Concept
The Objective Test of Assent
Manifestation of mutual assent and intent to be bound
The Objective Test of Assent
A court decides whether parties assented by asking what their words and conduct would reasonably mean to a person in the other party's position, and it does not ask what either party privately thought.1 A subjective test would look instead to what each party believed it was agreeing to. The objective test looks to the reasonable perception of intent conveyed by the party's words or actions.2 The Restatement's definition of a promise is built the same way: a promise is a manifestation of intention "so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made," and the definition never asks about the promisor's unexpressed state of mind.3
Some opinions still say that a contract requires a "meeting of the minds." Read literally, the phrase misleads, because the mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the formation of a contract.4 Mutual assent is judged from the parties' outward expressions, not from any secret or unexpressed intention,5 and the minds are treated as having met when those expressions lead a reasonable person to find agreement.
The test rests on reliance. If no one could count on words or conduct that indicate assent, no one could have confidence in the system of commercial exchange.6 A person must therefore answer for behavior that signifies assent and cannot escape a contractual commitment merely by claiming that assent was not intended. Otherwise one party could disappoint the other's reasonable expectations with a self-serving, unverifiable assertion that the manifested intent was not the real one.7
Lucy v. Zehmer is the classic illustration. On December 20, 1952, A. H. Zehmer and his wife, Ida S. Zehmer, signed a writing to sell the Ferguson farm to W. O. Lucy.9 The Zehmers later insisted the whole thing was a joke, but the writing had been under discussion for forty minutes or more. Lucy objected that the first draft was written in the singular and wanted Mrs. Zehmer to sign as well, so it was rewritten and she signed. The parties discussed what the sale would include, the instrument provided for examination of the title, and Lucy took the writing with no request from either defendant that he give it back.10 Lucy put it in his pocket and offered Zehmer $5 to seal the bargain. Even on the defendants' own evidence, nothing had been said or done to suggest a joke until then.11
Lucy sought specific performance, an order that the Zehmers go through with the sale as originally agreed.12 That is the simplest remedy for protecting a plaintiff's expectation interest,13 though it is often unavailable in a contract action, sometimes because the defendant simply cannot perform what she promised.14 The case therefore turned on whether the Zehmers had assented, and the court looked at Lucy's conduct as well as theirs. Even if Zehmer was jesting, Lucy did not understand it that way. He treated the writing as a serious business transaction, binding on both sides. The next day he arranged for his brother to put up half the money and take a half interest in the land, and the day after he employed an attorney to examine the title. When Zehmer told him on Tuesday night that he would not sell, Lucy answered, "You know you sold that place fair and square," and once the attorney reported the title good, he wrote that he was ready to close.15
The governing principle was that mutual assent is judged from outward expression,16 so "a person cannot set up that he was merely jesting when his conduct and words would warrant a reasonable person in believing that he intended a real agreement."17 The Zehmers' jest never reached Lucy. Both testified that when Zehmer asked his wife to sign, he whispered that it was a joke so that Lucy would not hear.18 A reservation kept from the other side cannot change what a reasonable person would take from the writing. The rule the court applied states the limit: if a party's words or acts have but one reasonable meaning, his undisclosed intention is immaterial, unless the party attaches to them an unreasonable meaning that the other party knows.19
The same reasoning answers a party who says he meant something other than what his words conveyed. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co. applied it to an employer who denied that his reply to an employee's demand for a new contract was meant as one.
The reasonable person in the test stands in the other party's position. The recipient of a manifestation is charged with what a reasonable person would know and also with whatever that recipient knows or should know from superior knowledge.20 A party's intention is held to be what a reasonable person in the other party's position would conclude the manifestation meant. Other versions of the objective approach exist, along with some more modern subjective approaches, but this serves as the working test.21
Formation runs through the familiar two steps of offer and acceptance,22 and the objective test reads each manifestation along the way, including preliminary correspondence. In Lonergan v. Scolnick, Lonergan inquired about property Scolnick had advertised in a newspaper. Scolnick sent a letter describing the property and noting that it was a form letter, then wrote that Lonergan had identified the property correctly and would have to decide fast because Scolnick expected a buyer within a week or so. Lonergan replied on April 14 that he would proceed immediately to have escrow opened.23 Whether any of those letters manifested a commitment depends on what a reasonable person in the recipient's position would take them to mean, and a label like "form letter" is part of what that person reads.
Reasonable reading also decides what role a message plays. Maggie's email reply to Penny's announcement reads reasonably as an offer: it incorporates the announced terms except for a higher hourly rate and signals that Penny may conclude the contract by accepting.24 Penny's answer merely asks whether Maggie would be amenable to $13 an hour. It does not unequivocally reject Maggie's terms, so a reasonable reader could take it as negotiation that leaves acceptance open rather than as a counteroffer.25
Context can also tell a reasonable listener that no commitment is being made. Leonard v. PepsiCo held that a television commercial offering a Harrier jet could not reasonably be taken as a serious offer. The jest there was visible to everyone watching, while Zehmer's was hidden from the one person who mattered.
When both parties understand an exchange as a jest, no contract results, even if a third-party observer would conclude that both meant their promises seriously.27 Contracts students and professors strike "agreements" in class every day that create no rights, because both sides understand them as hypothetical. Neither side has been led to rely on a commitment.
Two limits keep the test from favoring the listener automatically. Conduct manifests assent only if the actor intends to engage in it and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer assent from it.28 And when the parties attach different meanings that are each reasonable, no objective reading prefers either one. In Raffles v. Wichelhaus, each party reasonably believed the agreement referred to a particular ship, and neither had reason to know of the other's contrary understanding. No objective criterion shows which ship was meant, a contract on reasonable terms cannot be established, and, assuming the delivery date was a material term, no contract came into being.29