Concept
Advertisements and Price Quotes
Offer: what counts, preliminary negotiations, and who may accept
Advertisements and Price Quotes
A seller who publicizes goods or a price speaks to many people at once, and the question is whether any one listener can answer “yes” and close a contract. Section 26 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts answers by asking what the listener had reason to know: a manifestation of willingness to bargain is not an offer if the person addressed knows or has reason to know that the maker does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent.1 Comment b applies that test to advertising.2 The same inquiry reaches price quotations, and in both settings “reason to know” depends not only on the words used but on the circumstances, including the parties’ previous communications and the usages of their community or line of business.3
The result in each setting is a presumption, not a rule. An advertisement ordinarily invites offers, and a “price quote” ordinarily signals no present intention to be bound, yet either can be an offer when its language and circumstances commit the sender. The first two subsections state the default for advertisements and then its exceptions. The third applies the same inquiry to price quotations, where a single word, “quote,” cannot settle the question.
Advertisements as Invitations
Advertisements of goods by display, sign, handbill, newspaper, radio, or television are not ordinarily intended or understood as offers to sell, and the same is true of catalogues, price lists, and circulars, even when they state the terms of suggested bargains in some detail.4 Courts regard such advertisements as invitations to deal, even when they are specific as to price, quantity, time limit, and other details.5 The advertiser has proposed nothing, so the customer who responds is the offeror, and the advertiser may accept the response or decline it.6
What an advertisement ordinarily lacks is a commitment to sell to every reader. An offer must justify the recipient in understanding that his assent is invited and will conclude the bargain,7 and advertisers seldom manifest an intention to be bound to sell or buy potentially unlimited quantities to all who might see or hear the ad.8 Absent particular language and facts, readers should know that the advertiser does not mean to give every one of them the power to “accept” and bind it without a further expression of its own assent.9 Shoppers, for their part, are presumed to understand that advertised goods may or may not be available by the time they are ready to buy.10
The suit advertisement shows how little detail changes the default. A clothing store advertised a well-known brand of suit as “nationally advertised at $440, today only at $250,” and a shopper came in response, selected a suit, and tendered $250. There is no contract, perhaps surprisingly. The ad stated no quantity and used no language of commitment, so the cases treat it as only a statement of intention to sell or a preliminary proposal inviting offers.11 The shopper’s tender is the offer, and the store remains free to accept it or decline it.
Catalogues, price lists, and mass mailings follow the same logic. When the material makes the fact of wide distribution readily apparent, the recipients are not justified in assuming that their assent alone will conclude the bargain.12 A communication that is not an offer is not legally inert, however. Its promises or representations may be incorporated in a later offer and so become part of the contract made when that offer is accepted.13
Contract doctrine is reluctant to police deceptive advertising. Intentionally misleading advertising may be punishable or enjoinable under local consumer protection statutes, and the advertiser’s reputation for fair dealing is at stake.14 That reluctance, together with concern over bait-and-switch and similar sales tactics, has produced state and federal legislation with civil penalties or criminal sanctions, enforced by consumer fraud units, by agencies such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or through actions for civil penalties and attorneys’ fees brought on behalf of aggrieved consumers.15
The presumption rests on two missing terms, quantity and the identity of the offerees. An advertisement that supplies both stands on different footing, as the next subsection shows.
Advertisements That Are Offers
An advertisement directed to the general public can be an offer (see § 29), but there must ordinarily be some language of commitment or some invitation to take action without further communication.17 Each feature answers the § 26 question. Language of commitment tells the reader that the advertiser has bound itself to sell. An invitation to act tells the reader that the next move is the reader’s and that nothing remains for the advertiser to decide.
