Concept
Agreements to Agree
Common-law definiteness
Agreements to Agree
Two questions from earlier in this chapter converge on the agreement to agree. The first is whether the terms are reasonably certain. An offer cannot be accepted into a contract unless they are, and terms are reasonably certain when they give a court a basis for finding a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.1 The second is whether the parties meant to be bound yet, since a term left open or uncertain may show that a communication was never meant as an offer or an acceptance.2 A clause promising to settle some term later, usually the price or the rent, puts both questions to the court in a single sentence of the contract.
The lease renewal option is the recurring illustration below, because it shows the problem at its commercial sharpest. A tenant holds an option to extend the lease at a rent to be agreed on, and the tenant has already paid for the option.3 When the parties then cannot settle on a rent, the court must decide whether the promise to renew was ever a contract.
Courts have answered in three ways, and the subsections that follow take them in turn. The traditional rule holds that an agreement to agree on a material term prevents a contract from forming. A second position enforces the narrower promise that such a clause often carries, the promise to negotiate in good faith. A third reads the clause to intend a reasonable or market term that the court can apply. Courts have not settled on one of these: the Restatement and the UCC support a flexible approach, but common-law courts have not broadly embraced it.4 An answer should therefore identify the clause, ask what it gives a court to measure the missing term, and apply the approach of the controlling jurisdiction, noting where courts divide.
The Traditional Rule
The traditional rule is that an agreement to agree on a material term prevents a contract from forming.5 Courts give two reasons. The agreement leaves a material term too vague and indefinite to enforce, and it shows a lack of present agreement.6 The first reason tracks the requirement that a court have a basis for finding a breach and giving a remedy, and the second tracks the inquiry whether the parties had yet made an offer and an acceptance.7
The vagueness reason follows from what a clause reserving a term for later agreement actually says. It names no number, no formula, and no one to decide. When the parties fail to agree, a court asked to enforce the clause has nothing to apply: it cannot say whether a party who rejected a figure broke the contract, and it cannot measure the other side’s loss.8 Walker v. Keith states the point in terms of what a court may do. The question, the court said, is not what the law would imply if the contract were silent, but whether the parties, by removing a material term from the field of implication, have fixed their mutual obligations.9 Rent, which is payable in dollars, leaves little room for possible agreement, so if the parties agreed neither on the rent nor on a definite method of ascertaining it, the case is one of clear nonagreement.10 A court that fixed an obligation anyway would not enforce the contract; it would bind the parties to something they were patently unable to agree to when they wrote it.11
The second reason concerns the parties’ own commitment. When they reserve a term for their future agreement, each side may reject every figure the other proposes and still honor the clause, so neither has bound itself on that point.12 The two reasons reinforce each other, because the gap that leaves the term unenforceable also casts doubt on whether anyone committed to it.
A renewal clause that leaves the rent to the parties shows both reasons at work. One lease provided that at the end of its term “landlord and tenant shall agree on an appropriate rent” for a further term. The parties could not agree, and the landlord ordered the tenant to leave. The court held that an agreement to agree on rent does not suffice, so the parties had formed no contract to renew, and because price is an essential term it refused to impose a “reasonable” rent itself.13 “Appropriate” names no benchmark, which is the vagueness problem. “Shall agree” leaves each side free to reject the other’s figure, which is the lack of present agreement.
A clause that supplies a method stands differently. One lease clause provided that the rent for the period in question “shall be renegotiated to the then prevailing rate within the mall.”14 The prevailing rate is a figure the market already supplies when the option is exercised, so the renegotiation has something to measure against. Walker treated the absence of any definite method of ascertaining the rent as what produced nonagreement.15 The traditional rule therefore reaches a term left to the parties’ unconstrained later agreement, and a clause that names a benchmark presents a different question even when it uses a word like “renegotiate.”
The rule reaches only a material term, one central to what the parties exchange, so a reserved point that does not go to the exchange does not defeat the contract.16
An answer applying the traditional rule should present it as the starting point, since courts divide and the next two subsections show courts enforcing promises to negotiate in good faith and reading some clauses to call for a reasonable term.
Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith
A promise to agree guarantees a result that no court can identify, because no one has said what the price will be. A promise to negotiate and to use reasonable efforts to reach agreement guarantees only conduct, and that narrower promise is enforceable.18 The traditional rule therefore leaves standing any clause whose words promise a process and leave the result open.
