Concept
Offer Versus Preliminary Negotiation
Offer: what counts, preliminary negotiations, and who may accept
Offer Versus Preliminary Negotiation
A seller who wants to know what her property is worth has to say something to prospective buyers, and what she says must draw responses without giving any buyer the power to bind her. If the property is unique, such as an operating business, the buyers themselves may be the only reliable source of market data, so she needs a communication that induces them to value the property and submit bids. The difficulty is saying enough to show that her interest is real without actually offering the property for sale.1
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 resolves the difficulty with a single test: a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until a further manifestation of assent has been made.2 The test applies the definition in § 24, under which an offer is a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.3 Section 26 names the case in which the answer is no despite willing words: the recipient has reason to know that the sender is keeping the final step.4 Detailed terms alone do not settle the question. Catalogues and price lists may state suggested bargains in some detail and still not be understood as offers.5
Two points follow. The first is how a recipient comes to have reason to know that no commitment is being made. The second is what becomes of a message that fails as an offer, since its promises and representations may still enter the contract through a later offer.6 Advertisements and price quotations, the common mass-market applications of the rule, are taken up in the next section.
Reason to Know No Offer
Section 26 governs the speaker who intends to bargain, but only after one more step, such as reviewing the responses, comparing buyers, or approving a final figure. Because that speaker has kept the last word, the recipient's reply cannot conclude anything, and the § 24 requirement that the recipient's assent conclude the bargain goes unmet.7
The section does not reach every communication that merely resembles an offer. A speaker may intend no legal effect, may not intend the conduct at all, may address the proposal to someone else or never deliver it to the recipient, or may contemplate a gift rather than a bargain. Each of those fails for a reason of its own. Section 26 deals instead with the actor who does intend to make a bargain in the future, but only after making some further manifestation of assent.8
Whether the addressee had reason to know depends on the words and other conduct and also on the surrounding circumstances, including the parties' previous communications and the usages of their community or line of business.9 The test is objective, and it cuts both ways. An addressee with reason to know that no offer is intended receives no offer, even though he understands the message to be one.10 A sender whose writing a reasonable reader would take as an offer gets no relief from private intention: one who makes a written offer that is accepted is bound by the contract though ignorant of the writing's terms or of its proper interpretation, and cannot say that she meant to be bound on narrower terms.11
The test suits the way bargains begin. A message that invites bids serves its purpose only if it leaves the sender free to choose among the answers, and an owner whose every reader could bind her by saying yes could not gather bids at all.12 The recipient is still protected when he reads a message reasonably as a commitment, because the question is what the message justified him in understanding.13
Language suggesting that the sender may deal with anyone produces the same result. A seller writes that he will get rid of the goods “one way or another” this month and asks the buyer to let him know right away if the buyer is interested. The words suggest that he may sell to anyone at any time, which is inconsistent with being bound to this buyer, because binding him would require him to hold the goods until the buyer replied. The request for a quick answer also reads as an inquiry, so the message is probably a preliminary negotiation or a solicitation of an offer. A prior course of dealing might change that result, but such facts cannot be assumed; they must be given.16
A price letter sent in reply to an inquiry can land on either side of the line, as Lonergan v. Scolnick and Southworth v. Oliver show. In Lonergan the court treated the owner's letters as preliminary, so the inquirer's acceptance created no contract. In Southworth, Oliver asked his neighbor whether he would be interested in buying some land and showed him a map. They left the conversation with an understanding that Oliver would determine the value and price while Southworth looked into financing. Oliver then mailed Southworth and three other neighbors letters setting out the terms and price. Southworth wrote back to accept, and Oliver refused to go through with the sale, claiming that his letter had not been an offer.17 The court recognized that a price quotation standing alone is not an offer, but that one considered with the surrounding facts may be, and that sending it to more than one person does not of itself defeat that reading.18 The conversation that preceded Oliver's letter is the kind of circumstance that bears on that reading.
The number of recipients matters only to the extent that it shows the sender cannot mean to be bound to each one. A letter addressed to two or three people offering “my horse Charley for $3,000” creates no power of acceptance, because there is only one Charley, and each recipient should know that the sender does not intend to give every one of them the power to form a contract.19 The point returns in the discussion of who may accept.
A message that calls itself an offer can fail for the same reason. A resort emails its mailing list a “limited-time offer” on a room and describes the accommodation and its cost in general terms. Nothing in the email could be accepted by simple assent. That specificity arrives only when a customer selects a room, price, and dates on the website, which is where the resort may make an offer.20 Even the word “offer” is not determinative.21
On an exam, the question is what the addressee had reason to know from the words, the earlier exchanges, and the usages of the trade. A stated price does not answer it, because Penny's email named a rate and still left the decision to her. Messages that count as offers leave the recipient's assent as the last step; messages that do not leave a step for the sender.
Preliminary Statements Later Reused
A communication that fails § 26 is not an offer, but it need not be legally inert. Comment f explains that even a communication that is not an offer may contain promises or representations that are incorporated in a subsequent offer, and those then become part of the contract made when that offer is accepted.23 The earlier communication can in this way form part of a written contract, of a memorandum satisfying the Statute of Frauds, or of an integrated contract.24 Those doctrines have their own readings; here they only mark the places where an early message can reappear.
Two questions need separate answers. The first is whether the earlier communication was itself an offer. Under § 26 the answer is no when the recipient had reason to know that the sender was reserving a further step. The second is whether the content of that communication later became a term, and that question concerns a different communication, the later offer, and the substance it carried in. The earlier message has no binding force of its own, because assent to it could not conclude a bargain. It reaches the contract only because the later offer adopts it, and the offeree's acceptance of that offer supplies the assent that makes the content binding.25 A contract may be assembled in this way from a series of correspondence or other interrelated documents, so its terms need not all sit in the final communication. That arrangement invites disputes over what became a term, and the rules of offer and acceptance supply the framework for resolving them.26
The two scenes begin with the same kind of non-binding email and differ in what followed. In the first, a later offer adopted the email by reference, and the publisher's acceptance supplied the assent. In the second, nothing carried the promise forward. The email's status as a non-offer decided neither result. An exam stem in which a buyer points to a warranty found only in an earlier, non-binding message therefore asks one question: did a later offer take the promise in?