Concept
Comparing Roberts and Dale
Freedom of association
Comparing Roberts and Dale
Roberts v. United States Jaycees and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale apply one framework and reach opposite results, so the useful question is which facts moved the answer. The framework holds that a state's compelling interest in stopping discrimination justifies interfering with associational freedom.1 The exception arises when forced inclusion would severely intrude on a group's expressive association, and then the group's right prevails over equality interests.2 In Roberts, the Court found no basis in the record for concluding that admitting women as full voting members would impede the Jaycees' protected activities or the dissemination of their views.3 In Dale, the Court held that an expressive association need not place in a leadership position a member who openly opposes its message.4 Everything therefore depends on what each group could show about the burden.
The cases diverge on the group's side of the scale, and a reader arriving from the compelled-disclosure cases will recognize the structure. There, a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest cannot justify a significant encroachment on First Amendment rights; the state's interests must survive exacting scrutiny and bear a substantial relation to the information demanded.5 The group, for its part, need show only a reasonable probability that disclosure will expose its contributors to threats, harassment, or reprisals.6 Roberts and Dale speak of compelling interests where the disclosure cases speak of exacting scrutiny, but they too ask what the group has actually shown. The Jaycees showed generalizations. The Scouts showed more.
Intimate association gave the Jaycees no shelter. Apart from restrictions on gender and age, membership was completely unselective, and local chapters had several hundred members; the local chapters, which had the better claim to intimacy, had decided to admit women, and only the more impersonal national organization objected.7 The Jaycees' claim therefore rested on expression, as the Scouts' claim did, and three differences in the expressive showing explain the opposite results.
The first difference is the record on the group's message. Admitting women, the Roberts Court observed, required no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it left the organization free to exclude individuals whose ideologies or philosophies differed from those of its members.8 The Scouts, by contrast, had publicly expressed their views on homosexual conduct through assertions in earlier litigation, where they consistently took the position they asserted in Dale, and the Court said it could not doubt that they sincerely held that view.9 Where the statute left a creed untouched, forced inclusion had nothing to contradict. Where a long-asserted position existed, the Court saw a message that the applicant's presence could contradict.
The second difference is how much weight each Court gave the group's own account. The Jaycees claimed that women might take different attitudes on the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, and that the group's public positions would have a different effect if it were not a purely young men's association; the Court called this reliance on unsupported generalizations about the interests and perspectives of men and women.10 Dale announced that courts defer to an association's assertions about the nature of its expression and about what would impair it. It added that an expressive association cannot erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that accepting a member from a particular group would impair its message.11 The two statements reconcile once you ask what stands behind the assertion. The Jaycees offered a guess about how a class of people would think; the Scouts offered an established position and an individual who was open about his orientation. Critics press on the deference step. The Court was unwilling to probe the national leadership's litigation position, although there was significant evidence that opposition to homosexuality had not figured substantially in the organization's messaging, and it is that deference, more than the holding, that gave Dale the potential to undermine antidiscrimination laws.12
The third difference is who was to be included and in what role. Roberts concerned the admission of women as members. Hurley had already drawn the relevant line, observing that a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken by the club's existing members,13 and the parade sponsors there had no wish to exclude individual gay people but objected to an explicitly gay contingent.14 Dale looked to the individual. By his own admission, Dale was one of a group of gay Scouts who have become leaders in their community and are open and honest about their sexual orientation, and his presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, to its youth members and to the world, that it accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.15 That reasoning tied the burden to a particular person in a leadership position, which makes the holding narrow: an expressive association need not include in a leadership position a member who openly opposes its message, much as the government may discharge a policy-level employee because of political views contrary to his superiors'.16
Because Dale turned on what one person's presence would say, its nearest relative is Hurley, which Dale itself invoked as illustrative, and not Roberts.17 Hurley shows what follows once the burden is severe: having found a substantial intrusion on the parade's expressive rights, the Court ended its analysis without a glance at any state interest.18 The summary rule is the same. When expressive association is severely intruded upon, it prevails over equality interests, although the Court remains resistant to inflated claims about how expressive an association's activity really is.19 Neither result ranks equality above liberty or the reverse. The burden decided both.
Two hypotheticals show the pattern. A national civic club with unselective local chapters of several hundred members is ordered to admit women, and it claims only that women would take different positions on public issues, with nothing in the record showing that admission would change what it says. That is Roberts, and the order stands. A youth organization has long stated, in its public positions and in litigation, that avowed advocates of a contrary view are unsuitable leaders, and it is ordered to keep as a leader someone who publicly champions that contrary view. That is the shape of Dale, and the group's expressive association prevails. The common error is to carry either case away as a verdict on the abstract weight of the antidiscrimination interest. In Roberts the interest justified the law because the group showed no serious burden, and in Dale the burden on expression decided the case.
Dale leaves two limits unsettled. First, courts have not said to what extent some employees are more akin to members than to the recruiters involved in the Rumsfeld case. Second, they have not said whether government may condition funding for an expressive organization on compliance with antidiscrimination rules regarding members.20 Later sections take up both. For a later collision between an antidiscrimination law and a speech objection, see 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis.
The final sections turn from membership to money, where the objection comes from individuals who resist funding a group. In Janus, the Court held that requiring non-union members of a public-sector bargaining unit to pay an agency fee, a percentage of full union dues that supported collective bargaining, violated the First Amendment.21 The older rule had excused non-members from paying for the union's political and ideological positions, but the Court found the line between chargeable and non-chargeable expenditures impossible to draw with precision.22