Concept
Formation by Exchanged Forms
Acceptance terms and timing: mirror image rule, mailbox rule, and UCC § 2-207
Formation by Exchanged Forms
Section 2-207(1) answers the first question that conflicting forms raise: do the writings form a contract at all? It provides that a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, or a written confirmation sent within a reasonable time, operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.1 At common law, the same reply would have been a rejection and a counteroffer, and no contract would have existed until the original offeror assented to the changes.2 Under the Code, a reply that varies the offer can still be an acceptance, so an exchange of forms can create a contract although neither party agreed to the other’s fine print. The rule belongs to Article 2, which applies to transactions in goods, so every example in this unit is a sale of goods.3
For a reply to an offer, the statute sets three tests. The reply must be a definite expression of acceptance, it must be seasonable, and it must not be expressly made conditional on the offeror’s assent to the additional or different terms. A reply that passes all three operates as an acceptance. A reply that fails one is not an acceptance, so it is a rejection or a counteroffer, and either one ends the offeree’s power to accept the original offer.4 None of the tests asks whether the reply’s new terms are material or whether the parties are merchants. Those questions arise only under subsection (2), which sorts terms after subsection (1) has found a contract and takes no part in deciding whether one exists.5
Each test compares the reply with an offer, so this unit begins by finding the offer and then takes the three tests in the order the statute states them. It closes with written confirmations, the second kind of writing that the same sentence covers. When the writings fail to form a contract, the parties’ conduct may still do so, because Article 2 lets a contract form in any manner sufficient to show agreement,6 and subsection (3) governs contracts established by conduct.7 A later section takes up subsection (3) in full.
Finding the Offer
Each test measures the reply against an offer, so the analysis starts by finding that offer. The Code does not help on this point. Article 2 contains no definition of an offer and leaves the concept to the common law of the relevant state.8
The common-law question is whether the communication gave the recipient the power to conclude a contract by assenting. A seller’s price quotation ordinarily does not, and courts treat it as an invitation to make an offer. In Corinthian Pharmaceutical Systems, Inc. v. Lederle Laboratories, a vaccine manufacturer’s price lists stated that prices could change without notice and that all orders were subject to the manufacturer’s acceptance, and the court held that the lists were not offers.9 A later letter sent to every customer was likewise a mere quotation, because it gave no customer the power to bind the manufacturer to a thousand vials or, for that matter, a million.10
The reservation of the seller’s acceptance carries the weight in that case. A quotation that makes orders subject to the seller’s acceptance leaves the seller a further act to perform, so the recipient’s yes cannot close the deal. The practical reason is plain: if a form quotation sent to every customer were an offer, each customer could hold the seller to whatever quantity it ordered. Brown Machine, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc. applied the same reasoning to a seller’s written proposal for a machine. The proposal said that no order would bind the seller until the seller accepted it on its own acknowledgment form, and it expired by its own terms before the buyer’s purchase order arrived. The proposal was therefore not an offer, and the buyer’s purchase order was.
When the seller’s communication is only an invitation, the buyer’s purchase order is ordinarily the first offer, and the seller’s reply is the response to test. A reply that rejects the order’s terms and substitutes the seller’s own is a counteroffer. In one repair dispute, for example, a seller’s final price quotation, at a lower price than the one in the buyer’s purchase order, was a counteroffer rejecting the order.11
The buyer’s order is only the ordinary choice, though, and what each communication says about the sender’s commitment controls in both directions. In McCarty v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., the buyer’s purchase order stated clearly, expressly, and repeatedly that it was an offer to be accepted by the seller and that no contract existed until the seller accepted it. The court refused to distort that definite expression of an offer into a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance.12 A seller’s quotation can be the offer, too, when it leaves the buyer nothing to do but say yes.
The supplier’s letter and the Brown Machine proposal are equally detailed about goods and price. They differ in whether the seller kept a step for itself, and that one feature decides which party’s communication is the offer.
Identifying the offer in McCarty fixed the baseline for the rest of the case, because the terms enclosed with the seller’s letter were then proposals for additions to the contract the purchase order began.13 In every battle of the forms the offer fixes the baseline in the same way: the reply is measured against the terms offered, and the terms it adds are measured against them. Which document is the offer therefore decides whose fine print is under review and whose is the baseline.
