Concept
Notice of Acceptance
Acceptance: bilateral versus unilateral contracts and acceptance by promise or performance
Notice of Acceptance
An offeree who accepts by acting may finish the work without the offeror ever hearing of it. Does a contract form anyway? Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 54(1) says it does: where an offer invites acceptance by rendering a performance, no notification is necessary to make the acceptance effective unless the offer requests one.1 The offeror chose performance as the reply, and an offeror who wanted a message could have asked for one.
Notice raises a second question, and keeping it apart from the first is the main discipline in this area. Suppose the contract has formed and the offeree had reason to know that the offeror had no adequate means of learning of the performance with reasonable promptness and certainty. Section 54(2) then discharges the offeror's contractual duty unless one of three conditions is met.2 The first question concerns when an acceptance takes effect. The second concerns whether the offeror's duty survives an acceptance that has already taken effect.
The previous section addressed notice that an act is not meant as an acceptance; this one addresses notice that it is. The general rule comes first. The trigger for discharge follows, and then the three conditions that preserve the offeror's duty: the offeree's reasonable diligence in notifying, the offeror's own timely discovery, and an offer that indicates notice is unnecessary.
Notice Generally Not Required
An acceptance by performance needs no announcement because the performance is the acceptance. In a unilateral contract the offeree's act of acceptance also completes the offeree's duties, so at the moment of formation the offeree owes nothing more and the offeror alone holds an outstanding promise.3 An acceptance by words is different, because words of acceptance invariably amount to a promise of future performance.4 The offeree who accepts by acting has made no promise to deliver, and the contract forms when the invited act is complete, whether or not the offeror knows of it.
Each half of § 54(1) rests on a reason. The default of no notice follows from what the offeror asked for. An offeror who requests an act has asked to receive that act as the price of the promise, and a duty to report it adds a step the offeror never bargained for. A contrary default would also let an offeror who regretted the deal deny that a contract formed, for want of a report the offer never mentioned. The exception follows from the offeror's control over the terms. The offeror alone writes the offer and can add a request for a report at almost no cost, so a duty to report exists only when the offeror chose to include one.
Often the question never arises, because the requested act announces itself. A person who advertises a reward for a lost dog will see the dog come home, and those who go looking for it do not stop to write that they accept.
Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. tested the rule against a newspaper advertisement. The company promised £100 to any person who used its smoke ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions and then caught influenza, and it said that £1000 was on deposit at a bank to show its sincerity.5 The advertisement asked users for nothing more: no letter, no registration, no report that they had begun. When Mrs. Carlill completed the course, fell ill, and claimed the reward, the company objected that she had never notified it of her acceptance.
Lindley L.J. and Bowen L.J. both began by conceding the ordinary rule that an acceptance ought to be notified to the person who made the offer, and both went on to explain why this offer fell outside it.6 Lindley L.J. gave two answers. The offer was a continuing one, so the advertiser receives notice of the acceptance together with notice that the condition was performed. And an advertiser who makes this kind of offer shows, by language and by the nature of the transaction, that he "does not expect and does not require notice of the acceptance apart from notice of the performance."7
The second answer fits § 54(1) more directly, because the Restatement asks what the offer itself requests. The company asked for use of the ball and, after illness, a claim for payment, and that claim tells the company everything a separate message of acceptance could. Mrs. Carlill accepted by completing the stated course of use, and the advertisement left no room to argue that she owed the company a report on top of it.
Two errors tempt on an exam. One carries a communication requirement over from acceptance by promise to acceptance by performance. The other reads Carlill to mean that notice can never matter. Everything turns on whether the offer requests notification, as the text of § 54(1) says.
The request must appear in the offer. An unexpressed wish to hear about the work does not count, and a deadline for finishing is not a request for a report that the work is finished.
Section 54(1) states only a baseline. Section 54(2) adds a protection that can apply even when the offer asks for nothing. It leaves the time of formation alone, since the contract still forms on performance, but it can discharge the offeror's duty when the offeree had reason to know that the offeror had no adequate means of learning of the performance with reasonable promptness and certainty.8 The two rules ask different questions. Section 54(1) asks whether notice is needed for the acceptance to be effective; § 54(2) asks whether the offeror's duty survives without it.
