Concept
Contract by Conduct
Acceptance terms and timing: mirror image rule, mailbox rule, and UCC § 2-207
Contract by Conduct
Parties often keep performing after their forms fail to make a contract. The seller ships, the buyer takes the goods and pays, and neither mentions that the forms clash. Section 2-207(3) was written for that moment. It provides that conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings do not otherwise establish one, and that the terms of that contract consist of those on which the writings agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under other provisions of the Act.1
The subsection catches transactions that subsection (1) lets fall. Subsection (1) finds no contract in the writings when the reply is not a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, or when it makes acceptance expressly conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.2 A reply of the second kind is a counteroffer, not an acceptance.3 At common law, a party who receives a counteroffer and proceeds with the deal accepts the counteroffer's terms by performing.4 Subsection (3) keeps the first half of that analysis and discards the second: the writings made no contract, but performance by both sides does, and the performance is not assent to the other side's terms.5
Three questions organize what follows: what conduct triggers the subsection, what terms the resulting contract contains, and when the subsection has no work to do.
When Conduct Forms a Contract
Subsection (3) is a fallback. It operates only after subsection (1) has found no contract in the writings, and it then asks whether what the parties did next shows that each side regards the deal as made.6 One court described the sequence this way: when no contract is recognized under subsection (1), the entire transaction aborts at that point, unless the parties' later conduct, particularly performance by both under what they apparently believe to be a contract, recognizes that a contract exists. If it does, subsection (3) makes the conduct sufficient to establish a contract even though the writings alone would not have.7
The writings fall short in either of two ways. The reply may not be a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, or it may contain an expressly made conditional clause. The second is substantially more common. The usual conduct is the seller shipping the goods and the buyer paying for them.8
The acknowledgment was expressly conditional, so subsection (1) finds no contract in the writings. Shipping, receiving, and paying are conduct by both parties recognizing a contract, so subsection (3) supplies one. Arbitration appears on Flintstone's form alone and is not a term on which the writings agree, so Rubble is not bound to arbitrate. The dispute goes to court, which is where a dispute goes when the parties leave the matter open.9 At common law the same paper would give Flintstone its arbitration clause, because Rubble, by performing, would have accepted the counteroffer.10 The forms, the shipment, and the payment are identical under the two rules. Only what the law makes of the performance differs.
The statute asks for conduct by both parties, and the requirement does real work. An act by one side shows only what that side believes. A buyer who mails a check may hope the seller will go along, and a seller who ships may hope to pressure the buyer, but neither act alone shows that the other side treats the deal as made.
Only the buyer has acted, so subsection (3) supplies no contract, and the writings supplied none either. The seller remains free to decline the deal, and the buyer's check creates no obligation.
Performance by both parties shows that a contract exists. It does not show that either side approved the other's terms. An offeror can of course agree expressly to the offeree's proposed terms, but courts demand a specific and unequivocal expression of acceptance from the offeror before they find that agreement. Receiving goods and paying for them is not an express statement of agreement, so it cannot meet that standard, and the standard fits subsection (3)'s rejection of the last shot rule.11
Subsection (1) forces a court to identify the offer, since a reply is definite, seasonable, or conditional only in relation to the communication it answers. Subsection (3) removes that burden. In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, the court saw no need to parse the parties' various actions to decide exactly when they formed a contract. TSL had shipped the product, Step-Saver had accepted and paid for each copy, and that performance demonstrated a contract, so the dispute concerned the nature of its terms and not its existence.12 Article 2's general formation rule points the same way. A contract for the sale of goods may be formed in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including the parties' conduct, and the exact moment of formation need not be identified.13 Because those formation rules do not compel a particular result, one commentator asks which reading produces the better outcome and proposes that rolling contracts formed under § 2-204 be enforceable if buyers predictably gain from the procedure compared with the one § 2-207 requires.14 A complete answer on a tangled problem should say which route it takes and why, because forms that cross in the mail leave room to dispute whether a reply was a definite expression of acceptance at all.
A fact pattern that pairs an expressly conditional acknowledgment with shipment and payment calls for two conclusions: a contract exists, and the conditional form's extra terms are not part of it. Stopping after the first leaves the answer unfinished, and saying the seller's terms govern repeats the common-law result that the subsection was written to replace.
Terms of a Conduct Contract
The sentence of subsection (3) that creates the contract also fixes its contents: the terms are those on which the writings agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under other provisions of the Act.16 Only two sources feed the contract, the overlap between the forms and the Code's own background rules, and neither party's paper controls. That is a pointed rejection of the common-law approach in which one side totally wins.17
The overlap is narrow. A term on which both forms agree stays. A term found in only one form drops out, and so do competing versions of a term on which the forms conflict, because the writings do not agree on it.18 The rationale is realistic. As one commentator observes, when the parties have not read each other's forms, speaking of agreement to the other side's fine print is fiction, and a rule that handed the terms to whoever mailed last would favor that party arbitrarily.19 The only assent in the record is assent to what the forms share, plus the shared understanding that a deal exists.
