Concept
Dale and Judicial Deference
Freedom of association
Dale and Judicial Deference
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme Court held by a vote of five to four that New Jersey could not apply its public accommodations law to make the Boy Scouts keep an openly gay man as an assistant scoutmaster. Forced retention, the majority reasoned, would significantly burden the Scouts' expressive association, and the state's interest in ending discrimination did not justify that burden.1 Dale uses the sequence of questions that decided Roberts v. United States Jaycees: does the group engage in expression; would the unwanted person's presence significantly affect its ability to advocate public or private viewpoints; and only then, does the state's interest justify the intrusion?2 The Jaycees lost under that sequence and the Scouts won. The difference lies in how much of the group's own account of its message the Court was willing to accept.
James Dale joined the Cub Scouts at eight in 1978, became an Eagle Scout in 1988, and in 1989 won approval of his adult membership application and a post as assistant scoutmaster of Troop 73.3 At Rutgers University he acknowledged that he is gay and became copresident of the campus Lesbian/Gay Alliance. In July 1990 a newspaper published an interview with him about the need of gay teenagers for gay role models, along with his photograph and a caption naming his office.4 Later that month the Monmouth Council revoked his adult membership, and its executive, asked for a reason, replied that the Boy Scouts specifically forbid membership to homosexuals.5 Dale sued in 1992 under the New Jersey statute that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.6
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled for Dale. It held that the Boy Scouts is a place of public accommodation, that no express exemption covered it, and that revoking Dale's membership violated the statute, and it then rejected the organization's federal defenses.7 It found no intimate association, because the Scouts are large, nonselective, and open to nonmembers at meetings. It accepted that the Scouts express a belief in moral values but doubted that members share a goal of preserving the view that homosexuality is immoral, so it concluded that Dale's membership would not significantly affect the members' ability to carry out their purposes. It also found New Jersey's interest in eliminating discrimination compelling.8 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, reversed.9 Four Justices dissented in an opinion by Justice Stevens.10
Dale follows Roberts through its early steps, since both cases ask whether the group engages in expression and whether forced inclusion would burden it before the state's interest is weighed. The departure comes at the burden step, where the Court accepted the Scouts' own account of what they stand for. In Roberts the claimed burden was slight, so the group's assertion carried little weight. In Dale the continued presence of a publicly avowed gay leader was held to send a message of approval that the Scouts rejected, and the outcome therefore sits closer to Hurley than to Roberts.11 The question running through the four sections below is how much of an organization's description of its own message a court should accept when the organization says forced inclusion would impair it. The majority accepted a great deal, and the dissenters thought it accepted too much.12
Is the Group Expressive?
A court deciding whether a group may invoke expressive association must first ask whether the group engages in expression at all. The protection, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “is not reserved for advocacy groups,” but “a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private.”13 The requirement follows from how the right is derived. The First Amendment protects association as the implied counterpart of the activities it names, so the right reaches only groups that carry on some of those activities, and a group that carries on none has no expression for forced membership to disturb.14
The Scouts cleared the threshold on a record the Court reviewed for itself. Because the ultimate conclusions of law in a First Amendment case are virtually inseparable from findings of fact, the Court independently reviewed the factual record instead of deferring to the state court.15 The record showed an organization whose mission is to instill values in young people, values the Scouts say rest on the Scout Oath and Law. Adult leaders carry out that mission by spending time with youth members in camping, archery, fishing, and similar activities, and while they do, scoutmasters and assistant scoutmasters teach the Scouts' values both expressly and by example.16 To the Court it “seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity.”17 Camping and archery carry no message in themselves. They become expressive when the adults leading them mean to develop good morals and a desire for self-improvement, a point the Court drew from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts.18
The New Jersey court went wrong by asking about purpose. It found that Scout members do not associate for the purpose of spreading the belief that homosexuality is immoral, and it treated that finding as proof that forced inclusion would not impair the Scouts' message. The Court answered that associations need not associate for the “purpose” of disseminating a certain message to earn First Amendment protection. An association “must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired.”19 The parade in Hurley shows the point, since its purpose was not to espouse any view about sexual orientation, yet the organizers could exclude certain participants anyway.20 The two questions differ in practice. A purpose inquiry asks what the group is for, and many groups exist for recreation, service, or fellowship while they transmit values along the way. An expressive-activity inquiry asks what the group does that a change in membership could distort, which is the harm the right exists to prevent.