Offeror Unable to Learn
Section 54(2) protects an offeror who is left in the dark. If an offeree who accepts by rendering a performance has reason to know that the offeror has no adequate means of learning of the performance with reasonable promptness and certainty, the offeror's contractual duty is discharged unless one of three conditions is met.10 The sentence holds a trigger and a consequence.
The trigger has two parts. The first looks at the offeree: reason to know asks what the offeree's own situation signals, so an offeree who can see that the offeror lives far from the work, or that the act will leave nothing the offeror is likely to come across, cannot rely on never having considered the problem. The second looks at the offeror: the offeror's means of learning must be adequate for both promptness and certainty. A rumor that arrives months late, or an inference the offeror cannot confirm, does not qualify. Distance matters only because it usually removes the offeror's means of learning; an offeror who lives far away but has arranged for a reliable report of the work has not been left in the dark.
The consequence falls on the offeror's duty, and it arrives after the acceptance. The completed act is the acceptance, so the contract has formed before any question about reporting arises. The notice an offeree might owe is not itself the acceptance. An offeree who omits it still holds a contract, but the offeror's duty under it is discharged; a treatise discussing a related problem makes the same point, observing that such notice is not necessary for formation but that failure to give it would discharge the offeror's obligation.11 The discharge is not automatic. The same provision lists three conditions under which the offeror's duty survives: the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to notify the offeror of acceptance, the offeror learns of the performance within a reasonable time, or the offer indicates that notification of acceptance is not required.12 The first closes the information gap, the second describes a gap that closes on its own, and the third reflects the offeror's own waiver. The next three subsections take them in turn.
The trigger has two halves because they solve different problems. After the act, the offeree has no further duty and the offeror alone holds an outstanding promise.13 An offeror who cannot learn that the act was done carries a binding commitment without knowing that its condition has been met. That offeror cannot plan around the performance, hire a substitute, or budget for payment, and revocation is no longer available because the offer has been accepted. The offeree is the one party who can close the gap, and a short message costs far less than the exposure the offeror carries. The reason to know requirement keeps that burden fair: an offeree with no signal that the offeror was uninformed has no cue to speak, and discharging the offeror's duty on those facts would penalize a gap the offeree could not see.
Reasonable Diligence to Notify
The first saving condition is the one the offeree controls most directly. Under § 54(2)(a), the offeror's duty survives if the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to notify the offeror of acceptance.15 The clause matters only after the trigger is met, and by then the contract has formed on performance. The notice does not create the contract; it preserves the offeror's duty under a contract that already exists.16
The clause speaks of diligence in notifying, and it should be read literally. It measures what the offeree did to tell the offeror and does not ask whether the message arrived. The test is what a reasonable offeree in that position would have done, so a prompt and sensible attempt keeps the offeror's duty alive even if the message never reaches its destination. Three features usually decide the question. Timing: a reasonable offeree acts soon after finishing. Channel: a call or message to the number or address the offer supplied is likely to reach the offeror, while a letter sent to an address the offeree knows to be stale falls short. Follow-up: an offeree who sees an obvious attempt fail, such as a returned letter, can be expected to try another route.
The standard looks to effort because effort is what the offeree controls. The offeree alone knows that the act is finished, and a short call or email costs far less than the exposure the offeror carries: a binding promise with no way to confirm that its condition has been met. But the offeree cannot control the offeror's full inbox, spam filter, or travel schedule. A rule that demanded receipt would make the offeree answer for failures outside that control, and it would let an offeror discharge a duty simply by declining to open the mail. Measuring diligence keeps the burden reasonable while giving the offeree every reason to act promptly.
On an exam, compare what the offeree did with what a reasonable offeree would have done. Whether the offeror actually heard is a separate matter, and it becomes the question under the next condition. An offeree whose effort falls short is therefore not necessarily lost, since the offeror's independent knowledge or a waiver in the offer can still keep the duty alive.
Offeror Learns Independently
The second saving condition shifts from the offeree's effort to the offeror's knowledge. Under § 54(2)(b), the offeror's duty survives if the offeror learns of the performance within a reasonable time.18 Clause (a) asked what the offeree did to tell the offeror. Clause (b) asks what the offeror came to know, and by when.
