Concept
Breach and Remedy Test
Common-law definiteness
Breach and Remedy Test
An agreement can leave a great deal unsaid and still bind the parties, so the question is how much a court needs before it can act. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2) answers in functional terms: the terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.1
That sentence turns "reasonable certainty" into two tasks. When a plaintiff sues, the court must decide whether the defendant failed to do what the agreement required, and, if so, it must grant relief that answers to the bargain the plaintiff lost. An agreement passes when its terms make both tasks possible. Counting omitted terms tells you little; what matters is whether any omission blocks one of the two.
This is the common-law test. It governs transactions that Article 2 of the UCC does not reach, since Article 2 deals with sales of goods and does not apply to contracts for the sale of real estate, contracts to provide services, or contracts to lease goods.2 The treatment of missing terms under Article 2 appears in the Contrast With the UCC section below.
Basis for Finding Breach
The first half of § 33(2) asks whether the terms give a basis for determining the existence of a breach.3 Breach is a comparison. The court sets what the defendant promised beside what the defendant did and decides whether the performance fell short. The comparison needs both sides, and the promise side exists only if the terms describe the promised performance well enough to be stated. When the agreement leaves the promise itself undefined, nothing marks the point at which performance became deficient, and no one can say that a failure occurred.
The yardstick need not be complete. If an agreement had to settle every conceivable disagreement, almost no real contract would survive, because no one drafts for every contingency. The sensible way to apply the test is to ask it about the failure the plaintiff actually alleges: given what the parties said, can that failure be recognized as a failure?
A bonus dispute shows what a usable yardstick looks like. A plaintiff sued on a bonus contract for $18,404.31 and later amended her petition to add prejudgment interest. At trial the defendant, Laiben, denied having told the agents at a March meeting that the bonuses would be paid at the end of the year, and he testified that he had told them payment would wait until the following March.4 The terms on one point, the time of payment, decided whether withholding the money was a breach. If year-end payment was promised, the defendant fell short by not paying then; if March was promised, he did not. The example involves a disputed term rather than a missing one, but it shows the comparison the first half of the test requires.
The reverse appears in Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever, where the Illinois Supreme Court refused to enforce an agreement to publish a collection of John Cheever's stories because essential matters, such as which stories the book would contain, were left unresolved. On those terms, a court asked whether the publisher had breached would have found nothing to hold its conduct against: a slim volume, a lavish one, and a refusal to publish a submitted manuscript would all fit what the parties had said.
The stamp card and the Cheever agreement both left much unsettled, so counting the gaps does not separate them. What separates them is whether a core obligation can be identified. On the card, the central duty to redeem for some gift could be stated, and giving nothing plainly broke it. In Cheever, the court found the terms too open to say what the publisher owed. The useful question is therefore not whether the parties covered everything, but whether the terms say enough about the point in dispute for a court to compare promise with performance.
Passing this half does not end the analysis, because a court that finds a breach must also be able to grant relief.
Basis for an Appropriate Remedy
The second half of § 33(2) asks whether the terms provide a basis for giving an appropriate remedy.6 A court that has found a breach has finished only half its job, because the plaintiff came for relief and not for a finding. That relief aims to protect the plaintiff's expectation interest. The simplest way to protect it would be specific performance, an order that the defendant cooperate in exchanging performances as originally agreed. Such relief is often unavailable, however, and sometimes the defendant is simply unable to perform.7 When that order cannot issue, the court needs some other measure of what the plaintiff lost, and the agreement has to point toward one. If nothing in the deal does, any award is a guess, and a guess is the court's own invention rather than enforcement of the parties' bargain.
The standard is reasonable certainty, so the basis need not yield a figure to the dollar; it must give the court something firmer than a guess. The two halves of § 33(2) also work independently. A defendant's failure can be obvious while the cost of that failure remains unknowable, and the remedy half exists to catch that case.
Price is the measure that most often does this work, and sales law states the consequence of its absence plainly. If no price can be set, a court has no way to compute damages by the difference between the contract price and the market price, by the difference between the contract price and the aggrieved buyer's cost of cover, or by the difference between the contract price and the aggrieved seller's resale price.8
A lease renewal clause fails on exactly this ground. The lease provided that at the end of its term "landlord and tenant shall agree on an appropriate rent" for a further term. The parties could not agree, the landlord ordered the tenant to leave, and the tenant sued. The court held that an agreement to agree on rent does not suffice, so no contract on renewal had formed, and it refused to impose a reasonable rent of its own because price is an essential term.9 Viewed through the remedy half, the clause names no rent, no formula, and no person who will set one. Any figure the court chose would be its own.
What suffices is an agreed method, even without an agreed number. A price can be fixed by the market price on a fixed date on a recognized market, by a formula or calculation method as with many adjustable rate mortgages, by an institution that regularly sets prices for similar contracts, such as the "blue book" for automobiles, or by a specific person such as a third-party expert. A bare agreement to agree on the price later does not suffice.10
Return to the bookstore's stamp card. The breach was plain, so the question is what each holder lost. If the card prints a value, say that twenty stamps are "worth $10 in books," the court has a starting number for each holder's loss, and the store's discretion over which gift to hand out does not change that. If the card prints no value and nothing else in the parties' dealings points to one, the remedy half presents a real difficulty even though the breach is clear.