The terms generally missing from an ordinary advertisement are quantity and parties, meaning the identity and number of the intended offerees. If the advertisement supplies them without further communication by the advertiser, a court may find a valid offer. An ad that identifies an item with sufficient specificity as to subject matter and price, and limits the offer to the “first person who shows up” at a particular place and time, may create the power of acceptance in that first person once he tenders the required price.18
Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store is the standard example. A store advertised for Saturday at 9 a.m. a black lapin stole, “worth $139.50,” for $1.00, and closed the notice with the words “FIRST COME FIRST SERVED.” Lefkowitz was the first customer to present himself on Saturday, and he demanded the stole for $1.00. The store refused to sell to him under a house rule that the offer was intended for women only.19 The court rejected the store’s objection. The advertisement contained no such restriction, and an advertiser may modify its offer at any time before acceptance but may not, after acceptance, impose new or arbitrary conditions that the published offer did not contain.20
The store’s undisclosed rule fails for a reason that reaches beyond advertising: private intention does not narrow what a party has manifested. One who makes a written offer that is accepted is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the writing’s terms or of its proper interpretation, and cannot then say it intended to be bound only according to its own specifications.21
The features that matter in the Lefkowitz ad are its quantity of one, its “first come first served” instruction, and its stated time. Together they fix how many persons may accept and who they are. A later court, distinguishing a commercial from that ad, observed that the Lefkowitz advertisement “identified the person who could accept” and specified “first come first served.”22
Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. adds evidence of seriousness. The Carlill advertisement announced that “£100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball.”23 It also stated that £1000 was deposited with the Alliance Bank, “shewing our sincerity in the matter.” One judge asked for what purpose that statement was made, if not to negative the suggestion that the advertisement was a mere puff and meant nothing at all.24
Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc. supplies the contrast. The plaintiff alleged that a television commercial offered consumers a Harrier Jet. The court held there was no offer, for two reasons. First, the commercial was not sufficiently definite in itself, because it reserved the details of the offer to a separate writing, the Catalog, and mentioned none of the steps a potential offeree must take to accept. Second, even if the Catalog had listed the jet among the items obtainable by redeeming Pepsi Points, the absence of words of limitation such as “first come, first served” left the alleged offer too indefinite for a contract.25 The court added that the commercial never identified the person who could accept, and that buying an expensive Harrier Jet at an exceptionally reduced price from a soft-drink maker was far less realistic than buying fur coats for $1 while the merchandise lasted. It concluded that “no objective person could reasonably have concluded that the commercial actually offered consumers a Harrier Jet,” and it entered judgment for PepsiCo.26
Read together, the two decisions show what an advertisement must settle before it becomes an offer. A court asks whether it communicates willingness to contract, sets out the essential terms, leaves nothing for negotiation, and conveys the reasonable understanding that a contract will come into being on assent.27 An advertisement can pass those questions and still fail for want of definiteness or realism, as the jet commercial did.
The earlier suit advertisement, “nationally advertised at $440, today only at $250,” belongs with the first flyer. It stated no quantity and no language of commitment.
Price Quotations
A price quotation is one more manifestation of willingness, and § 26 tests it the same way: did the addressee have reason to know that the sender would make a further manifestation of assent before concluding anything?33 People in business frequently use the term “price quote,” which ordinarily implies that there is no present intention to be bound.34 One court stated the rule this way: a price quotation standing alone is not an offer, but a quotation considered together with the surrounding facts and circumstances may be one, and an offer may be made to more than one person, so the fact that a quotation went to several recipients does not by itself defeat it.35
The label does not settle the matter. Even the word “estimate” is not conclusive, because in context it may be used in the sense of “offer.”36 “Reason to know” turns on the words and conduct, on the circumstances, and on the parties’ previous communications and the usages of their community or line of business.37
A quotation that reserves the sender’s acceptance is an invitation, however detailed it is. In a dispute over a trim press, the seller, Brown, quoted a press with a mechanical ejector at $24,410. Paragraph three of the attached terms and conditions provided that no order, sale, agreement for sale, accepted proposal, offer to sell, or contract of sale would bind Brown unless Brown accepted it on its standard “Order Acknowledgment” form. The court held that no firm offer existed, because the quotation reasonably appeared to be an offer to enter into negotiations, with acceptance conditioned on Brown’s acknowledgment form.38 That is § 26 at work. Language reserving a further manifestation of assent gives the buyer reason to know that the seller has kept the final word. When a seller has only quoted, the buyer’s order is the first offer. In another dispute, the buyer’s order of May 19, 1986, for 1,000 vials at $64.32 was held to be the first offer, because nothing the seller had done before that point could be interpreted as one.39
A quotation that answers a buyer’s specific request for a price on certain goods stands on different footing, and a court is more likely to find in it an intention to be presently bound. The request shows the seller the buyer’s immediate and specific interest in the designated goods. It also gives the seller a chance to say that the goods are unavailable or not for sale. A seller who answers with a price instead may be seen as expressing a willingness to be currently bound to supply the goods at that price.40 The request narrows the open-ended exposure that keeps an advertisement from binding its maker, and the reply, given after a chance to decline, reads as a commitment.
Quotations for mixed goods-and-service work add a classification question. A flooring contractor’s estimate that covers both the sale of carpet and its installation is a hybrid transaction. Under the predominant-purpose test it is a sale of goods subject to Article 2 if the sale aspect predominates and a common law contract if the labor does. The source notes that the facts given do not settle that classification and that it does not matter there.41
Surrounding circumstances decide the cases that remain. A statement of the lowest price an owner would take, the problem in Harvey v. Facey, may or may not be an offer. If the parties have bargained over Blackacre for six months, steadily trading proposals and counterproposals, then “would not take less” or “would not pay more” might well be taken as an offer. If there has been no prior bargaining, a different inference seems plausible.42 These circumstances must appear in the facts. One cannot assume a course of dealing or a usage of trade; they need to be given.43
An exam stem that reports only that a seller “sent a price quote” leaves open the two facts that matter most: who else received it and what prompted it.
The March price list is an invitation for the reasons given in the trim-press dispute: it went to many customers and reserved the seller’s acceptance.44 The April reply is likely an offer because it answers a particular question about particular goods and invites quick acceptance. The word “quote” could appear in either document without changing either result.