Concept
Proving Actual Malice
Freedom of the press
Proving Actual Malice
Actual malice is the showing a public plaintiff must make before the First Amendment permits a libel judgment. A public official who sues over a defamatory falsehood about official conduct must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the statement was false and that the defendant published it with actual malice, meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.1 Public figures must make the same showing of actual malice.2 A plurality has carried the constitutional malice standard into defamation suits about matters of public concern, though not to an inaccurate credit report sent to a few subscribers, where presumed actual damages and punitive damages were recoverable without it.3 Later sections sort out which plaintiffs carry this burden. This one asks what the showing consists of and how courts hold plaintiffs to it.
The test is demanding because of the problem that produced Sullivan. A rule requiring a critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of every factual assertion would deter even true criticism, because speakers doubt whether they can prove their statements in court and fear the expense of trying. Critics would “steer far wider of the unlawful zone,” and the rule would dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate.4 A fault standard prevents that outcome only to the extent that plaintiffs find it hard to satisfy. If a false statement and a careless newsroom were enough, the old pressure would return under a new label.
Sullivan itself shows the standard working as a filter on the evidence. The advertisement was inaccurate in respects the Commissioner was permitted to prove: Dr. King's home had been bombed twice, but both bombings predated the Commissioner's tenure, and the police not only were not implicated but had made every effort to apprehend those responsible.5 The judgment fell anyway, because the evidence against the Times supported at most a finding of negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and the proof of actual malice lacked the convincing clarity the constitutional standard demands.6
Two questions organize the rest of the unit: what state of mind actual malice requires, and what proof and review the Constitution demands before a plaintiff can establish it.
Meaning of Actual Malice
Actual malice offers two routes to liability, and both run through the publisher's mind. The publisher either knew the statement was false when it ran or published it despite serious doubt about its truth.7 The label misleads, because ordinary usage and ordinary tort law take malice to mean ill will. Here the term is a term of art, a convenient shorthand for the standard of liability that must be met before a state may let officials recover for libel, and it differs from the common-law malice (personal ill will, or reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights) that state tort law uses to support punitive damages.8 The constitutional test asks about the publisher's attitude toward the truth of what it published, and its attitude toward the plaintiff does not count.9 Some plaintiffs need show only something like negligence, but an official or public figure must show knowing or reckless falsehood, and in neither case does motive determine fault.10
Ill will proves nothing about actual malice. A defendant cannot be liable to a public official or public figure on proof that it published because of ill will toward the plaintiff or a desire to cause harm.11 Garrison v. Louisiana held that expression remains protected even when the speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will, and the Court has repeated that a bad motive, though it may control tort liability in other areas of law, cannot decide liability for speech in public debate about public figures.12 Motive of any kind drops out for a related reason. A defendant's subjective motives do not matter so long as it believed it was publishing the truth, so a profit motive, which every commercial publisher shares, separates the knowing liar from the honest reporter no better than spite does.13 Critics of officials usually dislike them, and a test that treated dislike as proof of fault would punish the vigorous critic the rule exists to protect.
Reckless disregard is the harder phrase, because everyday speech uses reckless to mean careless. St. Amant v. Thompson gave the phrase a subjective meaning: the plaintiff must offer enough evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts about the truth of its publication.14 Garrison expressed the same idea as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.15 The measure is therefore what this publisher actually believed. Whether a prudent publisher would have investigated further is a negligence question, and negligence in failing to discover a misstatement falls short of the recklessness the standard requires.16 A prudence test would also revive the self-censorship Sullivan feared. A publisher cannot know in advance how a jury will judge whether it checked enough, so it would resolve every doubt by saying less, true statements included.17 A test tied to the publisher's own awareness gives a speaker a rule it can follow, because the speaker always knows whether it doubted its story.
Sullivan applies the test. The Times ran the advertisement without comparing it with news stories in its own files that contradicted some of its claims. The presence of those stories in the files did not show that the persons responsible for publication knew the advertisement was false, and those persons had relied on the sponsors' reputations and saw nothing in the advertisement that made it unacceptable. The evidence therefore showed at most negligence.18 Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton confirmed that mere proof of a failure to investigate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard. The publisher must act with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.19
Both scenes involve a skipped check, and the first reporter was hostile as well. What separates them is whether the publisher had reason to doubt the story and ran it anyway. Because a defendant rarely admits doubt, plaintiffs prove state of mind through circumstances, and the circumstances that count are the ones that show doubt. A thin or nonexistent investigation may support an inference that the publisher doubted its informant and did not want those doubts verified, but that inference standing alone is still not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. The case becomes much stronger where the publisher was aware of facts tending to discredit the informant's story and failed to pursue obvious leads.20
An exam stem that describes a sloppy newsroom, a hostile editor, and a paper hungry for readers invites the conclusion that actual malice exists. Each fact may be offered as circumstantial evidence, but none of them, standing alone, shows that the publisher entertained serious doubt: carelessness is negligence, hostility is irrelevant motive, and profit is shared by every publisher. The question to ask is whether the facts support an inference that the publisher actually doubted the story.
