Concept
Definiteness of Terms
Offer: what counts, preliminary negotiations, and who may accept
Definiteness of Terms
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 defines an offer as a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.1 The definition presupposes a bargain with enough content for assent to conclude. A proposal that never says what is being exchanged, or on what terms, gives the recipient's 'yes' nothing to attach to. The missing quality is definiteness, and the question it poses is whether the proposal states its terms with enough certainty that a court can identify what the offeror promised, recognize a breach of that promise, and fashion a remedy.
Two reasons support the requirement. A court cannot decide whether a contract was broken until it knows with some certainty what the contract required. And because the law protects the promisee's expectation interest, a court that calculates damages must be able to say with some precision what the promise was.2
Courts do not demand that every detail appear in the proposal, and this section follows that tolerance in three steps: which terms an offer must supply, how the law fills a gap when the parties meant to contract and left a term unaddressed, and when a stated term is too vague, or a choice too open, for a court to enforce.
Essential Terms
Section 33 of the Restatement (Second) sets the standard. Even a manifestation plainly meant as an offer cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless its terms are reasonably certain, and terms are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining that a breach has occurred and for giving an appropriate remedy.3 Definiteness therefore stands apart from intent: a sender can mean to be bound and still leave the proposal too thin for a court to act on. The question to put to each term is whether it helps a court identify a breach and fix a remedy.
Most offers that clear this hurdle say who may accept, what performances are being exchanged, and at what price. An offer must be directed at some person or group; it is usually addressed to a specific person, but it may be made to a defined or undefined group.4 The proposal must also specify the performances to be exchanged and the terms that will govern the relationship. A communication that omits essential terms is unlikely to be an offer, so the comprehensiveness and specificity of its terms help show whether a reasonable recipient would read it as an offer or as a preliminary proposal that opens negotiations.5
Subject matter and price are the two halves of the exchange, and a breach is a failure to deliver one half or to pay for the other. When neither is described, a court has nothing against which to compare what the defendant did. In a sale of goods, the subject matter includes a quantity, because a unit price means little until the count is known.
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code shows the difference between a term a court can supply and one it cannot. Under UCC § 2-204(3), a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness although one or more terms are left open, so long as the parties intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.6 Price is the term the Code most readily supplies: where the parties meant to contract without settling the price, the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery.7 Quantity differs. Unless the agreement is an output or requirements contract, the parties form no contract without one, because goods have a market price but no 'market quantity.'8
The requirements version works because the figure it points to is measurable: the buyer's actual good-faith requirements, which must approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure.9 That measure gives a court something to compare the seller's performance against, the same service an express number would perform.
A term can also be definite without appearing in the writing if it points to a standard a court can consult. In deciding whether an agreement is definite enough, a court may piece together terms from preliminary negotiations, prior communications, outside sources such as governmental regulations and trade usages, and the parties' course of dealing before the transaction or course of performance after it.10 The purpose of the requirement explains why. What matters is that a court can find what was promised, and a reference to a document or practice that both sides can point to makes the promise findable as surely as text would.
Completeness of terms also bears on whether the sender meant to commit at all. Under § 33(3), the fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation was not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance.11 That links definiteness to the reason-to-know rule of § 26: a manifestation of willingness is not an offer when its recipient knows or has reason to know that the sender does not intend to conclude a bargain until he makes a further manifestation of assent, and a proposal that omits essential terms can give the recipient exactly that reason.12 An incomplete proposal thus raises two questions in order: whether the open terms show that the sender had not yet committed, and, if the sender did commit, whether a court can still identify a breach and a remedy despite the gaps.
Gap Fillers for Open Terms
Leaving a term open does not by itself defeat an offer. Section 33(2) treats the terms of a contract as reasonably certain when they provide a basis for finding a breach and giving a remedy, and § 33(3) adds that open terms may show that a party never meant to make an offer or an acceptance.14 For sales of goods, UCC § 2-204(3) goes further: even though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.15 The last subsection listed the terms an offer ordinarily supplies for itself. This one asks what a court does when the parties meant to bargain and left one of those terms unwritten, and the answer is often that the law supplies the term and enforces the deal.
