Concept
Ways of Manifesting Assent
Manifestation of mutual assent and intent to be bound
Ways of Manifesting Assent
A contract does not need a spoken or signed “I agree.” Section 19 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts lets a party manifest assent wholly or partly by written or spoken words, by other acts, or by failure to act.1 The breadth follows from the objective test taught above. If assent is measured by what a party’s outward expression would reasonably mean to the other side, the form of the expression matters only to the extent that it carries that meaning. Assent can even arrive in pieces: a spoken sentence may be completed by a handshake, and a written order by shipping the goods, with neither piece carrying the whole message.
A rule this permissive needs limits, because the objective test puts the burden of interpretation on the observer, and an observer can read a commitment into almost any gesture. Section 19(2) supplies two. The actor must intend to engage in the conduct, and must know or have reason to know that the other party may infer assent from it.2 The first condition ties the signal to the actor’s own deliberate act. The second holds the actor to the reasonable reading of the conduct only where the actor could foresee that reading.
Section 19(3) then addresses a signal that outruns the signaler’s real state of mind. Conduct may manifest assent even though the actor does not in fact assent, and the resulting contract may be voidable (open to cancellation by the party who was wronged) because of fraud, duress, mistake, or another invalidating cause.3 A contract can form on externals, so a missing inner agreement does not by itself prevent formation; the law answers real defects through avoidance doctrines.
The three subsections thus ask what kinds of conduct can carry assent, when that conduct is effective, and what follows when it carries assent the actor never felt. The sections below take up the first question in two parts, words and acts and then failure to act. Each condition of § 19(2) then gets its own section, and the third question comes last.
Words and Acts
Written or spoken words and other acts sit side by side in § 19(1), with no ranking between them.4 The objective test explains why. A signal succeeds if a reasonable person would hear it as a commitment, and the channel that carried it is beside the point. Express words are the clearest signal, whether the speaker says “I agree” or signs a contract document. But assent may also occur through a nod of the head, a wink of the eye, or any other word, gesture, or action, depending on the circumstances.5
Commercial life runs on both channels. Customers sign delivery slips, sellers ship goods, and crews arrive and start work, often with no sentence of agreement spoken at any point. A rule that counted only formal words would defeat transactions of this kind. It would also reward the party who never says the words of agreement while acting exactly as though it had agreed, since that party could take the benefit of the dealing and then deny that it ever assented. Treating conduct as assent closes that exit. Spoken words carry the same force as written ones, so an oral acceptance is as much an acceptance as a signed one. Whether a particular contract must also be evidenced by a writing is a separate question, taught elsewhere.
Acts generate more disputes, because they leave the meaning to be inferred. Pauline leaves Jamal a voice mail offering to pay him $8,000 to paint her house by next week. Jamal never answers, but the next morning his crew arrives and starts painting. A reasonable person in Pauline’s position would read the crew’s arrival as an acceptance. Where, as is standard, the offer permits the offeree to accept merely by promising, “the beginning of the invited performance … is an acceptance,” because the conduct implicitly manifests an intent to accept and so promises to complete the work.6 The assent is equally effective whether it arrives in words or in conduct. The rules on when beginning performance operates as acceptance belong to the acceptance material.