Altered quotations raise the same question in another form. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., Jeffrey Masson sued over quotations attributed to him, and the Court held that even the intentional fabrication of quotations is not enough, by itself, to prove actual malice if the statements were substantially accurate in reflecting what was said.21 The test looks to substance, not syntax.22 A writer who knows the words were polished for the page but still convey what the speaker meant has published nothing false that matters. A writer who puts a different and damaging meaning in the speaker's mouth stands on different ground, because the attribution is then false in substance.
How much proof of that state of mind a plaintiff must produce, and how closely appellate courts review a finding of it, is the subject of the next part.
Burden of Proof and Review
Sullivan wrote a standard of proof into the rule. After announcing that an official must prove actual malice, the Court examined the Alabama record and found that the proof lacked the convincing clarity the constitutional standard demands, so the judgment could not stand.24 The rule is now stated as a requirement of clear and convincing evidence of both falsity and actual malice.25 That intermediate standard asks for more than the preponderance of the evidence that governs most civil cases. The common law required no proof of falsity, fault, or actual damages, and the Constitution now requires each of them in some cases, so the burden on falsity returns in a later section.26
The height of the burden follows from the self-censorship problem. Evidence about state of mind leaves many close cases, and under a preponderance rule a plaintiff whose proof was only slightly better than the publisher's would win. A speaker who cannot predict how a jury will weigh a close case resolves the doubt by saying less, the same response the Court saw in critics who feared they could not prove their statements true in court.27 Clear and convincing evidence shifts the risk of error toward the plaintiff, so that a narrow edge produces no liability and an honest publisher can run a story it believes.
A demanding burden would mean little if the jury's verdict were the last word, so appellate courts review a finding of actual malice independently. Sullivan shows the method. The Court said its duty extends beyond elaborating constitutional principles to reviewing the evidence in proper cases to make certain those principles have been constitutionally applied, particularly where the question is whether a judgment has crossed the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech that may legitimately be regulated.28 On that review the Court found the evidence supported at most negligence in failing to discover the misstatements and was constitutionally insufficient to show the recklessness required.29 The Seventh Amendment's ban on re-examining facts tried by a jury did not stand in the way, because the ban does not prevent a court from deciding whether governing rules of federal law have been properly applied to the facts, and the Court will analyze the facts where a conclusion of law and a finding of fact are so intermingled that the federal question cannot otherwise be decided.30 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. later made independent judgment the general rule: appellate judges decide for themselves whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity, and they do not ask only whether the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous.
Three Justices concurring in Sullivan called actual malice, especially its recklessness element, “an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove,” and said it invites local jury bias.31 Their concern supplies a practical reason for scrutiny. A standard that is hard to apply is where a jury's hostility to a message could do the most harm, and the heightened burden together with appellate review checks that risk.
Independent review leaves one question to the jury, which is credibility. A jury that watched the witnesses is better placed to say whose account to believe, so its findings on that point stand unless clearly erroneous. The appellate court decides whether the facts so found add up to knowing or reckless falsehood. The split follows what each decision-maker is positioned to do.
The burden also shapes a case before trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. held that where the clear-and-convincing requirement applies, the judge deciding a summary judgment motion asks whether the evidence is such that a jury applying that standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant.32 The evidentiary burden thus defines what counts as a genuine dispute. If the judge asked only whether a jury could find actual malice by a preponderance, the heightened burden would protect a publisher only after trial, and the cost of defending a thin claim to verdict would itself chill speech, as the fear of the expense of proving truth did in Sullivan.33
The messages in the second scene are the kind of proof a plaintiff can reach only through discovery, which brings the last rule into view. Herbert v. Lando declined to recognize an editorial privilege that would bar pretrial discovery into actual malice.34 Actual malice turns on judgments about state of mind and on the journalistic process, so a plaintiff needs access to that information to carry the burden the Constitution imposes.35 A privilege that walled off editorial deliberations would remove the best evidence of what the publisher believed. Combined with a convincing-clarity burden, it would approach the absolute protection that the concurring Justices in Sullivan urged and the majority did not adopt.36
An exam stem that reports a jury verdict for the plaintiff, supported by testimony about the publisher's ill will, invites the answer that the judgment stands. The better analysis asks whether the evidence reaches convincing clarity on the publisher's awareness of falsity. The appellate court decides that question independently and defers only on credibility. A stem in which the plaintiff's evidence is somewhat better than even odds but short of clear and convincing supports summary judgment for the defendant. A stem in which a broadcaster invokes an editorial privilege to avoid a deposition about its state of mind reaches the opposite result, because the plaintiff may probe.