The test has two parts, and each guards a different interest. Requiring that the parties intended to contract keeps a court from imposing a bargain on people who were still negotiating, since an open term sometimes signals an unfinished deal. Requiring a reasonably certain basis for a remedy lets the court find a breach and measure a loss without inventing a bargain. A gap filler supplies that basis: a standard drawn from outside the parties' words, such as a reasonable price, gives the court something against which to measure the defendant's performance.16 The approach also keeps a dissatisfied party from taking refuge in indefiniteness to wriggle out of an agreement,17 and a rule demanding piercing clarity on every material term would fail parties who reasonably expected to be bound and relied on the deal.18
The Code's treatment of price shows the pattern. When the parties intend to conclude a contract without settling the price, the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery. That rule applies when nothing is said about price, when the price is left to be agreed and the parties fail to agree, and when the price was to be fixed by an agreed market or other standard that is never set or recorded.19 Market evidence can establish a reasonable price, so the court has a measure for a breach even though the parties never stated one. Other defaults follow the same logic. Unless otherwise agreed, the place for delivery is the seller's place of business, and the time for shipment or delivery is a reasonable time.20 When an agreement leaves particulars of performance to one party, that party must act in good faith and in accordance with commercial standards.21
Because these provisions are default rules, the parties' actual agreement comes first and the Code operates only to fill gaps; the one unalterable exception is the basic requirement of good faith and reasonableness.22 A court therefore looks first to what the parties actually agreed, including any course of dealing or course of performance between them, before it reaches for a statutory default.23
The drywall order falls within § 2-204(3) because both halves of the test are met: the conversation shows intent to be bound, and the default price supplies the basis for a remedy. The flour order falls outside it because the Code preserves the parties' choice. Where they intend not to be bound unless the price is fixed or agreed, and it is not, there is no contract, and any goods already delivered must be returned or paid for at their reasonable value.24 A gap filler can say what a missing term should be only after a court has found intent to contract, and it cannot create that intent. An exam stem that reports an open price should therefore be read for what the parties said about being bound before the price was settled. Quantity marks the edge of these defaults: outside output and requirements contracts, the parties form no contract without it.25 The number of open terms bears on the same inference, because the more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they meant to conclude a binding agreement.26 Their own performance can nevertheless show that they did.27
The common law has moved toward the Code's attitude, more slowly and with more hesitation. Section 33(2) and UCC § 2-204(3) share a test that tolerates some indefiniteness when the evidence shows that the parties intended a contract and some means of resolving the uncertainty lets a court identify a breach and provide a remedy.28 A lease option that lets the tenant renew at a rent to be agreed is the standard illustration. Some cases still follow the older view that the agreement to agree prevents the exercise of the option. The better view reads the clause as promising a reasonable rent, because market conditions are ascertainable and the tenant has already paid for the option.29 Recent decisions generally ask whether the contract is definite enough to permit the relief the plaintiff seeks; a plaintiff who seeks money damages needs terms from which a court can tell whether the contract was breached and what damages the breach caused.30 Even so, a court need not insist that every material term be expressed with piercing clarity.31
The trend has limits, and services outside the Code show them. A client engages a portrait painter, and the two agree that the price will be mutually arranged in a week. The client repudiates before the week is out. Under Article 2 the central question would be whether the parties intended to be bound before the price was fixed, since a court could substitute a reasonable price at the time of delivery. But the dominant nature of the transaction is services, so Article 2 likely does not apply, and the absence of agreement on an essential term such as price might prevent a contract, because the traditional common law approach required the parties to agree on the price or provide a method for fixing it.32 The portrait and the drywall order both left the price open. What separates them is the body of law that answers the question: the Code fills the price when intent exists, and the common law stays cautious when the parties reserved a material term for later agreement.
Vague Terms and Open Choices
Section 33 supplies the test once more, and this subsection applies it to terms the parties did state: even an offer cannot be accepted into a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain, meaning they provide a basis for finding a breach and giving an appropriate remedy.34 The last subsection dealt with silence, where the parties said nothing about a term and the law supplied a standard from outside the bargain. A vague term poses a different problem. The parties addressed the subject but chose words that give a court no measure, such as a promise of a fair share of profits. A gap can be filled because an outside yardstick exists, while a vague term leaves the court guessing at what the parties meant, and that difference decides whether the agreement can be enforced at all.
A court should not find a contract where indefiniteness is severe enough to indicate a lack of assent to material terms.35 The court need not demand perfect clarity, though; a rule that strict would deny enforcement to parties who reasonably expected to be bound, did intend to contract despite the indefiniteness, and relied on the contract.36 The general principle falls between those poles: some indefiniteness is tolerable if the evidence shows an intent to contract and some means exists of resolving the uncertainty so that a breach can be identified and a remedy provided.37
In Varney v. Ditmars, a draftsman sued his employer on a promise of a stated salary plus a fair share of the employer's profits. The court denied recovery of the profits, because a 'fair share' could mean anything from a nominal sum to a large part of the profits, depending on whose guess a court adopted, and the figure was therefore conjecture.38 Evaluative words are not always fatal, however. Good faith and reasonable efforts count as sufficiently definite when an external standard can fix their content, and a court may piece that standard together from preliminary negotiations, prior communications, governmental regulations, trade usages, or the parties' course of dealing.39 A fair share of profits offers no such standard. The dividing line separates terms whose content something outside the court's own preferences can fix from terms that nothing can fix, and it does not separate precise words from evaluative ones.
A promise to settle a term later raises the same question in another form. The lease-renewal clause discussed above shows where the line falls. Where market conditions fix a reasonable rent, the clause has an external standard and can be enforced; where nothing comparable fixes the term, the clause sits closer to Varney's 'fair share' than to the lease option.
An offer that gives the offeree a choice among defined alternatives is not vague. At first glance § 33(1) seems to create a puzzle, because an offer with alternatives does not say which one will govern. The puzzle dissolves once the question is asked about the contract that acceptance would create instead of the offer standing alone. Each alternative is a fully specified bargain, so the offeror has already fixed what each choice means, and the offeree's selection only completes the content. Until the offeree designates, the offer is uncertain as to which item the seller must sell and the buyer must buy. To accept, the offeree must exercise the choice, and when the offeree does so the resulting contract is specific.40 A court can then find a breach, which is a failure to deliver the chosen item, and can measure the loss on that item. A vague term differs because no choice, made by anyone, tells the court what the promise required. The open choice is only a step in forming the contract, and no contract results until the offeree makes the selection.
The horse scene shows that who chooses, and when, matters as much as whether the alternatives are defined. A bare 'I accept' fails to exercise a choice the offeror required at acceptance. For goods, though, an agreement that is otherwise sufficiently definite remains valid even though it leaves particulars of performance to be specified by one of the parties, so a breeder who allowed postponement is bound once the rancher specifies.41
Because § 33 asks about the terms of the contract, a term that was loose when the parties agreed can become definite through what they do afterward. Courts look to the course of performance to find the parties' intentions as to terms, and an agreement too vague to enforce when made may become enforceable after the parties have rendered and accepted some performances and thereby manifested what they in fact intended.42 A course of performance may also supply terms.43