A stem that opens with a catalog, an advertisement, or a price quotation warns that the first document may not be the offer. Check it for a reservation of the seller’s acceptance and for an expiration date that passed before the buyer responded, and do not assume that the seller spoke first in the legal sense.
Definite Expression of Acceptance
Once the offer is identified, the first test asks whether the reply is a definite expression of acceptance. The statute lets a reply state additional or different terms and still operate as an acceptance, but a reply that disagrees with the offer about the deal itself cannot fairly be read as saying yes to it. The Code does not define definite, so courts have supplied the meaning: a reply is definite when it agrees with the offer on the dickered terms, the business terms that parties actually negotiate. Those terms are the goods (including quantity), the price, and the time of performance.16
Businesspeople conclude deals on those three matters, so those are the terms they check when a form comes back. A reply that matches on all three shows that both sides understand a bargain to be closed. The fine print on the back, which nobody negotiated and few people read, says little about whether the parties meant to deal. The same reasoning limits the word: if definite reached boilerplate, almost every pair of preprinted forms would fail the test, because fine print rarely matches, and the mirror image rule would return by another route.
An illustration shows the test passing. Buyco sends a purchase order offering to buy 1,000 widgets at $4.00 per unit with delivery by June 1. Sellco promptly returns an order acknowledgment stating that it is pleased to accept the offer, and the back of its form carries dozens of fine-print terms. The reply expresses acceptance, comes promptly, and agrees with the offer on goods, quantity, price, and delivery time, so it operates as an acceptance and a contract forms on the exchange.17 That result holds even if the fine print includes a material term such as a warranty disclaimer, because materiality is a question for subsection (2) and has no part in formation.18
Change a dickered term and the result flips. If Sellco’s form had promised 800 widgets, or a different price, or delivery on June 15, it would not agree with the bargain that Buyco proposed, and it would not be a definite expression of acceptance.19 The writings would form no contract, and the reply would stand at best as a counteroffer.20 The word accept on the form does not change that result, because the test looks at what the reply does to the dickered terms.
The subsection does not relax the basic requirement of mutual assent. McCarty, discussed above, held that § 2-207(1) still requires a definite expression of acceptance and leaves untouched the common-law requirement of an objective manifestation of mutual assent.21 Koehring Co. v. Glowacki marks the other edge: a response that departs radically from the offer, particularly on dickered terms, may fail as an expression of acceptance and end the formation inquiry at once.
A reply that fails the definiteness test is not an acceptance, so the writings alone form no contract. The analysis does not necessarily stop there. Article 2 lets a contract form in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including by the conduct of the parties,22 and when both sides ship, receive, and pay as though a deal exists, subsection (3) can establish a contract for sale although the writings do not otherwise establish one.23 Parties often keep performing while they disagree about a term. In one staffing dispute, an agency sent a contract with a non-solicitation clause every time it supplied employees, the customer took specific exception to the clause and refused to sign, and the customer nonetheless paid for the employees each time.24 Whether such a course of dealing forms a contract, and on what terms, is the question that subsection (3) answers.
The usual exam error is to ask how many terms differ or whether the differences are material. Materiality sorts terms later, under subsection (2); here the only question is whether the dickered terms agree. On multiple-choice questions, the stem has already narrowed the field of possible errors,25 so ask which of the three formation tests its facts raise. A changed quantity points to definiteness, a lapsed deadline to seasonableness, and a recital that acceptance is conditional to the third test.
Seasonable Acceptance
A reply that agrees on the dickered terms must also be seasonable. Definiteness asks what the reply says, and seasonableness asks when it was sent. If the offer states a deadline, a reply sent within it is seasonable. If the offer states none, a reply sent within a reasonable time is seasonable.
The requirement survives in a section written to relax the mirror image rule because an offer is a power that the offeror gives for a limited time. A variation in the fine print leaves the offeror in no doubt that the offeree wants the deal, so the statute can safely let such a reply operate as an acceptance. Silence past the deadline leaves the offeror guessing. An offeror who hears nothing may treat the offer as dead, sell the goods elsewhere, and commit capacity to other customers, and a reply that arrives later answers an offer that no longer exists.
The content of the reply plays no part in that result. Which moment in the reply’s journey is measured against the deadline, its sending or its arrival, is a question for the timing rules covered earlier in this chapter.