The state court's other findings fared no better. It reasoned that the Scouts discourage leaders from voicing views on sexual issues and that some sponsors and members hold different views about homosexuality.21 On the first finding, the Court said that even if the Scouts do discourage leaders from addressing the subject, a fact the Scouts disputed with contrary evidence, the First Amendment protects their method of expression. A preference that leaders avoid questions of sexuality and teach only by example does not negate the sincerity of the belief.22 The Court answered the finding about dissenting members at the burden step, which the next section covers. A group, then, need not announce its view at every opportunity. Silence on a subject is itself a choice about message, and a test that withdrew protection whenever leaders stayed quiet would penalize a group for teaching by example.
Nor must every activity of the group be expressive. The Scouts spend much of their time on camping and archery, which carry no message in themselves, yet the Court protected the group's choice of leaders because a leader's conduct could significantly impede the message the Scouts teach.23 The inquiry targets the part of the group's work that carries values, and the recreational surface of the program does not defeat the claim.
Clearing this step wins nothing by itself. It opens the next question, whether the unwanted person's presence would significantly affect the group's ability to advocate its viewpoints. The Jaycees in Roberts show the point: they also engaged in expression, and they still lost.
Significant Burden and Deference
Once the Scouts cleared the threshold, the Court asked whether forcing them to keep James Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly affect their ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. Answering required a limited look at what the Scouts believe about homosexuality.25 The Scouts said they teach that homosexual conduct is not morally straight and do not want to promote it as a legitimate form of behavior. The Court's response was short: “We accept the Boy Scouts' assertion.”26 It added that it need not inquire further into the nature of the Scouts' expression on the subject. Every later step rests on that acceptance, which is why Dale is a case about deference as much as about association.
The Court used the record only to test sincerity. A 1978 position statement, signed by the Scouts' president and chief executive, set out the organization's “official position” on “homosexuality and Scouting.”27 A 1991 statement called homosexual conduct inconsistent with the Oath's requirement that a Scout be morally straight and the Law's requirement that a Scout be clean in word and deed. A 1993 statement said the Scouts do not register avowed homosexuals as members or leaders, and the organization had taken the same position in earlier litigation in California.28 From that history the Court concluded that it could not doubt that the Scouts sincerely hold the view.29 A sincerity inquiry asks only whether the group actually holds the belief it describes. A position stated consistently over years met that test, whatever its wisdom or its fit with the group's founding documents.
The Court declined to look behind that position for a second reason. The Scout Oath and Law do not mention sexuality, and the terms “morally straight” and “clean” do not define themselves. Some people would say homosexual conduct is compatible with both; the Scouts say it is not.30 The New Jersey Supreme Court had treated that ambiguity, together with the Scouts' commitment to a diverse and representative membership, as showing that excluding members like Dale appeared antithetical to the organization's goals. The Court answered that its cases reject this sort of inquiry. It is not the role of courts to reject a group's expressed values because they disagree with those values or find them internally inconsistent.31 A court that sorted groups by whether their positions follow from their own founding texts would be deciding which messages are coherent enough to deserve protection, and the First Amendment gives a judge no such authority. When an oath is ambiguous, the group's reading is one reading among others, and the court has no basis for preferring its own.
The Court extended the same deference to the other half of the burden question, which asks what would damage the message once the message is known. “As we give deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature of its expression,” the Court said, “we must also give deference to an association's view of what would impair its expression.”32 The group knows best how its message is received and what would blur it, and a court that substituted its own judgment would again decide for the group what its expression means. The Court relied on an earlier ruling that neither a state nor a court may substitute its own judgment for a political party's on what burdens the party's associational rights.33
The deference has a stated limit. An expressive association cannot “erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its message.”34 Without that limit the right would swallow public accommodations laws, since every group that wished to exclude could recite the formula, and a court bound to accept it would have nothing left to decide. The limit also squares with the earlier membership cases. In Roberts and the Rotary Club case the Court recognized that states have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women in public accommodations, and it found that enforcing the statutes would not materially interfere with the ideas the organizations sought to express.35
Dale himself separated the Scouts from a bare assertion. By his own admission he was one of a group of gay Scouts who have become leaders in their community and are open and honest about their sexual orientation, and he had been copresident of a gay and lesbian organization at college.36 The Court concluded that his presence in the Boy Scouts would, “at the very least,” force the organization to send a message, both to its youth members and to the world, that the Scouts accept homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.37 His role mattered because scoutmasters and assistant scoutmasters teach the Scouts' values both expressly and by example, so a leader's public identity and conduct are part of how the organization communicates.38
The Court drew the comparison to Hurley. There the parade organizers did not wish to exclude the gay, lesbian, and bisexual marchers because of their sexual orientations, but because the marchers wanted to march behind their own banner.39 As the marchers' presence would have interfered with the organizers' choice not to propound a particular point of view, so Dale's presence as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Scouts' choice not to propound a point of view contrary to their beliefs.40 Whether his presence actually communicated any such message is where the dissent attacks the majority, and the last section of this part returns to it.