The reason for the clause appears when you ask what the discharge rule protects. It protects an offeror who is ignorant of the performance, and the offeree's notice is the usual cure for that ignorance. Once the offeror has the information, the cure has nothing left to do, because a message from the offeree would repeat what the offeror already knows. Discharging the duty of an offeror who knows the work is done would let that offeror keep the benefit of the performance without paying for it, on the strength of a missing message that would have told the offeror nothing new. The point follows from the way the rules fit together: notice was never needed to form the contract, and its absence matters only because it can leave the offeror in the dark.19
The clause names no channel, so the source of the offeror's knowledge does not matter. The information may come from the offeree's message, from a local agent who sees the finished work, from a neighbor, or from the offeror's own visit. What counts is that the offeror learns of the performance itself. The clause therefore tests the offeror's knowledge and says nothing about the offeree's effort. An offeree who sent no notice and made no attempt is still protected if the offeror learns in time, and an offeree whose diligent attempt never arrived gets help from clause (a) and none from clause (b). The three conditions are alternatives joined by or, so satisfying any one of them keeps the offeror's duty alive.20
The reasonable-time limit keeps the clause from swallowing the rule. Until the offeror learns of the act, the offeror carries a binding promise with no way to confirm that its condition has been met. Prompt learning ends that uncertainty before it does much harm. Learning after a long delay means the offeror lived through the very exposure the discharge rule exists to prevent, and the late information repairs nothing. The clause sets a standard in place of a fixed deadline, so the answer depends on the circumstances. Late discovery does not end the analysis, because the offeree may still rely on diligence under clause (a) or on a waiver under clause (c).
The two results differ in one fact, the date on which knowledge arrived; who informed Rosa played no part. A careful analysis fixes the date of the offeror's learning first, measures it against what the circumstances make a reasonable time, and only then looks at what the offeree did.
Offer Waives Notice
The third saving condition looks back at the offer. Under § 54(2)(c), the offeror's duty survives if the offer indicates that notification of acceptance is not required.22 Clauses (a) and (b) look forward from the performance, asking what the offeree did to tell the offeror or what the offeror learned without help. Clause (c) asks what the offeror said before the offeree acted. The answer is fixed when the offeree decides whether to begin, which makes this the one condition the offeree can check in advance.
A waiver is possible because the discharge rule exists to protect the offeror. An offeror who cannot find out that the requested act was done holds a binding promise with no way to plan around it. A party may give up a protection that exists for that party's own benefit, and an offeror who tells offerees that no report is needed has done exactly that: the offeror has said in advance that the risk of not knowing is the offeror's. Offerees then do the work in reliance on that statement. If the law discharged the offeror's duty for want of the very message the offer called unnecessary, the offeror would invoke a protection already surrendered, and the offeree would lose the price because of a step the offeror's own words excused.
The same allocation of control appears in § 54(1), which lets the offer decide whether a report is part of the bargain.23 An offer can request notification, and then the acceptance is not effective without it, or it can excuse notification, and then the offeror's duty survives without it. The two provisions answer different questions, since § 54(1) concerns when the acceptance takes effect and § 54(2) concerns whether the offeror's duty survives after a contract has formed, yet in each the offeror's own words are the controlling fact.
Lindley L.J.'s second answer in Carlill is the same idea in an older setting. An advertiser who shows, by language and by the nature of the transaction, that no notice of acceptance is expected apart from notice of the performance has told offerees that no separate report is wanted.24 He used that reasoning to answer an objection about forming the contract, while § 54(2)(c) addresses the survival of the offeror's duty, but the same fact does the work in both: the offer itself shows that a separate message is unneeded.
The clause requires an indication in the offer, and silence is not one. The discharge rule is triggered by an offeror who cannot learn of the performance, and an offer that says nothing about reporting is the ordinary background to that situation. If silence waived notice, every offer to which the rule might apply would satisfy clause (c), and § 54(2) would discharge no one. The indication may be express, as in a sentence telling offerees not to report back, or it may arise from the language and the nature of the transaction, as in Carlill. It cannot rest on the offeree's own assumption that the offeror would not care, and a completion deadline or a price term, which say nothing about reporting, supplies none. The opposite case belongs in the analysis too: an offer that asks for a report has requested notification under § 54(1), and no waiver argument can arise from it.
Because the three saving conditions are alternatives joined by or, an offer that waives notice ends the inquiry. There is no need to ask what the offeree did to tell the offeror or when the offeror learned of the work. With all four provisions in hand, an exam answer can run as one sequence.