Concept
Promise or Performance as Assent
Manifestation of mutual assent and intent to be bound
Promise or Performance as Assent
A party joining an exchange assents in one of two ways, by promising or by performing. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 18 says so directly: a manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.1 The earlier sections of this chapter asked what counts as a manifestation of assent and how a court reads one. Section 18 asks what each party must contribute once the thing assented to is an exchange. A party who contributes neither a promise nor a performance has not yet assented, however interested the party sounds.
Section 18 supplies one ingredient of the bargain that ordinarily forms a contract, the manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange; consideration, the other ingredient, is taught elsewhere.2 A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises, to exchange a promise for a performance, or to exchange performances, and in each shape each party's share of the assent is a promise or a performance.3 Those two routes explain the labels that follow. When both parties assent by promising, the contract is bilateral. When the offeree assents by rendering the performance the offer calls for, the contract is unilateral.4 The labels differ only in what the offeree gives to show assent.
Assent by Promise
The usual way to assent to an exchange is to promise, and when both parties do, the result is a bilateral contract: at the moment of acceptance, each party has promised to perform at some time in the future.5 Most contracts take this form, so bilateral contracts are the norm.6 The Restatement defines a promise as a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.7 Because the promise is itself the assent, no performance has to occur before the contract exists. At formation, each side holds only the other's promise about what will happen later.
An offeree who accepts in words makes that promise automatically, since an acceptance in words invariably constitutes a promise of future performance.8 Suppose an owner offers to sell Bleakacre for $2 million and the offeree replies in words that accept. The offer carried the owner's promise to convey; the reply supplies the offeree's promise to pay. The farm has not changed hands and no money has moved, yet the contract is complete, because the exchange being assented to is an exchange of promises.
The standard offer invites exactly this reply. In the standard case of an offer for a bilateral contract, the offeree validly accepts merely by making a promise to perform as described in the offer.9 The offeror, as master of the offer, may demand performance instead, but that is the rare case, and the next section takes it up.10
The return promise need not be spoken. Under the objective test, parties communicate their intentions by words, by conduct, or by both, and each side gives meaning to what it observes.11 The offeree's promise may therefore come through unequivocal words (express acceptance) or through conduct (implied acceptance).12 The common example of implied acceptance is an offeree who begins to do the thing the offer requests. The contract is then bilateral, with a promise in the offer and an implied promise, the acceptance, in the offeree's conduct.13 Restatement (Second) § 62 states the rule: where an offer permits acceptance either by promise or by performance, commencement or tender of performance constitutes a promise to complete performance as the contract requires.14
Consider a note offering Ned $20 to mow a lawn by noon tomorrow, with nothing in it saying that only a finished lawn will accept. If Ned telephones to accept, his words are the promise. If he simply starts mowing at 8:00, his beginning of performance is an acceptance that carries an implied promise to complete, and a bilateral contract binds both parties from the moment he starts.15 Stopping after a third of the lawn would then be a failure to perform a promise Ned made.
Assent by conduct does not by itself make a contract unilateral. Suppose an offer asks the offeree to signal acceptance by raising a flag. The flag is only a symbolic act signifying acceptance, no different legally from delivering a paper that says “I accept.” The offeree's actual performance, paying the $2 million price, still lies in the future, so the contract remains bilateral.16 The classification changes only when the act the offer calls for is itself the performance that completes the offeree's side of the exchange. That is the unilateral contract, the subject of the next section.
The hypothetical asks what § 18 asks on any set of facts: what did the offeree do? A reply that commits the offeree to the requested act, in words or by starting the work, is a promise. A reply that expresses only interest or a conditional possibility is neither a promise nor a performance. Where the offer is silent about method, a return promise is enough, so the analysis ends with a bilateral contract in which both sides hold duties still to be performed.
