emphatic instructions that each juror must decide the issues only on evidence presented in open court, and restraining orders on the parties and their attorneys in discussing the case with the press.12
The order reached two kinds of information, and the Court treated them differently. To the extent it barred reporting of what occurred at an open preliminary hearing, it violated the settled principle that once a public hearing has been held, what transpired there cannot be subject to prior restraint.13 The judge’s power runs earlier in time. Where the relevant statutes allow, and subject to constitutional limits, a judge may close part of the proceedings, but a judge who bypasses closure cannot reach the same result afterward through a protective order against the press.14 The rule is not confined to preliminary hearings. If the information was lawfully obtained from an open hearing, the court cannot restrain its republication, and Sheppard had already warned that nothing proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom.15 The Court applied the same logic in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, which invalidated an order against publishing the name and picture of a juvenile defendant that the media had lawfully obtained. Truthful reports of public judicial proceedings, moreover, have received special protection even against subsequent punishment.16
The other half of the order reached information the press learned elsewhere, such as from police or counsel. Here the heavy First Amendment presumption against prior restraints made the order virtually impossible to sustain, given the numerous other measures, such as a change of venue, that protect the defendant’s trial.17 The record in Nebraska Press shows why, because it failed in three separate ways.
First, the threat was speculative. The trial judge found only a clear and present danger that pretrial publicity could impinge on the defendant’s right to a fair trial, and his conclusion about the effect on prospective jurors was of necessity speculative, since he was dealing with factors unknown and unknowable.18 A prediction of that kind cannot carry a restraint against which a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality inevitably attaches.19 Experience deepens the doubt. One treatise observes that, however famous a case, twelve people who have never heard of it can always be found somewhere, so an impartial jury, though perhaps an exceptionally ill-informed one, can always be seated without a gag order.20
Second, the trial court never showed that the alternatives would fail. Each Sheppard tool acts on the jury, the trial, or the parties and lawyers who supply the news, and a judge can try them before concluding that none will work. A gag order asks the judge to predict in advance that nothing else will succeed, and the Court found no showing to support that prediction.21
Third, the order might not have worked. The editors of some publications could lie beyond the court’s in personam (personal) jurisdiction even though their publications circulate throughout the area from which jurors are drawn. The speculative character of the order also created drafting problems: its language appeared to prohibit publication of material that would not prejudice the jury, yet it did not reach seemingly innocent information that would later develop into very damaging evidence.22
Justice Brennan’s separate opinion shows how far one Justice would have gone. He argued that the presumption against prior restraints can be rebutted only in crises affecting national security, that in every other situation the First Amendment must remain preeminent, and that the defendant’s fair-trial right must rest on the procedures traditionally within the trial judge’s province.23 The Court itself rested on the record’s failure of proof. That leaves a showing possible in theory, but a protective order lacking one could never overcome the heavy presumption, and in practice such orders against the press are virtually impossible to sustain.24
Orders Against Participants
A court worried about pretrial publicity has another target: the people who generate the news. A trial court may proscribe extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official in order to avoid publicity that would prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial.26 That permission, drawn from Sheppard, sits beside the result in Nebraska Press, which flatly rejected a gag order aimed at the press.27 The two decisions work together, since Nebraska Press itself lists restraining orders on the parties and their attorneys among the measures a judge should consider before turning to the press.28 The judge’s goal, a jury pool free of prejudicial coverage, is the same in both settings. The treatment differs because the press receives the full protection of the presumption against prior restraints, while lawyers receive a lower level of protection.
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada sets the standard for lawyers. A state rule prohibited statements with a “substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing” a proceeding, and the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that standard sufficiently protective of speech.29 The comparison with other speakers gives the holding its force. Had the speaker been an ordinary citizen, the state could have intervened only to prevent a “clear and present” danger of interference with the proceeding, but the Court applied a lower level of protection to lawyers, who are officers of the court.30 “Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are key participants in the criminal justice system,” the Chief Justice wrote, “and the State may demand some adherence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct.”31
Two reasons support the lower standard, and each separates the lawyer from a bystander. A lawyer has a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or obstruct the fair administration of justice. A lawyer’s statements also pose a special threat, because they are likely to be received as especially authoritative, given the lawyer’s special access to information through discovery and client communication.32 A neighbor’s guess about the evidence is heard as a guess, while a prosecutor’s account is heard as backed by inside knowledge.
Gentile has two halves that students must keep apart, because the standard survived while the lawyer went free. Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the other “opinion of the Court,” lifted the discipline on the ground that the lawyer could reasonably have believed he was within one of the “safe harbor” exceptions to the rule.33 The upshot is that states have broad power to restrict lawyers’ commentary about pending cases, even though this particular lawyer escaped punishment, and experienced lawyers appear adept at skirting the limits of such rules.34
A single judge can enter both kinds of order, and the outcomes diverge. An order limiting a defense lawyer to statements that do not pose a substantial likelihood of material prejudice fits within Gentile. An order barring a newspaper from printing information it learned from the police faces the heavy presumption against prior restraints, and measures such as a change of venue remain available to protect the accused, so the order is virtually impossible to sustain.35 The lawyer is an officer of the court told how to speak about a case in which the lawyer is professionally engaged. The newspaper owes the court no comparable duty.
Beyond lawyers, Gentile offers less help. Its two reasons, a fiduciary duty to the administration of justice and special access to information through discovery and client communication, describe a lawyer, and they do not by their terms describe a witness. Sheppard still permits a trial court to proscribe extrajudicial statements by parties, witnesses, and court officials, and the decision inevitably requires balancing the defendant’s fair-trial right against the First Amendment rights of individuals and the press.36 On an exam, say that Gentile fixes no standard for these speakers, and argue the balance on the facts.
A participant who believes an order is unconstitutional should expect to challenge it through review rather than by speaking anyway. In Walker v. Birmingham, the Court held, by a vote of 5–4, that marchers could not defend against contempt charges by asserting the unconstitutionality of the injunction, because court orders must be obeyed until “reversed for error by orderly review.”37 Justice Brennan’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Fortas, insisted that the Court had elevated a “rule of judicial administration above the right of free expression.”38 The general rule suggests that a lawyer or witness who defies a gag order will have difficulty defending a contempt charge by arguing that the order was invalid, a point the earlier discussion of the collateral bar rule develops.
Two errors recur on exams. One applies the lower Gentile standard to a newspaper, which ignores the heavy presumption that protects the press. The other treats Gentile as settled authority for witnesses and parties, which overlooks that its reasoning rests on a lawyer’s duties as an officer of the court.