Concept
Working Through a Problem
Acceptance terms and timing: mirror image rule, mailbox rule, and UCC § 2-207
Working Through a Problem
A battle-of-the-forms problem rewards the student who asks the statute’s questions in the statute’s order, because each answer decides which question comes next. Subsection (1) asks whether the exchanged writings form a contract: a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it states additional or different terms, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to them.1 If the reply passes that test, subsection (2) sorts the extra terms. If it fails, subsection (3) asks whether conduct by both parties recognizes a contract and, if it does, builds the terms from those on which the writings agree plus the Code’s supplementary terms.2 The Mendoza and G&P problem runs that sequence on one set of facts and shows what a skipped step costs.
The Facts
Mendoza Construction is the general contractor on several buildings for Wintel, Inc., and G&P Industries supplies roofing materials and compounds. On September 15, Margaret Novak of Mendoza phoned Frank Park of G&P to ask the price, availability, and delivery schedule, and Park answered and told her to order soon because demand was brisk. On October 1, Novak emailed an order for roofing products at the quoted price and schedule, with delivery of everything by November 15. The next morning Park faxed a reply that confirmed receipt and the basic terms and stated, “Acceptance of Your Order Is Subject to the Following Terms and Conditions.” Six terms followed:
- a payment schedule of 10 percent in ten days and the balance seven days after delivery is complete;
- interest of 1 percent a month on unpaid amounts;
- attorneys’ fees and collection costs;
- arbitration of all disputes;
- the manufacturer’s warranty on the materials; and
- a delay clause that lets Mendoza cancel only if delivery slips more than 60 days past the scheduled date and otherwise leaves G&P not liable for delays beyond its control.
Mendoza mailed a check for $35,643.20, ten percent of the price, on October 7. On November 4, Park reported that the manufacturer’s next delivery would be late and that G&P expected the materials in 30 to 45 days. Novak objected that the delay would expose Mendoza to liquidated damages under its contract with Wintel. Park replied that G&P was not responsible for delays beyond its control and that G&P would keep the deposit and seek other damages if Mendoza refused to honor the contract. Novak then found another supplier who could deliver on time and asked G&P to cancel, and Park refused.
Park’s estimate falls inside the sixth term’s 60-day window, so whether that term is part of the contract largely decides who wins. If the term is in, Mendoza cannot yet cancel. If it is out, the November 15 date controls.
The Sale of Goods and the Offer
Article 2 applies because roofing materials and compounds are goods, and the choice of regime changes the result. Under the common-law mirror image rule, a reply that varies the offer’s terms is a counteroffer that ends the offeree’s power of acceptance, so G&P’s fax would leave the parties without a contract, while § 2-207(1) allows a contract even when the reply states additional or different terms.3 The facts raise no doubt that this is a sale of goods, so a sentence settles the point. The economy is deliberate: an answer earns credit for each rule the facts raise and none for the rules they do not.4
Next, find the offer, because a reply can be definite, timely, or conditional only in relation to what it answers. Article 2 does not define an offer, so common-law principles supply the definition.5 A communication is an offer if it manifests the maker’s intent to invite acceptance and conveys the reasonable understanding that, upon acceptance, the maker expects to be committed to a contract without any opportunity for further approval; the test is objective, viewed from the position of a reasonable recipient.6 Park’s September 15 call fails that test. He gave information Novak had requested and told her to place an order, which a reasonable listener would hear as an invitation to make an offer. Novak’s October 1 email passes it, because it names the products, the quoted price, and the delivery date and invites G&P’s assent.
Suppose a court instead read Park’s call as an offer. The email would then be an acceptance and the fax a written confirmation, which subsection (1) also reaches.7 A confirmation raises no offer-and-acceptance question. Its terms are sorted by the same rule that governs additional or different terms in an acceptance: they join the contract only if both parties are merchants and none of the other barriers in subsection (2) applies.8 Had Mendoza not been a merchant, the answer would be simpler still, because an additional or different term in a confirmation would not join the contract unless Mendoza specifically agreed to modify the contract by adding it.9 The alternative reading therefore changes the route and leaves the sorting of the six terms where it was.
Acceptance or Counteroffer
The fax is a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance. It went out the morning after the order and repeats the products, price, and delivery schedule, so it departs from none of the bargained terms and differs from the order only in the six listed terms.
The common error comes next: a student sees “subject to” and announces a counteroffer. Under the common-law rule, a reply that purports to accept but is conditional on the offeror’s assent to additional or different terms is a counteroffer.10 Section 2-207(1) keeps that outcome only when acceptance is “expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”11 The word “expressly” carries the weight, because the reply itself must make the deal depend on the other side’s agreement. G&P’s fax recites that acceptance is subject to the listed terms, but it never says that G&P will refuse to proceed unless Mendoza agrees, and a recital of that kind, without more, is not an express condition. The fax is an acceptance, and a contract formed on October 2.