When the offer names no deadline, a reasonable time is ordinarily a question of fact. Courts consider factors such as whether the transaction is speculative and what the offeror evidently wanted,27 and evidence of how quickly these parties and this trade ordinarily respond shows what the offeror expected. A week may be prompt for a custom machine and slow for produce whose price moves daily.
A reply that fails the seasonableness test is not an acceptance, so the exchange of writings forms no contract under subsection (1). At common law, the classical view treats a late acceptance as an offer that the original offeror can accept only by a communicated acceptance, and a second view lets the offeror treat the reply as an acceptance by waiving the lateness.28 Under Article 2, a late reply does not necessarily end the analysis, because the parties may still have a contract based on what they did. If both sides ship, receive, and pay as though a deal exists, subsection (3) establishes a contract whose terms are those on which the writings agree, together with the Code’s supplementary terms.29
The usual exam error is to let a favorable fact about one test carry the others. A reply that matches the offer on every dickered term is still not an acceptance if it is late, and a reply that is timely but carries different fine print passes this test and moves on to the third. Seasonableness asks only whether the reply came within the agreed or reasonable time, and the next subsection turns to whether the reply made its assent expressly conditional.
Expressly Conditional Acceptance
The last clause of § 2-207(1) gives the offeree one way out of the section’s general rule. A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance despite additional or different terms “unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”31 An offeree who uses that exit has sent a counteroffer, and no contract forms on the writings until the original offeror agrees to the offeree’s terms. The clause tracks the common-law rule of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59, under which a reply that purports to accept but is conditional on the offeror’s assent to additional or different terms is a counteroffer.32 It entered the statute at the request of drafting-committee members who feared that the broader language would be misread. The chair agreed because, in his view, a reply conditioned on assent to changed terms was never an expression of acceptance to begin with.33 An offeree who will deal only on its own terms therefore keeps the power to say so. The question is how clearly it must say it.
Courts answer that question strictly. They construe the clause narrowly, applying it only to a reply that clearly reveals that the offeree is unwilling to proceed without agreement to the additional or different terms, and a seller that merely encloses its conditions of sale with a cover letter has not met that standard.34 The structure of the section explains the strictness. Nearly every preprinted acknowledgment recites that it is subject to the terms on its reverse side, so if that recital were enough, almost every varying reply would become a counteroffer and the mirror image rule would return through the statute’s own exception. Clarity also serves the offeror, who must know whether a contract exists before deciding to bargain, decline, or hold back performance. A reply that plainly says there is no deal without the offeror’s assent supplies that knowledge, while a vague recital leaves the offeror reasonably reading the reply as a yes.
The early decisions read the clause more broadly. In Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., the seller’s acknowledgment disclaimed warranties and required the buyer to notify the seller of any objection. The First Circuit held that the notification requirement made the acknowledgment expressly conditional on the buyer’s assent to the disclaimer, so the acknowledgment was a counteroffer. The buyer, who did not protest and then received and paid for the goods, was deemed to have accepted the counteroffer and became bound.35 Critics objected that treating an acceptance with materially different terms as conditional restored the mirror image rule, and the First Circuit later overruled the decision in Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc. Mostt courts now look to what the words of the reply say. If the words clearly show that the offeree’s assent depends on the offeror’s agreement to the offeree’s terms, the reply is expressly conditional, even when the words are boilerplate, and a form that tracks the statute’s own language qualifies. A recital that the acceptance is “subject to” the terms of the form does not. Nearly all courts so hold, because the words do not declare that the offeree is unwilling to proceed without the offeror’s agreement.36 Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp. supplies the standard illustration. The seller’s acknowledgment forms said that they were “subject to all of the terms and conditions on the face and reverse side hereof, including arbitration, all of which are accepted by buyer,” and the court held that this language was not expressly conditional. The recital describes the terms on which the seller proposes to deal, but it never says that the seller will refuse to proceed unless the buyer agrees. A contract therefore formed under subsection (1), and the arbitration clause was a proposal for addition under subsection (2).