Dale argued that the Scouts do not revoke the membership of heterosexual leaders who openly disagree with the organization's policy. The Court said that if this is true, it is irrelevant. The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing with Scouts policy, and the Scouts have a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not the other.41 The same reasoning answers the objection that members and sponsors hold different views. The First Amendment does not require every member of a group to agree on every issue, an official position suffices, and an organization that tolerates dissent or does not trumpet its views from the housetops keeps protection for them.42 What separates the two leaders is what each one's presence communicates. The avowed activist would communicate acceptance of the conduct the group condemns, and the dissenting leader would communicate only disagreement with a policy.
The deference is the part of the decision that drew the most criticism. The record contained significant evidence that opposition to homosexuality had not figured substantially in the Scouts' messaging, and the Court was unwilling to probe the national leadership's litigation position about the organization's views.43 Five years later, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, the Court seemed less willing to defer to an association's own assessment of its expressive needs, a case taken up in a later section.44
The third step carries the weight, because it is the only point where the group's account meets facts about an individual. Dale supplied those facts through an avowed identity, a record of activism, and a leadership uniform. The hypothetical volunteer who has said and done nothing supplies none.
Why the State Interest Loses
The last step in Dale weighs New Jersey's interest against the burden that applying its public accommodations law would place on the Scouts, and the Court held that the interest does not justify so severe an intrusion on their expressive association.47 The step comes only after the two before it. The Scouts had been found to engage in expressive activity, and keeping James Dale as an assistant scoutmaster had been found to affect that expression significantly. What remained was whether the law, as applied to require his retention, violates the freedom of expressive association.48 The earlier membership cases treated that question as a weighing, with the group's associational interest in freedom of expression on one side of the scale and the State's interest on the other.49 Dale follows the same method. What changes the result is how heavy the burden proved to be.
The State's interest was real, and the Court did not say otherwise. Public accommodations laws began as protections against discrimination in places like inns and trains and have since grown to cover many more places. New Jersey's statute lists over 50 types of places, and the state supreme court applied it to a membership organization like the Boy Scouts without tying the word “place” to a physical location.50 The Court had recognized in Roberts and in the Rotary Club case that states have a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women in public accommodations. That recognition did not decide those cases, because the Court went on to find that enforcement would not materially interfere with the ideas the groups sought to express. The Jaycees failed to demonstrate any serious burden on the male members' expressive association, and the evidence failed to show that admitting women would affect in any significant way the Rotary members' ability to carry out their purposes.51 Dale came out the other way because the burden finding came out the other way. The Court had already concluded that requiring the Scouts to retain Dale would significantly burden their right to oppose or disfavor homosexual conduct, and against a burden of that size the State's interest could not prevail.52
Severity controls because of what a public accommodations law is for. Such a law secures equal access to goods, services, and facilities, so when it merely adds members whose presence leaves the group's message intact, the group loses little and the State's purpose is served. When the order rearranges the group's own expression, the law stops opening doors and starts deciding what the group communicates. The Court tied the case to Hurley on exactly this ground. It said the analysis it applied to the parade is similar to the analysis it applied in Dale, although it had not explicitly deemed the parade an expressive association.53 Roberts permits an infringement on association when a regulation serves a compelling state interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.54 The Dale majority does not separately work through that last requirement. Once it found the intrusion severe, it treated the weighing as finished.
