Concept
Options Override the Termination Rules
Termination of the power of acceptance and irrevocable offers
Options Override the Termination Rules
Every termination rule earlier in this chapter describes how an ordinary offer ends. An option contract escapes nearly all of them. Section 37 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts says so directly: notwithstanding §§ 38 through 49, the power of acceptance under an option contract is not terminated by rejection or counteroffer, by revocation, or by the death or incapacity of the offeror, unless the requirements for the discharge of a contractual duty are met.1
The exemption makes sense once you see what an option is. It is a promise that meets the requirements for the formation of a contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer.2 The promise may sit inside the offer itself or in a separate, collateral promise to keep the offer open.3 An offer in a signed writing that recites a purported consideration and proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time is also binding as an option contract.4 The word “option” itself is a trap, because people use it for any continuing offer, even a revocable one. The Restatement says “option contract” to mean only a promise that limits the power to revoke.5
Comment d to the Restatement's option-contract section (§ 25) states the consequence. The option contract limits the promisor's power to revoke, the termination of the offeree's power of acceptance is subject to the requirements for discharge of a contractual duty, and a revocation by the offeror is not of itself effective, so the offer is properly called irrevocable.6 The optionee has paid for and owns a right to accept for the stated period, and a contract right, unlike a bare offer, does not disappear because one party says it has.7 Each event that would kill an ordinary offer therefore fails against an option. The optionee's rejection or counteroffer does not end the power she bought.8 The optionor's revocation is not of itself effective.9 The optionor's death, taken up below, leaves the power intact.
An option can still end. The parties may discharge it by another binding agreement, ordinarily supported by new consideration on both sides, or the optionee's power may end on some other ground that discharges a contractual duty.10 A bare statement by the optionee that she will not exercise is neither of these. It is unilateral, not a new bargain, and it discharges nothing. The option also ends on its own schedule. The optionee's power does not expire until the end of the option period,11 and a revocation before then is not of itself effective.12 The ordinary rule fixes the deadline: the power ends at the time the option specifies or, if none is specified, at the end of a reasonable time.13
One exception lets the optionee's own words defeat the option. The prevailing view is that her statement that she will not accept does not terminate the power she paid for. But if the optionor reasonably and foreseeably changed position to his detriment in reliance on that stated intention, the optionee is estopped from denying that her rejection ended her power.14 Without the exception, she could prompt him to commit the property elsewhere and then exercise anyway, leaving him bound twice for one parcel. The exception therefore requires real reliance, such as a binding sale to another buyer. An optionor who only waited changed nothing in reliance and gets no estoppel.
Section 48 states the generally accepted rule that an offeree's power of acceptance ends when the offeror dies or loses legal capacity.15 Corbin saw no compelling necessity for that rule. The law has no difficulty creating legal relations with a dead man's personal representative when he has contracted to pay debts, he observed, and it would have no greater difficulty letting the power of acceptance survive against the offeror's representative.16 Section 37 reaches that result for options: the offeror's death or incapacity does not terminate the optionee's power, and she may exercise against the estate.17
The text of § 37 names only the offeror's death or incapacity. The general rule of § 48 also ends an offeree's power on her own death or incapacity,18 and nothing in the quoted text of § 37 says an option is different. Other statements of the option rule, however, extend survival to the death or insanity of the optionee as well.19 An exam answer should rest on the words of § 37 and flag the open point.
Within the option period, the optionee exercises by an acceptance, and the Restatement makes receipt the moment that counts. Under § 63(b), an acceptance under an option contract is not operative until the offeror receives it, in contrast to the usual rule that an acceptance by the invited manner and medium takes effect when it leaves the offeree's hands.20 The dispatch rule exists to give an offeree a dependable basis for decision, so that once she has mailed and is relying on the deal, a revocation cannot catch her. An optionee already has that security from the option itself, and “where more is needed, the option contract is available.”21 The date of receipt, not the date of mailing, is therefore the date to compare with the end of the period. Not every court agrees. An Oklahoma court in Worms v. Burgess rejected the Restatement position, reasoning that the mailbox rule is so widely known that parties to an option should be presumed to have contracted with reference to it unless they expressly provide otherwise.22
The usual exam error is to run the termination checklist on an option as though it were an ordinary offer, so that the optionee's early refusal or the optionor's change of heart ends the problem. Ask first whether a true option exists, meaning a promise to hold the offer open that is supported by consideration, by a signed writing reciting a purported consideration, or by another recognized basis. If the promise is unsupported, the offer is an ordinary revocable one, and every termination rule in this chapter applies. If an option exists, the answer turns on four limits: the stated period, the requirements for discharge, the estoppel exception, and receipt as the moment of exercise.