Concept
Part Performance and Irrevocability
Acceptance: bilateral versus unilateral contracts and acceptance by promise or performance
Part Performance and Irrevocability
Quintina offers to pay Wendell if he walks across the Brooklyn Bridge. Wendell sets out, and one step short of the far side Quintina withdraws her offer. Under the traditional approach the withdrawal works: no contract forms until the requested walk is complete, so Quintina keeps the power to revoke all along and has no duty to hold the offer open while Wendell finishes.1 An offeror may thus cancel at the moment the offeree has nearly paid the price the offeror asked for. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts softens that result with two rules that give legal weight to the start of performance.
Section 45 governs the offer that asks for an act and does not invite a promise: when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance, an option contract arises.2 Section 62 governs the offer that lets the offeree choose between promising and performing: tendering or beginning the performance is itself an acceptance, and the acceptance operates as a promise to render complete performance.3 The two sections share a trigger and differ in what it produces. Under § 45 the offeree gains protection and takes on no duty; under § 62 both parties are bound. Each rule also depends on a threshold question, whether the offeree has begun the requested act or has only made ready to begin it, and the last subsection takes that question up.
Option Contract by Part Performance
Section 45 applies to the unilateral contract, in which the offeree accepts by rendering the very performance the contract requires, so that the act of acceptance also completes the offeree's duties.4 Where such an offer invites acceptance by performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance, or tenders a beginning of it.5
The doctrine rests on an implied promise. The main offer includes a subsidiary promise, necessarily implied, that the offeror will not revoke once part of the requested performance is given and that a tender will be accepted, and the part performance or tender furnishes the consideration for those subsidiary promises.6 The start of the work, in effect, buys the option.
The option binds the offeror alone. Classical doctrine treated the offeree's performance as both the consideration for the offeror's promise and the acceptance of the offer, so the offeree never promised anything and stayed free not to perform, or not to finish, without liability.7 A start leaves that freedom intact. Even an offeree who has started is not bound to complete, and a promise to complete would add nothing, because an unsolicited promise is a nullity and only the promisor can become bound.8
Once the offeree has begun or tendered, the offeror can no longer revoke, and the offeree may take the time the offer permits to finish. Timely completion entitles the offeree to the promised performance; in the alternative, the offeree may be entitled to recover some or all of the losses incurred in reliance on the offer.9 Completion is the acceptance of the main offer, and at that moment the offeree has performed everything the contract requires while the offeror alone still has a promise outstanding.10
The offeror's duty, by contrast, is conditional. Under § 45(2), the offeror's duty of performance under the option contract depends on completion or tender of the invited performance in accordance with the terms of the offer.11 An offeree who stops simply lets the option lapse, and the offeror has no claim for breach. An offeree who finishes late, or who finishes a different job, has not met the condition, so the duty to pay never arises.12
The one-sidedness of the option is what separates § 45 from § 62. When an offer invites a choice, beginning the performance is an acceptance that operates as a promise to render complete performance, so the offeree who starts is bound to finish.13 The option is therefore the more favorable position for the offeree, who may stop at will.14 Which section governs depends on what the offer invited, so the analysis reads the offer before it looks at what the offeree did.
Offers that invite acceptance by actual performance raise special problems of notification, revocation, and reliance in the form of partial performance.15 Petterson v. Pattberg, a 1928 decision of the New York Court of Appeals, presents the revocation problem in its plainest form. The defendant had offered by letter to allow Petterson $780 off a mortgage if he paid it off by May 31, 1924. Petterson paid the installment due April 25. In late May he knocked at the defendant's door, announced, 'It is Mr. Petterson. I have come to pay off the mortgage,' and learned that the defendant had sold the mortgage.16 The majority held for the defendant: because the offer asked for payment, it stayed revocable until payment was made, and the defendant's statement came first.
The dissent read the same letter as requesting payment and concluded that Petterson had already done what was requested. He offered to pay with present intention and ability, and a formal tender is seldom made in business transactions except to lay the foundation for a later claim in court that rests on the refusal of the tender.17 Section 45 changes what depends on that disagreement. If Petterson's offer to pay, made with present intention and ability, was a tender of the invited performance, an option arose and the defendant's announcement could not defeat it.18 The question becomes whether Petterson tendered, and no longer whether he had finished paying.
The option rule also reaches beyond private bargains. Storti v. University of Washington applies the same framework to a university's announced merit-raise program, and the plan's own reservation of the university's power shapes the result. That is the general point: an option holds the offer open on the offeror's own terms.19 The offeror's drafting therefore keeps its force after performance has begun. A person can word an offer so that it permits multiple acceptances and thus many contracts. An offeror who posts a reward and wants to pay only once does well to say that the offer closes when the information is provided, although a court may imply that limit from the nature of the transaction.20
Beginning Performance as Acceptance
Where an offer invites the offeree to choose between promising and performing, the tender or beginning of the invited performance, or a tender of a beginning of it, is an acceptance by performance under § 62(1).22 Section 62(2) supplies the consequence for the offeree: the acceptance operates as a promise to render complete performance.23 A start on the work therefore does two jobs at once. It accepts the offer, and it commits the offeree to finish. Under § 45 the same start, made in answer to an offer that invited performance alone, creates only an option and leaves the offeree free to stop. When the offer invites either mode, the start produces a contract that binds the offeree as well as the offeror.