An act must also respond to the offer. If an offeree begins performing before learning that an offer exists, some authorities deny recovery, because under the First Restatement “the whole consideration requested by an offer must be given after the offeree knows of the offer.”7 The more modern view holds it sufficient that the offeree completes performance with knowledge of the offer, on the theory that the offer’s inducing completion matches the parties’ “common understanding.”8 The question arises only for unilateral contracts, and the later section on assent by performance returns to it.9
Conduct can also show agreement to terms that the parties never discussed. One court, confronting parties who held “very very different views” about what transpired in their contract-formation discussions, explained that the parties need not share a subjective understanding of the terms; their conduct may indicate an agreement to them.10
The same reasoning governs electronic dealing, where the act is usually a click. Courts routinely find assent on apps and sites that require a user to scroll through the terms before clicking a button that says “I Agree” (“scrollwrap”), and a federal court enforced an arbitration agreement in Lyft’s terms of service on that kind of showing. Visibility matters even for a hyperlink. In the Second Circuit case, the user clicked a “REGISTER” button near the words “By creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service & Privacy Policy,” and the link to the terms was blue and underlined, which made it conspicuous enough to put the user on notice. In the First Circuit case, the Uber app’s link “was presented in a gray rectangular box in white bold text,” which the court held did not look like a hyperlink and so gave the user inadequate notice.11
An automatic response can be an act of assent too. Suppose a user proposes a booking on a website and a confirmation window appears at once. The window is likely an acceptance, because it can reasonably be read as unqualified assent to the proposed booking. The site’s owner had no conscious intent to accept at the moment the response went out, but a party can set up an “electronic agent” to act on its behalf, and the law will treat the program’s automatic response as an effective acceptance when it meets the standards the party predetermined.12
Terms that arrive after a contract has formed raise a different problem. As a general rule, one party cannot impose terms on the other by revealing them only after formation; such terms are usually treated as proposals to modify the contract, which the other party must accept after receiving notice. The exception covers terms that contracts of that type routinely carry and that the other party reasonably expected, since that party may have had reason to know of them and should have ascertained what they were.13 Terms printed on product packaging test the rule, as in Dye v. Tamko Building Products, Inc., which asked whether buyers who opened shingle bundles had assented to an arbitration provision on the wrapping. The answer turns on what the buyers were shown before they acted and on what buyers in that market would expect.
The instinct that loses points is to treat any act after an offer, or any use of a product or website, as assent. The rule asks what the act reasonably means, so an act that a reasonable person would not read as a commitment manifests nothing.
Website cases mark the same boundary. In Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., the retailer’s Terms of Use, including an arbitration clause, were reachable through a hyperlink at the bottom of every page, but the buyer was never prompted to acknowledge them and never clicked the link. The Ninth Circuit held that Barnes & Noble gave no reasonable notice of its terms, so Nguyen’s use of the site did not unambiguously manifest assent to arbitrate.14 The scrollwrap user and the Uber user were shown the terms and told that their act meant agreement. Nguyen was shown nothing of the kind. In each setting, conduct manifests assent when it reasonably communicates commitment, and in electronic dealing that turns on what the user was shown.
Failure to Act
Silence is the hardest signal to read. Section 19(1) adds a third channel to words and acts: a party may manifest assent wholly or partly by failure to act.16 Words and acts carry some content of their own, but a failure to act carries none, and the objective test still governs. The question is whether a reasonable person in the other party’s position would take the failure to act as a commitment. Usually the answer is no, and the exceptions make up the rest of this section.
Silence ordinarily suggests that a party does not want to contract. A person who says nothing to a proposal may be ignoring it, weighing it, or declining it without bothering to answer, and an observer has no basis for choosing among those readings. Decisions often recite that silence is not acceptance, but the recital applies the objective test: in the usual case a reasonable person would not believe the silent offeree intends to be bound.17 The rule also protects recipients. If silence counted as assent whenever a proposer wished it to, anyone could impose obligations on a stranger by mailing a proposal, and every recipient would have to answer every message to stay safe.
For the same reason, an offeror cannot turn silence into acceptance by announcing that it will be treated as one. A seller who mails a proposal declaring that the recipient is “deemed to have accepted” unless a notice of rejection arrives by Friday has created no duty to answer, and a recipient who says nothing has not assented. Pride v. Lewis applied that principle to a dispute that began with a buyer’s written offer for real property, backed by earnest money, and the owner’s counteroffer.18 The offeror controls only the offeror’s own words, and a statement written by one side cannot supply the manifestation that must come from the other.
Section 69 of the Restatement nonetheless recognizes three narrow situations in which an offeree’s silence and inaction operate as acceptance. Each gives a reasonable offeror a basis for reading quiet as consent, because without one there would be no objective basis for inferring assent.19 The detailed rules belong to the acceptance material; this section marks the pattern.
The first situation arises when the offeree takes the benefit of offered services with a reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that the offeror expected to be paid.20 A lawn service that has mowed a homeowner’s yard for several years without any formally accepted arrangement, and that has not heard back about mowing again this year, unloads its mowers one spring morning and starts on the grass while the homeowner watches from a window. The homeowner’s silence is an acceptance: the homeowner had reason to know the service expected payment and every chance to stop the crew.21 The contested cases turn on whether a reasonable person would think payment was expected.