Sorting the Six Terms
Subsection (2) sorts the six terms one at a time. Each enters only if both parties are merchants and none of three barriers applies: the offer expressly limited acceptance to its own terms, the term materially alters the offer, or the offeror objected within a reasonable time.12 The facts suggest that both parties are merchants, since G&P sells roofing materials and Mendoza is a commercial contractor buying them for a building project.
The first barrier does not help Mendoza, because Novak’s email contained nothing limiting acceptance to its own terms.13 The third barrier is weak. Novak’s first protest came more than a month after the fax and was aimed at the delay, not at any listed term, so a court would have to stretch to treat it as a timely objection. The work falls to the material-alteration barrier. Many courts ask whether a term causes “hardship as a result of surprise,” and the test has generated a great deal of litigation because of its fuzziness.14
The routine terms probably enter. A commercial buyer is unlikely to be surprised by a payment schedule or an interest charge, and Mendoza’s ten percent deposit fits the payment term. Attorneys’ fees and collection costs are closer, because a court could find that shifting them to the buyer causes surprise. The warranty term depends on its wording: passing along the manufacturer’s warranty takes nothing from Mendoza, while replacing Mendoza’s other warranty rights would likely be a surprise.
The arbitration clause is the clearest candidate for exclusion. The order says nothing about how disputes are resolved, so the clause adds a term, where one that contradicted a stated term would count as different.15 A term that changes the way disputes are settled is surprising, causes hardship, and probably materially alters the contract, so it stays out.16 With the clause excluded, the contract survives and disputes go to court, the default forum when the parties leave the question open.17
The delay clause is where the dispute is won or lost, and a strong answer says what is arguable on each side and which side is stronger. G&P will argue that excusing delays beyond a supplier’s control is routine and that the 60-day window gives the buyer notice and a fixed exit. Mendoza will answer that delivery by November 15 was a bargained term of the order, and that a clause barring cancellation for delays of up to 60 days rewrites what missing that date means on a construction schedule. Mendoza’s argument is the stronger one.
Because the clause qualifies a date the order fixed, a careful answer also notes that it may count as a different term and not an additional one. Subsection (2) speaks only of “additional” terms, and the possible readings diverge. One reading extends “additional” to cover different terms, which sends the clause through the same tests. The other treats subsection (2) as silent about different terms and holds that conflicting terms knock each other out, leaving the court to fill the gap.18 On the first reading, the clause is excluded as a material alteration and November 15 stands. On the second, the clause and the November 15 date both fall away and a default rule governs delivery. A good answer names the approach it takes and follows that approach to its consequence.
The Conduct Route
A single sentence in the fax would have moved the analysis to a different route.
At common law, G&P’s terms would have fared better. In the Princess dispute, a price quotation that varied the purchase order was a counteroffer rejecting it,19 and the offeror who gave permission to proceed and paid the quoted amount accepted the counteroffer’s terms by performance.20 Subsection (3) gives performance no such effect. Mendoza’s deposit recognizes a contract, but the terms of that contract are those on which the writings agree plus the Code’s supplementary terms.21
Both routes exclude the delay clause, but for different reasons. Under subsection (2), exclusion rests on a judgment about surprise that a court could make the other way.22 Under subsection (3), it follows from comparing the two writings, because the clause appears only in G&P’s fax. The routes also part ways on the routine terms. The payment schedule and interest charge probably enter under subsection (2), but under subsection (3) they drop out, because they too appear in only one writing.
Keeping Timing Questions Apart
The mailbox rule answers when an acceptance took effect, and § 2-207 answers whether exchanged writings formed a contract and on what terms; neither substitutes for the other. The Mendoza facts raise no timing question, because no revocation competed with the fax. A different problem raises nothing but timing. Steve offered Ben his beach house for $1,850,000 and gave him until May 10 to respond. At 9:30 a.m. on May 2, Ben mailed a properly addressed acceptance. At 11:00 a.m., Steve signed a written agreement to sell the house to Lola, and at 2:00 p.m., when Ben telephoned to arrange an engineer’s inspection, Steve told him it was already sold.23
No forms are exchanged, so § 2-207 has nothing to sort. The question is whether Ben’s acceptance took effect before Steve sold to Lola. An acceptance made in a manner and by a medium the offer invited is operative as soon as it leaves the offeree’s possession, whether or not it ever reaches the offeror.24 The offer’s own terms decide whether mailing was open to Ben: an offer that prescribes the manner of acceptance must be followed, but an offer that merely suggests a manner does not preclude another.25 If the offer said nothing about how to answer, Ben’s mailed acceptance completed the contract at 9:30 a.m., before Steve sold to Lola.
The Sequence
Steps five and six are alternatives: a reply that is an acceptance sends its added terms to subsection (2), a reply that is not an acceptance sends the parties to subsection (3), and one contract never takes its terms from both.