Concept
The Sullivan Rule
Freedom of the press
The Sullivan Rule
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan turned libel into a constitutional subject. The Court held that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood about his official conduct unless he proves actual malice: that the defendant published the statement knowing it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false.1 The rule overturned a settled understanding. Before the 1960s the First Amendment was generally thought irrelevant to libel. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire had placed libel among the utterances that are “no essential part in the exposition of ideas,” and Beauharnais v. Illinois upheld a group libel law because libelous utterances are not “within the area of constitutionally protected speech.” At common law the plaintiff proved only that the defendant published a defamatory statement about her. Fault was irrelevant, falsity was presumed, and truth was an affirmative defense; only a limited conditional privilege protected critical social commentary.2
The case began with a New York Times advertisement that criticized Montgomery’s agencies and officials. Sullivan, the city commissioner who supervised the police, sued even though the advertisement made no reference to him by name or official position.3 Alabama’s courts allowed the jury to find the statements “of and concerning” him on the theory that the average person knows municipal agents such as police are under the control of the city governing body, and more particularly of a single commissioner, so that criticism of the group attaches to the official in complete control.4
Alabama libel law then left the defendants little room. Once the statements were held libelous per se, the defendant had no defense as to stated facts unless he persuaded the jury that they were true in all their particulars.5 General damages were presumed and could be awarded without proof of pecuniary injury. Actual malice was apparently a prerequisite only to punitive damages, and good motives and belief in truth did not negate an inference of malice.6 The jury awarded $500,000, the full amount claimed, against all the petitioners, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.7 In sustaining the size of the verdict, that court inferred malice from three facts: the Times printed the advertisement although its own files held articles that would have shown the allegations false; it retracted for the Governor but not for Sullivan; and its Secretary testified that, apart from the statement that the dining hall was padlocked, he thought the two paragraphs substantially correct.8
The Supreme Court reversed, but it first had to clear two threshold objections. The first was that a civil suit between private parties escapes constitutional scrutiny. The Court answered that the Alabama courts had applied a state rule of law, and that the test is not the form in which state power is applied but whether it has in fact been exercised.9 The second was that libel lies outside the First Amendment, a view that Chaplinsky and Beauharnais seemed to support.10 The Court refused to give the epithet “libel” any more weight than other “mere labels” of state law. Like insurrection, contempt, obscenity, and the other formulae for repressing expression, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations and must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.11
With those objections gone, the Court set the case against a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” and that it may include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.12 The Sedition Act of 1798 supplied the historical test. It punished false, scandalous, and malicious writing intended to defame the government, Congress, or the President, or to bring them into contempt or disrepute. It allowed a defense of truth and made the jury judge of both law and fact. Despite those qualifications, it was vigorously condemned as unconstitutional by Jefferson and Madison, and Virginia’s General Assembly resolved against it in the Virginia Resolutions of 1798.13
The truth defense does not rescue Alabama’s rule either. A rule that makes the critic prove every factual particular deters would-be critics of official conduct from speaking, even when they believe their criticism true and even when it is in fact true, because they doubt they can prove it in court or fear the expense of trying. Such critics tend to make only statements that “steer far wider of the unlawful zone,” and the rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.14 The Court drew an analogy to the bookseller held criminally liable without knowledge of a book’s contents. He will restrict his stock to what he has inspected, and the public’s access to reading matter shrinks with it.15
The Court’s remedy was a qualified privilege for the citizen-critic, built on the immunity the law already gave officials. It is as much the citizen’s duty to criticize as the official’s duty to administer, and, as Madison said, “the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.” Without a fair equivalent of the officials’ immunity, public servants would enjoy an unjustified preference over the public they serve.16 State courts had divided on a related question. Most limited the fair-comment privilege to opinion and left false statements of fact unprotected, while a minority, led by Coleman v. MacLennan, extended the privilege to false factual statements made in good faith.17 Justices Black and Goldberg, in separate concurrences, would have gone further and granted an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct.18 The majority chose a qualified privilege deliberately.
The line it drew falls at knowing or reckless falsehood. The Court named the standard actual malice, but the name misleads: the standard has nothing to do with malice as the word is commonly understood. It asks only whether the publisher knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded the truth.19 Because negligence does not suffice, honest error about an official’s conduct falls outside liability.20 The next section takes up what the plaintiff must show to meet the standard.
Applied to the record, the rule defeated the judgment. The proof of actual malice lacked the convincing clarity the constitutional standard demands.21 The evidence against the Times supported at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, which is constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness that actual malice requires.22 Later decisions confirm how demanding the showing is. In Masson v. New Yorker, the Court held that even the intentional fabrication of quotations does not by itself prove actual malice if the statements were substantially accurate in reflecting what was said.23
The Court also rested reversal on a second, independent ground. The evidence was incapable of supporting the jury’s finding that the statements were made “of and concerning” Sullivan, because the advertisement contained no reference to him by name or official position and the state relied solely on the bare fact of his official position.24 The First Amendment forbids turning an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations into a libel of the official responsible for those operations.25 The reason is structural. If criticism of a department counted as criticism of its head, every critic of government would risk a personal libel suit from whoever runs the office. This ground turns on whom the statement is about, while actual malice turns on what the publisher knew, so an official must clear both.
Alabama’s treatment of malice produced a third defect. Its rule let general damages be presumed from the libel per se label and let malice be inferred even where the defendant acted from good motives and believed the statement true.26 That approach cannot be squared with a requirement that the plaintiff prove the publisher’s knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.27 The trial judge also failed to instruct the jury to separate general from punitive damages, so the verdict may have been wholly one or the other. Because it was impossible to know, the judgment had to be reversed and the case remanded.28 For an official plaintiff the lesson is that proof of publication and of a defamatory falsehood does not carry the case. The official must supply evidence of the publisher’s state of mind, and the mere fact of publication cannot stand in for it.
A fact pattern that describes a false and damaging statement about a public official invites the conclusion that the official wins. Under the Alabama rule that conclusion would have been right, since falsity was effectively presumed and the defendant’s only answer was proof of truth in every particular.29 Under the Sullivan rule, falsity and injury to reputation only open the analysis; the dispositive question is what the publisher knew when it published. A second trap is reading actual malice in its everyday sense. Alabama treated good motives and honest belief in truth as irrelevant to an inference of malice, useful only to mitigate punitive damages. Under the constitutional rule spite is beside the point, and an honest belief in the truth counts against the plaintiff’s showing.30