The second situation arises when the offeror has stated, or has given the offeree reason to understand, that silence may manifest assent, and the offeree, in staying silent, actually intends to accept.22 The requirement of actual intent makes this exception very hard to prove, and it also reconciles the exception with the rule that an offeror cannot impose a duty to speak. The offeror’s statement supplies the opportunity, and the offeree’s own intent supplies the assent. Suppose A offers to sell B a car for $10,000 and adds that A will take silence past Tuesday as a yes. If B means to buy and says nothing past Tuesday, B has accepted. If B means to refuse and simply never answers, B has not.
The third situation arises when, because of previous dealings between the parties or otherwise, a reasonable person would expect the offeree to give notice of rejection.23 Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co. is the classic illustration. The plaintiff had sent skins to the defendant before and had been paid, and a later shipment sat with the defendant without a word of rejection. The court held that sending the skins imposed on the defendant a duty to act about them, and that silence coupled with keeping them for an unreasonable time could warrant the plaintiff in assuming they were accepted.24 The result changes if the sender has no history with the recipient. Federal law now treats mailing unordered goods as an unfair trade practice and lets the recipient keep them as a gift.25 A pattern of earlier transactions, a course of dealing, changes what a reasonable offeror expects. Because the offeree’s own pattern created that expectation, the question is what a reasonable offeror would conclude from the silence, and the offeree’s private state of mind drops out.26
Silence often travels with conduct. A rolling contract defers final assent until the buyer has had a chance to read the terms, and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg is the standard example. The license came inside the software box, appeared on the screen when the program ran, offered a refund to a buyer who found the terms unacceptable, and treated the buyer as accepting by using the software and keeping it. The Seventh Circuit held that supplying the software with the license was the offer and that the buyer accepted by using the software and failing to return it.27 The buyer’s inaction counted because it came after the terms were presented, with a real chance to reject. Terms first revealed after a contract has already formed are different: they are treated as proposals to modify that the other side must accept after notice.28 Either way, the question is whether the parties’ conduct indicates agreement, and a shared subjective understanding of the terms is not required.29
Every one of these exceptions has something in the facts beyond quiet: a benefit taken with a chance to refuse, an arrangement or actual intent that gave silence a meaning, a pattern of dealing that created an expectation of reply, or conduct that accompanied the silence. A fact pattern with nothing but quiet, together with the sender’s declaration that quiet will count, contains none of them.
Intent to Engage in Conduct
The first condition in § 19(2) is that the actor intend to engage in the conduct. Conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent unless the actor intends to engage in it and also knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer assent from it.31 Subsection (1) established that words, acts, and silence can all carry assent, and subsection (2) screens those signals with two prongs. This section takes the first prong, which looks at the actor’s relation to the conduct itself: was the signature, nod, or gesture something the actor chose to do? The second prong, which asks what the actor should have foreseen, follows in the next section.
Intent to do the act is a different thing from intent to make a contract. A person who signs a page, hands it across a table, or nods at a quoted price has intended the conduct whether or not that person grasped, or wanted, its legal effect. Under the objective theory the parties’ mental intentions are irrelevant, yet the acts that manifest assent must be done either intentionally or negligently, and to act intentionally means to intend the act, not necessarily to desire its consequences.32
A signer who never reads the document stands in the same position. The signing was deliberate, and the law can bind one who signs a record that the signer knows or should know is an offer.33 The same source gives a sharper example. B receives an offer, does not open it, and, to confuse A, sends back a letter saying “I accept.” There is a contract even though B did not know of the offer, because A, as a reasonable person, could rely on B’s promise.34 Automated responses fit this prong as well. A confirmation sent with no conscious decision at that moment can still be the owner’s acceptance, because the owner deliberately set up the program to respond on its behalf.35
The two halves of the formulation serve different purposes. Requiring intent to act ties accountability to choice: a person controls exposure to contractual liability by deciding whether to sign, speak, nod, or click. Dispensing with any need to intend the legal effect protects the other side. A party who relies on a deliberate signal sees only the signal, and excusing the actor because of an unspoken view of what the signal meant legally would let the actor disappoint that reliance by a self-serving and unverifiable assertion.36 If no one could rely on words or conduct that indicate assent, it would be hard for anyone to have confidence in commercial exchange, so a person must generally answer for behavior that signifies assent.37
Lucy v. Zehmer falls on the satisfied side of that line. After forty minutes or more of discussion, the writing was redone when Lucy objected that it was in the singular and wanted Mrs. Zehmer to sign too, Mrs. Zehmer signed it, and Lucy took it away with no request that he give it back.38 Every step was deliberate. The Zehmers defended on the ground that the whole affair was a jest, which disputes what the conduct meant and does not claim that anyone acted involuntarily. The court therefore looked to outward expression, since the law “imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.”39
The first prong bites when the actor can truthfully say that the movement was never the actor’s own choice.