The Court also held inapplicable the intermediate standard of United States v. O'Brien. A law banning the destruction of draft cards only incidentally affects the free speech rights of those who happen to use a violation as a symbol of protest. New Jersey's public accommodations law, by contrast, “directly and immediately affects associational rights” that enjoy First Amendment protection.55
The dissent stressed that public attitudes toward homosexuality have shifted. The majority acknowledged that homosexuality appears to have gained greater societal acceptance but called that “scarcely an argument for denying First Amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these views.”56 The First Amendment protects expression of the popular variety or not, as Texas v. Johnson (flag burning) and Brandenburg v. Ohio (the advocacy of a Ku Klux Klan leader) show.57 An idea's growing acceptance is all the more reason to protect those who wish to voice a different view, because a freedom that shielded only approved messages would give dissenting groups nothing, and dissenters are the ones a majority wants to pressure. The Court also answered the dissent's appeal to Justice Brandeis. He was never a champion of state experimentation in suppressing free speech, and his First Amendment commentary supports the Court's opinion.58
The same point disposes of any argument that a court may side with the State because the Scouts' teaching is wrong. The Court said it was “not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether the Boy Scouts' teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong.” Public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's expression does not justify compelling the organization to accept members where acceptance would derogate from its message. In the words of Hurley, “[w]hile the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”59 Two mistakes recur in answers to this problem. One treats the State's compelling interest in ending discrimination as automatically decisive, when Roberts shows that it prevails only against a group that cannot show a serious burden on its expression. The other reads Dale as holding the State's interest illegitimate, when the Court held only that the interest cannot justify so severe an intrusion.
The Dissent's Objection
Four Justices dissented in Dale, and Justice Stevens's opinion attacks a step the majority took before it ever weighed New Jersey's interest. The majority had accepted the Scouts' assertion that they teach that homosexual conduct is not morally straight. Stevens objected that this acceptance rested on the organization's litigating posture, and that deciding whether a group's message is significantly affected by an antidiscrimination law requires the Court's own analysis, not deference to what a group says in its briefs.62 The tension is visible in the majority opinion itself. It insisted on independent review of the factual record, yet took the Scouts' account of their message on faith. The disagreement therefore concerns how far a court may look behind a group's account of its own message, and not whether the message is wise. Stevens said expressly that an organization may adopt the message of its choice and that it is not the Court's place to disagree with it, but the Court must inquire whether the group is in fact expressing a message and whether a state antidiscrimination law significantly affects that message.63
To give that inquiry a floor, Stevens proposed that an organization invoking expressive association as a defense must at least show that it has adopted and advocated an unequivocal position inconsistent with a position advocated or epitomized by the person it seeks to exclude.64 The test has two parts. The position must exist and be clear, and it must collide with what the excluded person stands for. The first part answers a sorting problem. If courts accept whatever position a group will assert in its briefs, nothing marks the boundary between a genuine exercise of the right and a sham claim meant to insulate ordinary discrimination, and a claim shielded from scrutiny would render civil rights legislation a nullity.65 Every group that wanted to exclude could recite the formula that admitting the unwanted person would muddle its message, so the formula can carry weight only if a court checks it against something outside the brief. The right, Stevens added, is implicit in the enumerated First Amendment freedoms. It is not a freedom to discriminate at will, a license to act on any discriminatory impulse, or a right to keep an exclusionary policy out of fear of the public's reaction to an open membership.66
Stevens drew his yardstick from the earlier membership cases. The Jaycees and the Rotary Club both engaged in expressive activity, both openly avowed exclusionary policies, and both could point to some connection between exclusion and their expression, yet both lost. In each case the question was whether admitting the excluded class would impose a serious burden on, or significantly affect, the group's shared goals or collective effort to foster beliefs.67 Applying that question to the Scouts meant asking what their shared goals actually were, and Stevens found the record nearly empty on the point. The Scouts' mission statement and federal charter, their membership policy, and the Oath and Law with their accompanying definitions all said nothing about homosexuality.68 The organization's own guidance told Scouts to take questions about sex to parents, religious leaders, and teachers, and told Scoutmasters not to instruct Scouts on sex and family life, because that was not Scouting's proper area.69 On that reading the Scouts were silent on homosexuality, so Dale's presence had no shared goal to burden.
