Concept
After a Vagueness Ruling
Vagueness
After a Vagueness Ruling
A holding that a law is void for vagueness closes one door and leaves the rest of the building open. The Court said as much in City of Chicago v. Morales. The city had argued that brazen, insistent gang members and hangers-on frighten residents away from their own streets, depress property values, and can destabilize entire neighborhoods, and the ordinance's findings rested on those concerns. The Court had no doubt that a law directly prohibiting such intimidating conduct would be constitutional. The Gang Congregation Ordinance failed because it covered a great deal of additional activity, and uncertainty about how far that coverage reached made it too vague.1
Chicago lost a means, not an end. A vagueness holding passes only on the legitimacy of the legislature's means. It invalidates the regulation because the regulation is indefinite, and it reserves judgment on whether the legislature can reach its goal through more definite regulation. The statute in its present form is void, but the legislature remains free to enact new laws on the same subject. The court decides nothing about the constitutional boundaries of the police power, because uncertainty about how far the legislature meant to go removes that question from consideration.2
A court that finds such uncertainty does not resolve it. It declines to cure the ambiguity because the matter belongs to the legislature, and the message that goes back is “try again.”3 Two considerations support that restraint. The first is structural. The vagueness doctrine is a corollary of the separation of powers: it requires the legislature, not the executive or the judiciary, to define what conduct is sanctionable, so a court that supplied the missing definition would be doing the work the doctrine assigns to someone else.4 The second is caution. Courts are often reluctant to erect absolute limits on the police power, because doing so forecloses experimentation with some other statutory formulation.5
The opposite instruction is “hands off.” It directly rejects the legislature's judgment that certain conduct belongs within the criminal law, while “try again” asks only for greater care in setting forth what is proscribed.6 Equal protection decisions sort themselves the same way, according to the nature of the defect. A successful equal protection challenge voids the challenged provisions, because the vice lies in where the legislature drew the line between criminal and noncriminal conduct, and the legislature may have gone too far or not far enough. A statute proscribing interracial marriage goes too far, and the legislature can hardly answer its nullification with a broader law banning marriage without regard to race.7 Students often treat every invalidation as the end of the government's effort. The first question is whether the court passed on the legislature's means or on its power.
Morales itself shows what a second attempt might look like, because the Court named limits that would have changed its analysis. The requirement that an officer reasonably believe the group of loiterers includes a gang member did limit the authority to order dispersal. That limit would no doubt have sufficed if the ordinance applied only to loitering with an apparently harmful purpose or effect, or possibly only to loitering by persons reasonably believed to be criminal gang members.8 The ordinance did neither. It reached friends, relatives, teachers, counselors, and even total strangers who might unwittingly engage in forbidden loitering by chatting with a gang member.9 A separate opinion described the gang-member limit in structural terms. It might have cured the vagueness by specifying to whom a dispersal order could issue, but the Illinois Supreme Court had not read the ordinance that narrowly.10 The same opinion pointed to other, more precise ways for a city to address gang loitering.11 Each option answers a defect. A harmful-purpose element ties the offense to the harm the city fears. A gang-member limit narrows who may be ordered to move. A direct prohibition of intimidating conduct, which the Court said would be valid, aims at the harm without any loitering definition. Challenges to later loitering ordinances, such as the one in Johnson v. Athens-Clarke County, run through the same questions.
A limit must sit in the enactment itself to do any good. Chicago's police department had issued a general order confining enforcement to designated areas, but the Court agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court that this did not cure the “vast amount of discretion” the ordinance gave the police. Internal rules would give no defense to a loiterer arrested elsewhere in the city. A person who knowingly loitered with a well-known gang member could not safely assume that no dispersal order would come, however innocent and harmless the loitering.12 A knowledge element is no better as a general repair. Scienter, at least as traditionally defined, cannot cure vagueness in a statute or regulation. Justice Jackson made that point in dissent when the Court sustained an indictment because the statute punished only knowing violations of a regulation.13
A redraft need not be mathematically precise. Anti-noise ordinances are often upheld when they prohibit disturbances that “unreasonably” bother other persons. In City of Farmington v. Wilkins, the court upheld an ordinance making it a misdemeanor to create unreasonably loud, disturbing, or unnecessary noise detrimental to the repose, life, or health of others, even though the ordinance never mentioned decibel levels.14 A drafter who has lost on vagueness can take from that decision that a reasonableness standard tied to harm to others is a workable formulation, though not a guaranteed one.