Concept
Limits on Expressive Claims
Freedom of association
Limits on Expressive Claims
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale can look like a veto: any group that calls itself expressive may exclude whomever it likes, and antidiscrimination law must give way. Two later decisions show why that reading is wrong. In Dale the Court held that accepting a gay scout leader would have undermined the Scouts’ expressive message, which included opposition to homosexual conduct, and it applied strict scrutiny, which the government could not satisfy.1 Hurley, Dale, and Rumsfeld together make clear that the Court resists inflated claims about the expressive nature of associational activity. They also make clear that a private organization’s right of expressive association prevails over equality interests when it is severely intruded upon and no overriding compelling governmental interest is present.2
Rumsfeld v. FAIR is the clearest example of that resistance. Five years after Dale, the Court showed less willingness to defer to an association’s own account of its expressive needs. The law schools argued that giving military recruiters equal access impaired their expression by requiring them to associate with the recruiters, and the Court found that claimed associational interest implausible.3
FAIR indicates that Dale reaches only expressive organizations, as opposed to those serving other purposes such as commercial profit, and only “members,” as opposed to arm’s-length relationships.4 The second limit sorts cases by who is being added to the group. The Scouts were ordered to keep a leader inside their own organization. The law schools were ordered to admit recruiters who come to hire students and then leave, and the Court called that difference critical.5
A second variable is the form of the government’s pressure. In FAIR the statute took the form of a funding cutoff, but the Court made clear that a direct mandate would have been equally permissible, so the form of the pressure decided nothing there.6 FAIR left two questions open: to what extent employees count as members rather than outsiders, and whether government may condition funding to an expressive organization on compliance with antidiscrimination rules regarding members.7 The first subsection below works through FAIR. The second takes up the funding question in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where the form of the pressure does decide which test applies. Together they give two questions to put to any new expressive-association claim: who is being added to the group, and is the government commanding or conditioning?
Outsiders Are Not Members
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) marks the point at which the right of expressive association stops. The federal statute, the Solomon Amendment, required universities to give military recruiters equal access to campus, and it took the form of a funding cutoff. Law schools and law faculty challenged it because the military then followed a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy against homosexuality, and the schools said that hosting recruiters undermined their message of opposition to discrimination based on sexual orientation.8
The schools framed their objection in two ways: as compelled speech, on the model of Hurley, and as forced association, on the model of Dale. The Chief Justice rejected both.9 Because the statute was a funding cutoff, one might expect the funding form to matter. It did not, since the Court made clear that a direct mandate would have been equally permissible, and so the claims failed on their own terms.10 Whether government may condition funding on an expressive organization’s compliance with antidiscrimination rules about its members is a separate question, which FAIR left open and the next subsection takes up.
The compelled-speech claim fails because hosting recruiters is not the schools’ speech. Hurley turned on the expressive nature of a parade: because every participating unit affects the message the organizers convey, a law dictating that a particular group must be included alters the parade’s expressive content and violates the rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of its own message.11 Law schools do not speak when they host interviews and recruiting receptions. A school’s decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive, because schools facilitate recruiting to help students get jobs, and recruiting services lack the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or a newspaper’s editorial page. Accommodating a recruiter’s message is therefore not compelled speech, because the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere with any message of the school.12
No one would attribute the recruiters’ views to the schools either. The Chief Justice compared the situation to PruneYard, where the property owner remained free to disassociate himself from the speakers’ views and was not compelled to affirm any governmentally prescribed belief.13 Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the schools may say about the military’s policies.14
The schools also pointed to their own conduct toward the military, such as requiring military interviews to take place on the undergraduate campus, as expressive. The Court answered that those actions were expressive only because the schools accompanied them with speech explaining them. An observer who sees recruiters interviewing away from the law school cannot tell whether the school is voicing disapproval, has run out of interview rooms, or is accommodating the recruiters’ own preference. The expressive component comes from the accompanying speech, not from the conduct.15
The association claim is the heart of the case, and it fails for a different reason: the people the schools must accommodate are not members of anything. In the Court’s words, “Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the school’s expressive association. This distinction is critical.” The Solomon Amendment therefore does not force a law school “to accept members it does not desire.”16 The statute leaves the school’s membership and its message untouched, so a military recruiter’s mere presence on campus does not violate a law school’s right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the school considers the recruiter’s message.17
The contrast with Dale lies in who stands at the door. In Dale the Court accepted that admitting a gay scout leader would have undermined the Scouts’ message, which included opposition to homosexual conduct.18 The recruiters in FAIR sought to join nothing. They came to hire and would leave, and the Court treated that as the critical distinction between taking part in an enterprise from the inside and visiting it for a limited purpose.19 The result is the limit stated earlier: Dale protects expressive organizations rather than commercial ones, and members rather than arm’s-length relationships.20
FAIR also changed the Court’s posture toward an association’s own account of its message. Dale had credited the Scouts’ view of what would impair their expression, but five years later the Court was less willing to defer to an association’s assessment of its expressive needs and found the schools’ claimed interest implausible.21 The “shield” passage explains why. Just as saying conduct is undertaken for expressive purposes cannot make it symbolic speech, a speaker cannot “erect a shield” against laws requiring access “simply by asserting” that mere association “would impair its message.”22 If assertion alone were enough, any regulated group could defeat an access law by announcing that contact with outsiders would muddy its message.
