Concept
Vagueness and Overbreadth: Reach Versus Clarity
Vagueness
Vagueness and Overbreadth: Reach Versus Clarity
Challengers to a speech restriction usually plead vagueness and overbreadth together, but the two are different attacks.1 Either can be raised against any law that regulates speech, even by a person whose own speech is unprotected, and a successful challenge usually invalidates the whole law rather than only certain applications.2
Morales states the two tests. Overbreadth permits facial invalidation of a law that inhibits First Amendment rights when its impermissible applications are substantial in relation to the law’s plainly legitimate sweep. Vagueness has no such threshold: even a law that does not reach a substantial amount of protected conduct is impermissibly vague if it fails to set standards for the police and the public sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.3 The first test asks how much protected activity the law reaches, and the second asks whether the law marks its limits clearly enough to guide anyone.
Two hypothetical statutes show the difference. A statute forbidding the display of a nude human body on a motion picture screen is specific, so no one has to guess what it covers, and it is overbroad to the extent it also sweeps in films the First Amendment protects.4 Now reverse the design and forbid “all speech that the First Amendment does not protect,” defining nothing further. That statute reaches only what government may regulate, so it has no impermissible applications to weigh against its legitimate sweep and overbreadth has nothing to work on, but it supplies no standard telling a speaker where the line falls.5 A statute can be vague without being overbroad, and overbroad without being vague. The common error is to call a law vague because it covers a great deal of speech. Coverage is the overbreadth question, and vagueness asks whether the text lets the public and the police tell what is covered.
A standard built on annoyance shows vagueness in its plainest form. Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others, so a law keyed to annoyance is vague not because it states an imprecise but comprehensible standard, but because it specifies no standard of conduct at all, and “men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.”6
The two doctrines overlap in purpose, which is why pleaders reach for both. Each concerns the facial validity of a law. Overbreadth demands specificity and precision in drafting, and vagueness demands clarity. Both are driven by the worry that protected speech will be chilled and that enforcement will become selective, and both rest on the belief that the legislature can draft more narrowly so that a law reaches only the legitimate concerns of government.7 A vague statute, like an overbroad one, creates a risk of chilling protected speech and produces rulings of facial invalidity,8 a concern familiar from cases such as Thornhill v. Alabama. Even so, the doctrines are not identical.9
Morales shows the doctrines separating. The Court agreed with the city that the ordinance did not have a sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected by the First Amendment. It did not prohibit speech, and because it defined “loiter” as remaining in one place “with no apparent purpose,” it did not prohibit conduct apparently intended to convey a message and was by its terms inapplicable to assemblies designed to show a group’s support of or opposition to a point of view. The Court therefore held the ordinance invalid on its face without relying on overbreadth.10 The ordinance still failed. It was a criminal law with no mens rea requirement that infringed constitutionally protected rights, not an ordinance that simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement, and when vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to facial attack.11 A court can thus reject overbreadth and accept vagueness in a single case, so each theory needs its own analysis.
The airport litigation shows one rule open to both objections. In Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., the rule came from a state government, so the final word on its meaning belonged to the state courts. The Court considered waiting for a narrowing interpretation but declined, because with so many possible readings it doubted that the state courts could settle on a clear one without deciding a whole series of cases. The airport’s own proposed limit, confining the rule to “expressive activity unrelated to airport-related purposes,” did not help, since the Court found that reading was itself overbroad and vague.12 A single provision can thus be faulted for both reach and clarity, and a proposed cure can carry both defects. When a court may rescue a law by narrowing it is a separate question, taken up under Limits on the Doctrine.
Vagueness is one route to a larger due process failure, the lack of fair warning, and it is not the only route. The Court has said that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct it makes a crime, and that the right to fair warning can be lost through vague statutory language or through an unforeseeable, retroactive judicial expansion of language that appears narrow and precise on its face.13 A precise text that a court later stretches is therefore not vague, yet the retroactive expansion is still treated as a fair-warning violation.