The auctioneer saw conduct that looked like assent, and so did Lucy. What separates the cases is the actor’s relation to the conduct. Zehmer chose each act and quarreled only with its meaning, while the attendee chose nothing. The same sorting handles compulsion. A signer whose hand is pushed across the page by someone else’s strength has performed no act of signing. A signer who writes a name because of a threat has chosen to sign, however unwillingly, so the conduct is intended and the resulting contract may be voidable for duress under § 19(3), a defense taught later.40
The line also separates a mistaken act from an involuntary one. A party who prepares and signs a letter containing an offer, decides not to send it, and then mails it by mistake has still performed the act of mailing. The offer takes effect on receipt, so long as the recipient does not know of the sender’s lack of intent.41 The first prong asks whether the conduct was volitional, which is a different question from whether the actor meant this particular consequence.
Reason to Know of Inference
The second condition in § 19(2) asks what the actor could foresee. Intended conduct manifests assent only if the actor knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer assent from it.43 “Reason to know” makes the inquiry one of foresight. The actor need not have noticed that the other side would take the conduct as a commitment, so long as the facts the actor did know would have led a reasonable person in the actor’s position to expect that inference. This prong is the doctrinal footing of the jest cases, because “I was only joking” claims that the actor had no reason to expect the conduct to be heard as serious.
The first prong ties liability to the actor’s choice, and the second ties it to foresight, for a reason that concerns who can prevent a misunderstanding. An actor who knows or should know that the other side will treat an act as a commitment can dispel the mistake with a sentence such as “this is only a joke” or “I am not committing yet.” The other side sees only the surface of the conduct and cannot detect what the actor withholds. Leaving the risk of miscommunication with the actor who created the appearance of assent protects the reliance that the objective test exists to safeguard.44 The logic also runs the other way. An actor who behaves where no one could sensibly infer a commitment has created no appearance on which anyone could reasonably rely.
In Lucy v. Zehmer the facts left Zehmer every reason to know that Lucy would read the signed writing as a real sale. The terms were discussed for forty minutes or more, the writing was redone to meet Lucy’s objection, it provided for examination of the title, and Lucy took possession of it with no suggestion that he give it back. The court called these facts “persuasive evidence that the execution of the contract was a serious business transaction rather than a casual, jesting matter as defendants now contend.”45 The governing principle is that when a party’s words or acts have but one reasonable meaning, his undisclosed intention is immaterial, unless the unreasonable meaning he attaches to them is known to the other party.46 A private reservation that never reaches the other party leaves the reasonable meaning of the conduct untouched.
The same principle governs a private intent to revoke. Ann phones Art intending to revoke her offer, but a revocation takes effect only when that intent is manifested to the offeree, and Art accepted before Ann could express it. If Ann’s conduct was an offer, as it probably was, Art’s acceptance committed her to the sale.47
In Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., a reply rather than a signed writing carried the assent. Embry’s one-year contract had expired, and when he finally reached his employer he said that he needed to know whether he had a contract for another year. The employer answered, “You’re all right. Get your men out, and don’t let that worry you.” Because Embry had just put the very question that the reply seemed to answer, the employer had reason to know that Embry would hear a promise of continued employment. The court held that the employer contracted for Embry’s services even though he may not have intended subjectively to do so.48 A party’s secret intentions are irrelevant to whether a contract exists, and intent is read from the reasonable meaning of the words and acts of the parties.49 In Lucy and Embry alike, the circumstances told the actor how the words and acts would be received, and the private meaning the actor later invoked had never been signaled to the listener.
The prong also relieves actors whose conduct no reasonable person would take seriously. A television commercial that promised a Harrier fighter jet worth $23 million to anyone who collected seven million “Pepsi Stuff” points is a standard example of an “offer” too good, or too outrageous, to believe.50 The gap between the prize and the price signals hyperbole, so the advertiser had no reason to know that a reasonable viewer would infer a commitment. The contrast with Lucy lies in what the listener could see. Zehmer’s jest existed only in his own mind while the setting said the deal was real, whereas the commercial’s own extravagance told every viewer that no commitment was on offer.