Language that merely suggests or requests an added term is weaker still. A court may conclude that the language of an acceptance relating to an additional or different term is only suggestive, or precatory, which yields a contract on the offeror’s terms and leaves the offeror free to decide whether to accept the offeree’s proposal.37 Under the mirror image rule, the court in Ardente v. Horan treated an acceptance with a limitation as a counteroffer, and the buyer lost his claim for specific performance, although commentators ask whether the court could instead have read the added language as precatory.38 A reply that accepts an order and says that the seller would prefer payment thirty days after invoice voices a wish about an added term while committing to the deal, so it is an acceptance and the payment term is only a proposal.39
The redrafted Sellco form differs from the recital in Dorton in one respect: it states what the seller will refuse to do.
When the clause applies, the exchange of writings forms no contract, and what the parties do next decides the matter. At common law, an offeror who proceeds under a contract after receiving a counteroffer accepts its terms by performance,40 so a buyer who took receipt of goods and paid for them without objection was deemed to have accepted the seller’s counteroffer in full.41 Article 2 breaks with that last-shot result. If both sides perform as though they had a contract, subsection (3) establishes one whose terms are those on which the writings agree, together with the Code’s supplementary terms.42 In the Sellco hypothetical, the arbitration clause drops out of that contract because the writings disagree about it, even though Sellco conditioned its acceptance on that very clause.
The error to avoid is treating a “subject to” recital, enclosed conditions of sale, or a material new term as if it were an ultimatum, since none of them tells the offeror that the offeree will refuse to proceed.
Written Confirmations
The same sentence of subsection (1) reaches a second kind of writing, “a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time,” and says that it operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those “offered or agreed upon.”44 The phrase agreed upon points to a deal that exists before the writing is sent. The earlier tests applied to replies to offers, where the open question was whether the writings formed a contract. A confirmation works differently, because that question was answered before anyone wrote it.
Merchants often close a deal by telephone and then send formal memoranda that record the agreed terms and add terms that nobody discussed. Read literally, the text makes little sense for such a memorandum, because a writing that confirms a contract cannot also accept it; offer and acceptance are already finished. The working rule therefore sets the acceptance language aside and keeps the point that matters. Where confirming memoranda are involved, the only issue is whether their additional or different terms become part of the contract, and the answer comes from the same analysis that governs terms stated in an acceptance, which subsection (2) supplies.45
The steel order shows how this works. Boilerplate orders steel from Ironclad by telephone, and Ironclad accepts during the call. The parties never discuss how disputes will be resolved. Ironclad then sends an acknowledgment that contains a forum selection clause. The contract formed during the call, so the section’s job is to decide whether the clause became part of it, and the section has no formation question to resolve.46
In a confirmation, the baseline is the prior agreement, not an offer. A term in the confirmation is additional if the agreement said nothing on the subject, as with the forum clause above, and different if the agreement addressed the subject and the confirmation says something else. The other party’s writing is not the benchmark, and it need not exist, because only one party may have sent anything. The clash that matters is between the writings and the original agreement.47
That benchmark protects what the parties actually agreed. A party that has already agreed to a term may not knock it out by sending a confirmation that says something different. The knock-out rule has a narrower office: it applies only when both parties send confirmations whose terms differ from each other’s, and then only to those conflicting terms.48
Which of a confirmation’s added or different terms enter the contract is a question for the next section, but the rule is the same as for terms in an acceptance. They become part of the contract only if both parties are merchants and none of the other barriers in subsection (2) applies. If the recipient is not a merchant, the term does not become part of the contract unless she specifically agreed to modify the contract by adding it.49
Performance after a confirmation raises one more trap. Subsection (3) provides that conduct by both parties recognizing the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish one although the writings do not otherwise establish a contract.50 If both sides ship, receive, and pay after the confirmation goes out, a literal reading might send the case there. But the contract in the confirmation setting arose from the earlier oral or informal agreement, not from the writings or the performance. Subsection (3) is meant for situations in which no contract would exist without the performance, and not for situations in which an oral contract has been concluded.51
Ironclad’s acknowledgment in this exchange and the one in the telephone-order version could be photocopies of each other. What differs is whether a deal came before the paper, and that fact decides whether the writing is tested for formation at all.
The first question on any § 2-207 problem is therefore whether the writing confirms an existing agreement or answers a purchase order. Because Article 2 lets a contract form in any manner sufficient to show agreement, a telephone call can do the work of offer and acceptance.52 A writing that answers an order is tested under subsection (1) for definiteness, seasonableness, and conditional language, while a writing that confirms an agreement already made skips that test and goes straight to subsection (2).