Acceptance by conduct rests on ordinary doctrine. An acceptance occurs when a reasonable person in the offeror's position would understand the offeree's words and conduct as an intent to be bound, and the offeree's subjective intent basically does not matter.24 An offer that invites either a promise or a performance has told the offeree that conduct is a proper reply, so work that begins the very job the offer describes reads to a reasonable offeror as assent. The start also communicates an implied promise to complete the performance, which forms a bilateral contract, and that is the likely result without regard to whether the offeror is aware that performance has begun.25
The rule answers the same exposure that § 45 answers. If acceptance by performance took effect only on completion, the offeree would work through the whole job exposed to revocation. Section 62 makes the start the acceptance, and the fit is natural when the offeror has said that either a promise or the work will do. An offeree who starts has shown commitment as clearly as one who promised, and reading the start as a promise to finish keeps either side from being bound while the other stays free. The distinction between § 62 and § 45 decides cases in two situations: when the offeror tries to revoke after the start, and when the offeree starts, then stops, and the offeror claims that the start accepted the offer and bound the offeree to finish.
One added sentence would reverse the outcome. Suppose the letter had ended, 'Only the finished deck will count as acceptance; I am not asking for a promise.' The offer would then have invited performance alone. Tuesday's start would have created only an option, the carpenter could have left on Wednesday without breach, and the homeowner could not have revoked in the meantime.
Section 62 applies only when the offer invites the choice, so the analysis reads the offer before it looks at the offeree's conduct. In case of doubt, an offer is interpreted to invite acceptance either by a promise or by the performance, as the offeree chooses.26 Older law presumed that an ambiguous offer demanded a promise. For sales of goods, the Code replaced that presumption with the view that the offeror is usually indifferent to the mode of acceptance.27 At one pole, an offer that unambiguously demands a promise lies outside § 62: an offeree who begins to perform without promising has accepted nothing unless the offeror learns of the start and acquiesces in that informal manner of acceptance.28 The next subsection discusses White v. Corlies & Tifft, a case of this kind. At the other pole, an offer that unambiguously demands performance alone brings § 45 into play.29
Formation and notice are separate questions. When the offer invited either mode, the start forms the contract whether or not the offeror knows of it.30 Whether the offeree must also tell the offeror is a distinct inquiry. For sales of goods, where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance, an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance, a rule taken up in the Code section below.31
The common error is to reach for one section automatically. Treating every part performance as an option overlooks an offeror who was indifferent between the modes, and treating every start as a promise ignores an offer that required completion.
Preparation Versus Performance
Sections 45 and 62 limit the offeror's power to revoke only after the same event: the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance, or tenders a beginning of it.33 The earlier subsections explain what each rule does once that event has occurred, and this one asks whether it has occurred. The trigger is the requested performance itself. Steps that make the offeree ready to perform, such as buying supplies, renting equipment, or clearing a calendar, do not meet it, and a revocation made after preparation alone is effective, because no option or contract yet holds the offer open and the offeror keeps the power to revoke.34
The line falls there because of what each kind of act gives the offeror. A start on the requested work is the first installment of the price the offeror asked for, and an offeree who has begun to pay it deserves protection from cancellation. Preparation makes the offeree ready to give what was requested without giving any of it. Preparatory acts are also equivocal, since the same brushes serve any painting job, and they are cheap, since anyone can buy them. If every such act made an offer irrevocable, steps the offeror never sees could lock the offeror in, and offerors would hesitate to invite performance at all. A common error is to count money spent or time set aside as performance begun, so the analysis compares the offeree's act with the act the offer requested before it weighs the offeree's expense.
A revocation that is effective against preparation can still leave the offeree out of pocket. Acting in justifiable reliance on an offer may in some cases be a sufficient reason for making a promise binding, but that doctrine is separate from the option rule, and this subsection asks only whether a start held the offer open.35
White v. Corlies & Tifft gives the preparation side concrete form. The property owner wanted an agreement before the builder began, so the offer called for a promise. The builder began by purchasing and working on lumber, but none of the work was earmarked for the particular job, and none was performed at the site. The court held that this conduct was 'no indication to the other party of an acceptance.'36 The case does not arise under § 45, yet it shows what preparatory conduct looks like: generic materials, handled away from the offeror's premises, that tell the offeror nothing about whether the offer was taken up. The court's reasoning implies that work started at the owner's premises would have come out differently.37 The same two features help sort performance cases, because conduct tied to the particular job and visible as work on it points toward a beginning, while conduct that could serve any job points toward preparation.
A tender answers the situation in which the offeree cannot go further without the offeror's help. A tender is an offer to perform made with present intention and ability to perform.38 If the requested act is payment, the offeror must be there to receive it, and if it is work on the offeror's premises, the offeror must open the door. An offeree who arrives willing and able to begin has done everything within the offeree's control, and the rules count that as a tender of a beginning.39