Step four does the work in jest cases. A common mistake is to ask what the actor privately meant, when the prong asks what the actor had reason to expect from the other side’s vantage point. A reservation that is communicated changes what a reasonable person would infer, and a reservation that stays private changes nothing, subject to the narrow case in which the other party actually knows the unreasonable meaning the actor attaches. Once both prongs are satisfied, a gap between the outward signal and the actor’s real state of mind is handled by the voidability doctrines that the next section introduces.
Assent Without Actual Assent
Section 19(3) covers the case that the first two subsections leave open: conduct passes both prongs of § 19(2), yet the actor did not in fact assent. The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though the party does not in fact assent, and the resulting contract may be voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or another invalidating cause.52 Two labels sharpen the difference. Actual assent is given by words or conduct intended to express willingness. Apparent assent is given by words or conduct that, while not necessarily intended to express willingness, a reasonable person would understand as willingness and the other side actually does understand that way.53 Subsection (3) treats apparent assent as enough to form a contract. It then gives the party who lacked actual assent a power to cancel the contract (the meaning of voidable) when a recognized defect lies behind the gap.
The subsection builds a two-step sequence, and the order of the steps matters. The first step asks whether the outward conduct manifested assent, using the objective test and the two prongs of § 19(2). If it did, a contract formed, whatever the actor privately felt. The second step asks, as a separate matter, whether fraud, duress, mistake, or some other invalidating cause entitles the actor to undo what formed. Formation comes first because of the other side’s reliance. A party who receives a manifestation sees only the manifestation, and if a contract existed only when actual assent existed, every party could attack a deal by pointing to a private reservation that no one else could verify.54 The court in Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co. stated the formation half of the rule: “conduct which imports acceptance or assent is acceptance or assent in the view of the law, whatever may have been the actual state of mind of the party.”55 A private reservation, like the defendants’ claimed jest in Lucy v. Zehmer, is therefore not an invalidating cause, because the other side had no means of detecting it.
Routing real defects through voidability, rather than through a finding that no contract formed, gives the injured party a choice. Duress doctrine exists to protect the victim, so the victim holds the election either to abide by the contract despite the duress or to avoid it, and if the victim avoids, both sides must restore any benefit received.56 A contract that was a nullity from the start would let the party who procured assent by wrongdoing walk away from a deal that turned out badly for it and so profit from its own wrong. The label voidable places the power to undo the contract in the injured party alone.
Concealment shows how a defect can sit behind apparent assent. Suppose a seller who knows that a house has a cockroach infestation and a subsiding foundation fumigates and patches a wall to hide both problems, then accepts the buyer’s offer. The buyer’s offer was a deliberate manifestation of assent, so a contract formed. If the buyer can prove that the seller’s concealment amounted to fraud, the buyer may avoid the contract, because fraud is one of the invalidating causes that § 19(3) names.57 Whether the buyer wins depends on the elements of fraud, which are taught elsewhere. The structure is what matters here: a contract exists, and the buyer holds an option to undo it.
Voidability presupposes a manifestation, and one situation lacks any manifestation at all. When a person’s hand is physically gripped and forced across a signature line, Restatement (Second) § 174 treats the contract as void, because a manifestation of assent compelled by actual physical force is not voluntary and cannot constitute assent.58 This is the first prong of § 19(2) at work: the forced signer did not intend to engage in the conduct. Duress ordinarily involves a threat rather than physical compulsion, and a threatened signer has chosen to sign, however unwillingly, so the normal rule makes that contract voidable rather than void.59 The threatened party who seeks to avoid must show inducement: that under all the circumstances it had no reasonable alternative but to acquiesce. The existence of an alternative, even one the party later followed, does not necessarily defeat the claim. The party can argue that at the time the threatened harm made the alternative unreasonable and that the threat undermined its volition in making the contract.60
Skipping the sequence produces two opposite errors. One treats a missing inner agreement as proof that no contract formed, which turns every claim of private reservation into a defense and ignores that formation rests on the outward manifestation. The other treats the contract of a defrauded or threatened party as void from the start, which ignores that the victim must elect to avoid it and that a physically forced signature is the only case in which no manifestation exists.