The second source fills what the overlap leaves empty. The default rules of Article 2 supply the missing terms,20 which are the supplemental terms the UCC provides.21 A default rule is a source of law that applies when the parties have not drafted a rule for themselves, and court adjudication, for example, is the default mode of dispute resolution when they have left that gap.22
The writings form no contract, but the conduct does, and the contract consists of the four matching terms plus the Code's supplementary terms. The disclaimer and the cap appear only in the manufacturer's form, so they drop out, and the Code's default rules, including its implied warranty of merchantability, govern the quality of the mixers. Had the bakery's own order carried the same damages cap, the cap would be a term on which the writings agree, and it would stay.
One court reached the opposite result on a warranty disclaimer. The seller's acknowledgment required the buyer to notify the seller if the disclaimer was unacceptable, and the court held that this made the seller's acceptance expressly conditional on the buyer's assent. The acknowledgment was therefore a counteroffer, and the buyer, who failed to protest and then received and paid for the goods, was deemed to have accepted it and “became bound.” The court thought it absurd to treat the disclaimer as a mere proposal under § 2-207(2), since no buyer would willingly adopt so unfavorable a term.23 Subsection (3) points the other way. When the writings do not establish a contract but the parties' conduct shows that both proceeded as if one existed, the contract consists of the terms on which the writings agree, with neither form gaining primacy, plus the UCC's supplemental terms.24 The seller's disclaimer survived in that decision only because the court read the buyer's performance as assent.
A seller who wants its fine print in the contract therefore cannot count on shipping to deliver it. It needs a specific and unequivocal expression of assent from the buyer before it performs.25
Two mistakes recur on exams. The first is to run the exceptions of subsection (2) against a disputed term. Those exceptions screen additional terms in a reply that formed a contract on the writings, and in most situations they exclude the proposed addition.26 They play no part when the contract rests on conduct, where the only questions are whether the term appears in both writings and, if not, what the Code supplies. The second mistake is to restore a struck term as a supplementary term, or to award the last sender its terms because it shipped last.
Where Subsection (3) Does Not Apply
UCC § 2-207(3) establishes a contract from conduct only “although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.”28 That condition limits the subsection as well as triggering it. When something other than conduct has already formed the contract, the subsection has nothing to do, and shipment, receipt, and payment are simply performance. Three settings close it: the writings formed the contract, an earlier agreement formed it, or the transaction falls outside Article 2.
In the first setting, the reply passes subsection (1). A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it states additional or different terms, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to them.29 Subsection (2) then decides which of the added terms join the contract, and its positive wording is deceptive. The exceptions leave the rule applicable only to relatively unimportant terms in a small range of cases, and in most situations the offeree does not succeed in adding terms.30
Language in a reply may also be too weak to make the acceptance conditional. A court may conclude that the language relating to an additional or different term is only suggestive, or precatory. The writings then form a contract on the offeror's terms, and the offeror may decide whether to modify that contract by accepting the offeree's proposal.31
The second setting arises when the parties reach an oral or informal agreement and then exchange confirmations. Formation is complete before any form is mailed, so the live question is whether a confirmation's added or different terms join the contract, and subsection (2) answers it. For a post-contractual confirmation, the section raises no offer-and-acceptance issue. It supplies the same rule that governs added terms in an acceptance, so a term joins the contract only if both parties are merchants and none of the other barriers applies. A party who is not a merchant is not bound by an added term in a confirmation unless she specifically agrees to modify the contract by adding it.32
Because the contract arises from the earlier agreement, the literal text of subsection (3) seems to invite its use once both sides perform. That reading misses the purpose. The subsection addresses situations in which no contract would exist without the performance, and it does not reach a case in which an oral contract has already been concluded.33 A party who has agreed to the oral terms should likewise not be permitted unilaterally to change or knock out any of them by sending a confirmation containing a different term. If both sides send confirmations whose terms differ from each other, the knock-out rule applies to the differing terms in those confirmations.34
The call formed the contract and fixed the price. The confirmation's different price is a proposal to change that agreement, and the supplier, having agreed to the oral terms, may not change them by sending a form that says something else.35 Subsection (3) cannot supply the $1.25 price either, because no one needs conduct to establish a contract the call already made.36
Two reasons support the limit, and each answers a different half of the subsection. The trigger exists to find a contract where the writings leave none, so it has no job once a contract has been found. The terms formula exists for parties who never agreed to each other's fine print, so a contract that already exists takes its terms from the agreement the parties made and from the screen of subsection (2). If later performance could add a term under subsection (3), a party whose term failed that screen could cure the failure by shipping or paying, and the screen would protect no one. Performance cannot carry that weight, because shipping, receiving, and paying are what the existing contract already requires, and they say nothing about whether either side approved a proposed change.
The third setting lies outside Article 2. The Article applies to transactions in goods, does not apply to a transaction intended to operate only as a security transaction, and does not impair any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers, or other specified classes of buyers.37 Subsection (3) is a rule for sales of goods, so a transaction that falls outside the Article gets no help from it.
The late reply is not a seasonable expression of acceptance, and with no earlier agreement the writings form no contract. Conduct by both parties recognizes a contract, so subsection (3) supplies one, and the liability cap, which appears in only one writing, is not part of it. The brass sale and the hop sale reach performance the same way. What differs is what existed before it: a telephone call that had already formed a contract in one, and nothing but mismatched paper in the other. That fact decides whether the controlling terms come from the earlier agreement and subsection (2), or from the overlap of the writings under subsection (3).