Conduct is something a court can measure. To find a breach, the court asks whether a party did what it promised, and for a promise to negotiate that means asking whether the party met, responded, and bargained or instead stonewalled. To give a remedy, the court answers that failure without deciding what the price should have been.19 Each side remains free to decline the final deal, because the duty governs how the parties bargain and says nothing about where the bargaining ends.20
Modern courts have extended the duty beyond clauses that use the word negotiate. They have been holding that an agreement to agree carries with it an implied promise to negotiate in good faith, and the same duty arises when the parties reach an agreement in principle, as in some letters of intent from which an intent to negotiate in good faith can be inferred.21 Where such a duty binds, a failure to negotiate in good faith is a breach.22 The reasoning is that parties who wrote that a term would be agreed meant the sentence to accomplish something, and reading it as an empty gesture defeats a commitment they intended to be binding.23
The two scenes involve identical conduct and can end differently, because the first clause promised conduct a court can measure and the second promised only a result. Courts describe the commitment that results by sorting binding preliminary agreements into two types. In the first, a party may lawfully demand performance of the transaction itself, even if no further steps follow the preliminary agreement. The second type, the binding preliminary commitment, does not commit the parties to their ultimate contractual objective. It commits them to negotiate the open issues in good faith, in an attempt to reach that objective within the agreed framework.24 A party to the second type may not demand the transaction; what it may demand is that the other side negotiate the open terms in good faith toward a final contract incorporating the agreed terms.25 A letter of intent can fall on either side of this line, so the first question about one is which type of commitment it creates. For a construction-bidding fact pattern, see Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281, 565 N.E.2d 990 (1990), where a contractor sued the airline and the firm it had hired to prepare bid specifications, accept bids, and award contracts for the expansion of its facilities at O’Hare International Airport.26
A plaintiff who proves a breach of the duty to negotiate has shown that the other side failed to bargain in good faith. The plaintiff has not shown that the parties agreed on the open term, so the court does not treat the term as settled, and the remedy answers the failure to bargain. One court, after an intense review of the facts, found that the defendant did not meet the standards of good faith negotiation, and courts have exercised their equitable powers to order parties to negotiate under court supervision.27 The same limit protects a defendant who bargains honestly and still fails to agree, because the commitment ran to the negotiation and not to the ultimate deal. How much a plaintiff recovers is a separate question from whether a duty exists. In one purchase-order dispute, the court denied recovery for lost profits and for administrative and general overhead, allowed prejudgment interest from the date the litigation began, and held that the order’s termination liability provision gave no ground for recovery.28 Promissory estoppel has at times supplied a separate route to recovery on these facts, though it is a distinct doctrine with its own elements.29
On an exam, read the clause’s verbs first. A clause promising to negotiate and use reasonable efforts is enforceable as written. A clause saying only that a term will be agreed is a bare agreement to agree, which the traditional rule treats as creating no obligation and which modern courts often read to carry an implied duty of good-faith negotiation. After classifying the clause, ask whether the facts show a refusal to bargain or bad-faith bargaining, and limit any recovery to that breach.
Modern Enforcement Trend
Neither § 33(2) nor § 33(3) treats a postponed term as automatically fatal. Reasonable certainty is a functional test, and an open term only may show that the parties had not yet made an offer or an acceptance.31 A line of modern cases uses that room to go beyond the duty to negotiate and to read the clause as intending a reasonable or market term, so that the parties receive the deal they meant to make and not merely a right to bargain.
These cases recognize that agreements to agree serve a valuable commercial purpose and that the traditional rule defeats an agreement the parties intended to be binding.32 A term that the market can supply is not too vague to enforce in the way that troubled the older cases, because the court then has a basis for measuring the loss and shaping a remedy.33
The lease option is the standard illustration. A tenant holds an option to extend the lease at a rental to be agreed on, and the landlord invokes the clause as an agreement to agree. Some cases still follow the older view that the agreement to agree prevents exercise of the option. Others take what one court called the better view, that such a clause “intends renewal at a ‘reasonable’ rent” and that market conditions are “ascertainable with sufficient certainty to make the clause specifically enforceable.”34 The result coincides with the parties’ intention and with fairness, because the lessee has already paid for the option and should not be denied the benefit of the bargain.35
The tenant in these cases wants the simplest form of relief that protects an expectation interest: specific performance, an order that the defendant cooperate in exchanging the performances as originally agreed.36 The phrase “specifically enforceable” in the better-view passage points to that remedy, though specific relief is often unavailable in a contract action.37
The same conclusion follows from the instinct that courts should make every effort to fill gaps and enforce agreements when the parties intended to contract.38 In Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, Judge Cardozo found that Wood, though he had not expressly promised to market Lucy’s designs, had agreed to make reasonable efforts to do so. Applied to a renewal option, that lesson lets a court find that the parties impliedly agreed to a reasonable renewal rate based, for example, on the market value of the leasehold, and some decisions reflect that reasoning.39
Whether that reading prevails depends on where the dispute is litigated, and the same clause can come out both ways.
The older-view state’s result matches the one reached on the clause that left the rent to what landlord and tenant would find “appropriate.” There the court held that an agreement to agree on rent does not suffice and, because price is an essential term, refused to impose a reasonable rent.40 The difference between the two states lies in each court’s approach to a deferred rent.
Article 2 of the UCC relaxes the common-law approach. Section 2–204(3) provides that “[e]ven though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”41 A UCC comment rejects the formula that an agreement to agree is unenforceable and rejects defeating such agreements on the ground of indefiniteness, recognizing instead “the dominant intention of the parties to have the deal continue to be binding on both.”42 The Restatement supports a similarly flexible approach, though common-law courts have not broadly embraced it.43 Outside leases, the same question arises about the price clauses of licensing and other commercial agreements; see Arbitron, Inc. v. Tralyn Broadcasting, Inc.
The trend is real but uneven, and an answer should say so. The lease-option decisions themselves are only a small departure from the traditional rule.44 When a problem does not name the jurisdiction, state the traditional rule, state the modern reading, and apply the one that the facts support.