The line between member and outsider is not mechanical. FAIR left open to what extent employees, or at least some employees, are more akin to members than to the recruiters in that case.23 A hired staff member, a volunteer leader, or a voting participant therefore presents a genuine question. The more the person resembles a member who works inside the enterprise and the less a visitor who comes for a discrete purpose and leaves, the closer the case lies to Dale.
The first two steps resolve the speech claim and the third resolves the association claim. A host whose activity is not inherently expressive and whose guests are outsiders loses both, as the law schools did. The Scouts prevailed because the person at issue was a leader inside an expressive enterprise, and admitting him would have altered the group’s own message.
Funding Conditions and Recognition
The preceding subsection left open whether government may condition funding to an expressive organization on compliance with antidiscrimination rules about its members.31 Christian Legal Society v. Martinez answered that question for one kind of program. By a vote of five to four, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court applied limited public forum analysis and held that Hastings Law School, a state law school, did not violate the First Amendment rights of the Christian Legal Society (CLS) when it denied the group’s application to become a Registered Student Organization (RSO).32 The line the opinion drew is the one to remember: “The First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization’s expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity.”33
RSO status gave a student organization university recognition, which entitled it to university funds and other benefits.34 CLS limited membership to those who accepted Jesus Christ as Savior, practiced celibacy before marriage, and did not engage in homosexual activity. It could not satisfy the school’s all-comers policy, and Hastings denied its application.35 CLS argued that the policy impaired its rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion by prompting it, “on pain of relinquishing the advantages of recognition,” to accept members who did not share its core beliefs about religion and sexual orientation.36 It relied on Dale, contending that protecting its message as an evangelical Christian group required it to reserve membership and leadership to individuals who signed a prescribed statement of Christian faith and agreed not to engage in sexual activity outside traditional marriage.37
The Court decided the case on the policy as the parties had stipulated it. Both lower courts focused on the constitutionality of the all-comers requirement as described in the parties’ joint stipulation, and the Court rejected CLS’s “unseemly attempt to escape from the stipulation and shift its target to Hastings’ policy as written.”38 The opinion therefore considers only whether conditioning access to a student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers policy violates the Constitution.39 A reader who takes the case to approve any nondiscrimination rule a school might write has read more into it than the Court decided.
CLS’s claim sat between two lines of precedent that call for different tests. The forum cases recognize a State’s right “to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,” and they permit restrictions on access to a limited public forum, like the RSO program, so long as any access barrier is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.40 Traditional and designated public forums, by contrast, receive strict scrutiny.41 The association cases rigorously review laws and regulations that constrain associational freedom. In the public-accommodations context they permit restrictions only if the restrictions serve “compelling state interests” that are “unrelated to the suppression of ideas” and cannot be advanced through significantly less restrictive means.42
The Court placed Hastings’s program in the first line. It distinguished Dale on the ground that Hastings was not demanding, by regulation, that CLS include unwanted students. In offering potential access to a limited public forum, Hastings was “dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition.”43 The mechanism explains the distinction. A regulation that forces a group to take in unwanted members decides by command who belongs to the group. A condition on a benefit leaves that decision with the group, which must choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition.44 CLS, the Court emphasized, sought not parity with other organizations but a preferential exemption from Hastings’s policy.45
Because the policy came as a condition and not a prohibition, it did not trigger strict scrutiny and was subject only to a deferential test of minimal reasonableness. It applied to all groups, religious or otherwise, whatever their message or perspective, so the Court called it “textbook viewpoint neutral.”46 The Court held that compliance with the all-comers policy is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum.47 From Hastings’s perspective, CLS sought special dispensation from an across-the-board open-access requirement designed to further the reasonable educational purposes of the school’s student-organization program.48
Choosing the forum test does not make an indirect condition immune from challenge. Any access barrier must still be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and that is where the dissenters fought.49 Four Justices dissented. They argued that the stipulated purpose of the RSO forum was to promote viewpoint diversity among registered student organizations and not within them. They also argued that the all-comers policy was not viewpoint neutral, because it allows expressive association for every student group except those formed to express a particular religious message. A group forced to accept members whose status or beliefs run counter to its own, they said, loses its right to expressive association, and the only time Hastings had applied the policy was to a religious group. That, in their view, was viewpoint discrimination on the basis of religion.50 The two sides read the same policy differently. The majority looked at the text of the stipulated rule, which reached every group. The dissent looked at who had actually felt it.
The first step decides which test governs, so it is where a problem is usually won or lost. A statute or order that fines a group or compels it to admit unwanted members calls for the close scrutiny applied in Dale. A school or agency offering recognition, funds, or facilities on an all-comers condition faces only the reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality test. The Court left Dale where it was, distinguishing it on the ground that Hastings was not demanding, by regulation, that CLS include unwanted students.56 Reading the case as overruling Dale is therefore a mistake, and so is reading it as approving every indirect condition, since any access barrier must still be viewpoint neutral.
The next section turns from forced membership and conditioned benefits to compelled payment. In Janus, the Court held that requiring non-union members of a public-sector union’s unit to pay an agency fee, a percentage of full union dues that went to the union’s collective bargaining, violated the First Amendment, because the line between chargeable and non-chargeable expenditures had proven impossible to draw with precision.59