Assent by Performance
The second route to assent lets the offeree answer an offer with the very act it asks for. An offeree who accepts by rendering the performance the offer requires forms a unilateral contract.19 The label records who still has work to do. Because the offeree's act of acceptance also completes the offeree's contractual duties, the offeree has no further obligation at formation, and the offeror alone holds an outstanding commitment, the promise stated in the offer.20 A bilateral contract leaves both sides with duties to perform; here one side's part is finished the instant the contract exists.
Two versions of a Bleakacre offer show where the line falls. An owner who offers to sell the farm for $2 million and insists that the offeree accept only by paying $2 million in cash today has asked for the performance itself. The payment is both the acceptance and the offeree's entire contribution, so only the owner has a promise outstanding.21 The flag offer in the preceding section differs. The flag merely signals assent while the $2 million payment still lies ahead, so that contract is bilateral.22 For any prescribed act, ask whether it merely announces acceptance or is itself the performance that completes the offeree's side.
The word unilateral invites a mistake, because it sounds one-sided, as though only one party gave anything. Both parties have given. The offeror's promise is outstanding, and the offeree's consideration is furnished in full immediately upon acceptance, which leaves the offeree with no further duty.23 The transaction is a bargain of the kind in which a promise is exchanged for a performance.24 What distinguishes the unilateral contract is only that one side, the offeror, made a promise.
Why would an offeror insist on the act? Because a bare promise may be worth nothing to the offeror. In some rare cases the offeror is willing to be bound only if and when the offeree performs, and the classic example is a reward for the return of a lost thing.25 Take the offer, “I will pay $100 for the return of my dog, Barfy.” Neither the reply “I accept. I will search for your dog” nor the beginning of a search accepts it. A return promise may be worthless to the offeror, or the circumstances may make it unreasonable to expect a firm commitment to complete the task, and an offeree who begins a truly unilateral offer does not become bound to finish.26 Quirky Quintina makes the demand explicit. She offers Wendell $500 if and only if he walks all the way across the Brooklyn Bridge, and she tells him, “I do not want your silly promises.” Wendell can accept only by doing the act, and no contract exists at all until he fully completes the crossing.27
A well-known advertisement shows performance doing the work of acceptance. The plaintiff in Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., “on the faith of this advertisement,” bought a smoke ball and used it as directed, three times a day, from November 20, 1891, to January 17, 1892, when she was attacked by influenza. The trial judge held that she was entitled to recover the £100, and the defendants appealed.28
Because assent by performance rests on conduct, the conduct must respond to the offer. In Broadnax v. Ledbetter, the sheriff of Dallas County offered $500 for the capture and return of an escaped convict, and a bounty hunter captured him, brought him in, and sued for the reward.29 The trial court dismissed the petition for omitting a fact it thought essential. The Texas Supreme Court, answering a certified question about whether knowledge of the reward when the recapture was made was essential, said yes: a reward offer “may be accepted by anyone who performs the service called for when the acceptor knows that it has been made and acts in performance of it, but not otherwise.”30 A performer who does not know of the offer has therefore not accepted it. The act may be exactly what the offeror wanted, but it was not done in response to the offer.
Authorities differ on when the knowledge must arrive. Some conclude that the offeree may not recover without knowing of the offer before starting to perform, and the First Restatement stated that the whole consideration requested by an offer must be given after the offeree knows of it. The more modern view is that it is enough for the offeree to complete the performance with knowledge of the offer, on the theory that the offer induced the completion. The question concerns only unilateral contracts.31
An offer that names a performance does not thereby demand performance as the only mode of acceptance. Suppose an owner writes, “I offer to sell you Bleakacre for $2 million. If you wish to buy it, you must pay me $2 million in cash at my office on Friday at 2 p.m.” The letter fixes when and where payment is due, but says nothing that makes payment the only way to accept. In the standard case an offeree accepts merely by promising to perform as the offer describes, so a Monday reply of “I accept” is a promise and forms a bilateral contract.32 An offeree who instead appears Friday with the cash accepts by performing and forms a unilateral contract. To make performance the only route, the offeror must go as far as Quintina did, since demanding a performance only is the rare case.33