Concept
Press Clause in Context
Freedom of the press
Freedom of the Press
Press Clause in Context
The First Amendment protects against abridgment of the freedom of speech “or of the press,” and the second phrase raises a structural question that runs through everything that follows: does it give newspapers and broadcasters rights that an ordinary speaker lacks? Mostly the Court has said no. It has not accepted that the Press Clause carries a meaning independent of the Speech Clause.1 In the main, it has treated freedom of speech and freedom of the press as interchangeable terms.2 It has rejected claims for special press privileges and immunities that ordinary citizens do not enjoy,3 and it generally holds that the press is entitled to no special rights or protections under the First Amendment.4
Branzburg v. Hayes is the leading illustration. The reporters there claimed an exemption from grand jury subpoenas, arguing that if they were forced to identify their sources or disclose other confidences, informants would become reluctant to furnish newsworthy information in the future. The Court framed the sole issue as the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do. It observed that citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from such subpoenas, and that neither the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision protects the average citizen from disclosing to a grand jury information received in confidence.5 On this point, a reporter stands where other citizens stand.
Practical difficulty reinforces the refusal. The Court said that administering a constitutional newsman's privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Courts would have to define the categories of newsmen who qualify, and that task sits badly with the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press belongs to the lonely pamphleteer with a mimeograph as much as to the large metropolitan publisher.6 A press-only privilege would force the judiciary to draw that line.
Justice Stewart offered a different vision in a 1974 speech at Yale Law School. He argued that the primary purpose of the guarantee was to create a fourth institution outside the Government, an additional check on the three rival branches.7 In his account, the Free Press guarantee is a structural provision that protects an institution: the publishing business is the only organized private business given explicit constitutional protection, and if the guarantee meant no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy.8 The Court has generally taken the contrary view, and whether that reading adequately protects the public's need to be informed remains an open question.9
The same reasoning explains why the press has no special immunity from generally applicable laws. Branzburg repeated the Court's earlier statement that a newspaper publisher has no special immunity from the application of general laws and no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. On that principle, the Associated Press had to comply with the National Labor Relations Act. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling reaffirmed the holding by rejecting a newspaper's claim that applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to its business would abridge freedom of the press.10 The First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burden on the press that results from enforcing civil or criminal statutes of general applicability, and otherwise valid laws serving substantial public interests may be enforced against the press as against others. Branzburg also marked the boundary of its reasoning: the cases it relied on involved no prior restraint, no restriction on what the press may publish, and no command to publish what the press prefers to withhold.11
A law that singles out the press fares worse. Laws that treat the press differently receive stricter judicial scrutiny.12 In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, a special state use tax fell solely on the paper and ink used in publishing. The Court held it invalid absent a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that the state could not achieve without differential taxation, even though the press otherwise enjoyed favored tax treatment.13 The contrast with the labor statutes is the lesson. Those statutes covered publishers along with other employers, while the tax covered only publishers.
None of this leaves the press without constitutional protection. The press enjoys special constitutional protection as the eyes and ears, the surrogate, of the public on matters of public interest. The Court has shielded it against prior restraints, as in the Pentagon Papers case and Nebraska Press, and against post hoc burdens on publication, as in New York Times v. Sullivan, a defamation case.14 Even Branzburg did not deny that newsgathering qualifies for First Amendment protection, since without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.15 The sections that follow trace how these two ideas play out: limits on liability for what the press publishes, protection for gathering news and keeping sources confidential, access to government proceedings, and the conflict between press freedom and fair trials.