The timing of the Scouts' position reinforced that reading. Since at least 1984 the organization had known of the issue, and it had cared enough to file two amicus briefs in the Supreme Court, in the Jaycees and Rotary Club cases. Yet for six years before Dale's expulsion it did nothing to explain how its exclusivity connected to its expression. Even afterward, the view of “morally straight” and “clean” that it adopted in its 1991 and 1992 policies never became part of the values taught through the Handbook or in lessons.70 In Stevens's view that silence spoke “volumes about the credibility” of the Scouts' claim to a shared goal.71 A shared goal is something members pursue together, which ordinarily shows in what a group tells its leaders and teaches its youth before anyone sues. A position that first appears in litigation looks more like a litigating position than a shared goal.
The dissent also denied that Hurley, the parade case on which the majority leaned, controlled the result. Stevens found three differences, each going to whether a protected message was actually being forced on the host:
- In Hurley the contingent itself conveyed a message, because the marchers had formed to make a point about gay pride, distributed a fact sheet, and marched behind a banner. Dale carried no banner or sign, distributed nothing, and expressed no intent to send any message, so any message arose from the mere act of joining, which is not symbolic speech.72
- In Hurley spectators would likely perceive the contingent's message as the organizers' own. An organization that has welcomed over 87 million young Americans is not understood to endorse the views of every adult member, and nothing in the record showed that the Scouts in Dale's troop, or their families, even knew his sexual orientation.73
- Hurley involved the organizers' claim to control the content of their message at a particular time and place, while an expressive association claim normally involves the avowal and advocacy of a consistent position over time. That calls for a different kind of scrutiny, so that the right does not become a right to discriminate whenever a group can think of an expressive object inconsistent with someone's membership or leadership.74
The dissent pressed the point to its logical end. If joining a group were symbolic speech attributable to the group, and the group could exclude that speech, then free speech would become a limitless right to exclude for every organization, whether or not it engaged in any expressive activity. “That cannot be, and never has been, the law.”75 Stevens added that the only apparent explanation for the majority's holding was that gay people are so different from everyone else that their presence alone deserves special First Amendment treatment.76
Stevens did not deny the Scouts control over what they teach. They can advise Scouts with questions about sex to talk with parents, religious leaders, or teachers, and they can direct Scoutmasters not to instruct on the subject. Dale's right to advocate his beliefs in a public forum or a private debate does not include a right to advocate them while he is serving as a Scoutmaster, and the Scouts cannot be compelled to include a message about homosexuality among the values they choose to teach, if they would prefer to remain silent on that subject.77 The objection therefore targets the deference. A group that wants silence on a subject can have it. What the dissent resisted was letting a group claim a message it had never advanced and then invoke that claimed message to exclude.
Justice Souter wrote separately and made the same point in his own terms. He concluded that the Scouts had not made out an expressive association claim, because they had not made sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal advocacy through the channels they customarily use to state their message. He stressed that the popularity or progressiveness of a group's views is irrelevant to the right.78 Requiring less, he warned, and allowing an exemption from a public accommodations statute based on any individual's difference from an alleged group ideal, however expressed and however inconsistently claimed, would turn the right of expressive association into an easy trump of any antidiscrimination law.79 He also marked the limit of the objection. A group that meets Stevens's conditions might prevail, because an individual can become so identified with a position as to epitomize it publicly, and requiring the group to accept that person in a position of leadership could so modify, muddle, or frustrate its advocacy as to violate the associational right.80
The dissenting approach works as a filter on the claimed message, and the two leagues show where it sorts. The first league passes because its position predates the dispute and appears in what it teaches. The second fails for the reason Stevens gave in Dale, where the Scouts' stated view had not been made part of the values actually instilled through the Handbook, lessons, or otherwise.81
The majority recognized a limit of its own: an expressive association cannot erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that accepting a member from a particular group would impair its message.82 The dissent's reply is that this limit has nothing to hold onto unless a court tests the assertion against the group's teaching, history, and customary channels, since a court that declines to probe a litigating position cannot tell the shield from the genuine claim. The Court's later decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, taken up in a later section, can be read as a partial answer. There the Court measured a claimed associational injury against who the supposed associates actually were and found it implausible.83 A common error is to describe the dissent as saying that the Scouts' views were wrong or that the State's interest automatically defeats any group. The dissent accepted that an organization may adopt any message, and it left room for a group with a clear position and a leader who epitomizes the opposite one to prevail.