Concept
Supplying Missing Terms
Common-law definiteness
Supplying Missing Terms
A gap in an agreement need not defeat it if something closes the gap well enough to satisfy Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2): the terms are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.1 The earlier sections of this chapter used that test to decide when a gap is fatal. This section asks what can close one, and the law offers two sources. One lies inside the agreement: the parties authorize one of themselves to choose the open term as performance proceeds. The other lies outside it: a court adds a term that is reasonable under the circumstances. The first asks a court to enforce a process the parties built. The second asks a court to write part of the contract, and courts traditionally have been reluctant to do that, and to some extent remain so.2 Section 33(3) explains part of the reluctance. A term left open may show that the parties never meant their communications to operate as an offer or an acceptance, in which case no bargain exists to complete.3
Filling a gap differs from interpreting a contract. A court that interprets reads the terms the parties expressed and decides what they mean. A court that fills a gap responds to a point on which the contract is silent.4
The two tasks need different justifications. Interpretation carries out what the parties said. Gap-filling adds to it, so the court needs a reason to believe the addition is one the parties would accept or the law should impose. Commentators have traditionally sorted supplied terms into those implied in fact and those implied in law.5 A second sorting asks whether the parties can change the term. A default rule yields to an express clause that differs from it, while an immutable rule overrides any contrary clause. Only terms that come from immutable rules reach the parties without their consent, because parties who stay silent and defer to the law of contract can be taken to have consented to a default rule, much as silence can amount to acceptance.6
Both routes below answer the same two questions: when an incomplete manifestation of assent justifies legal enforcement, and how to read the assent that was manifested.7 Selection by one party comes first because it asks the least of the court.
Selection by One Party
Contracts often defer a choice. The buyer will pick the model before delivery, the owner will name the delivery date, the tenant will choose the unit. An agreement of that kind can still be reasonably certain. The parties can form a contract under which the specific subject matter, a roan stallion or a chestnut mare, is selected later by one party, with the price adjusting to the choice.8 The live question is what the seller assented to. If the seller manifested that the buyer had an immediate choice to make, a purported acceptance that designates neither animal is not sufficiently definite. If the seller manifested that the buyer could defer the choice, the same acceptance is not defective for leaving it open.9 The words of the reply are identical either way, so the outcome depends on what the offeror manifested about when the choice would be made.
A deferred choice leaves both halves of the § 33(2) test intact, because the parties have settled the range of possible performances and put off only the choice within it. A court deciding whether the defendant breached can compare the defendant’s conduct with the range, and a defendant who delivers nothing inside it has broken the contract whichever choice would have been made. A court fashioning a remedy has an outer limit on the loss, because nothing outside the range could ever have been demanded. The reasoning depends on the range doing its job. If one permitted choice were to do nothing, the range would give a court nothing to find broken.
Before the UCC, courts divided over agreements that left one party to pick the assortment. Some treated the unspecified assortment as a missing term and held the agreement too vague to enforce. Others held such agreements definite enough and ordinarily assessed damages on the alternative least onerous to the defendant. That measure follows from who held the choice. A defendant empowered to select could have chosen any alternative in the range, including the one that burdened it least, so the plaintiff can prove with confidence only the loss on that alternative.
Both outcomes start from identical facts. They part over whether the court sees the deferred choice as a gap in the contract or as a detail inside a fixed range. The first view holds the buyer to the minimum that the buyer’s own freedom of choice left owing, so no award exceeds what the buyer could have been required to do.
For sales of goods, the division no longer matters. An agreement for sale that is otherwise sufficiently definite under UCC § 2-204(3) is not made invalid because it leaves particulars of performance to be specified by one of the parties (UCC § 2-311(1)).10 The closing section of this chapter compares the Code’s rules with the common law.
A lease clause shows the same instinct at work on a different term. It provided that rent “shall be renegotiated to the then prevailing rate within the mall.”11 The figure is open at signing, but the clause names the benchmark that will close it. No one holds a power of selection here, so the clause is an analogy to the selection rule and not an application of it. Its value lies in the contrast, taken up below, with a clause that says only that the parties will agree on an appropriate rent.
Court-Supplied Reasonable Terms
The second way to close a gap puts the choice of term in the court’s hands, and the baseline against which it operates is that no contract exists. Depending on the posture of the case, a court may properly conclude that the parties made no enforceable agreement (see Restatement (Second) § 33, comment a),13 and an open term may itself show that neither party meant to commit.14 Section 204 addresses the cases in which that conclusion would be a mistake. It recommends that a court supply a term that is reasonable under the circumstances when the evidence of intent to be bound, or the degree of performance already rendered, makes a finding of no contract inappropriate.15 The recommendation reaches a defined group of cases and gives no general license to repair incomplete deals.
Each trigger has its own reason. Where the parties plainly meant to be bound, a deal exists, and what is missing is a detail inside it. Professor Prince notes that gaps may result from lack of foresight, incomplete bargaining, or excessive initial optimism about performance, and none of those is a refusal to commit.16 Performance adds a second reason. Once one side has performed and the other has taken the benefit, a holding of no contract awards a windfall to the party who wants to escape and denies recovery to the party who relied.17 A reasonable term avoids both results, and it gives § 33(2) what it asks for: a yardstick for finding a breach and a measure for relief.
Two decisions show the approach at work. In Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, Wood had not expressly promised to market Lucy’s designs, but Judge Cardozo found that the evidence showed he had agreed to make reasonable efforts to do so.18 The gap, how hard the agent must work, closed with a standard a court can apply. In Weston Investments, Inc. v. Domtar Industries, Inc., the parties consciously failed to agree on a provision with large tax consequences yet still intended to be bound, and the court relied on § 204 to supply the omitted term. Courts take that step only in rare circumstances, and then with terms consistent with good faith and reasonable expectations.19 The cases differ in how the term arrived. Wood found a promise the evidence showed the parties had implicitly made, while Weston supplied a term on a point the parties knew they had left unsettled, which is the more striking use of the power.
The traditional reluctance is easing. On the time for performance, courts have become increasingly willing to fill in a reasonable time, though not always.20 Lease options show the same drift. Some cases still hold that an option to renew at a rent to be agreed on fails as an agreement to agree. The better view reads such a clause as intending renewal at a reasonable rent and finds market conditions ascertainable with enough certainty to enforce it, a result that matches the parties’ intention and fairness because the tenant has already paid for the option and should not lose the benefit of the bargain.21 One treatise generalizes the point: courts should make every effort to fill gaps and enforce agreements when the parties intended to contract, and the lesson of Wood carries over to the lease-renewal problem.22 One commentator would go further and have courts say openly that, when a contract has a lacuna, they may weigh equitable factors: the public interest, the sharing of unanticipated gains and losses, the avoidance of a windfall to one side at the other’s expense, and each party’s good or bad faith.23 That is a proposal about what the law should do. The reasonable term of § 204 remains the working approach.
Price is where the reluctance holds firmest. Most modern disputes arise when the parties have not sufficiently described the price or the subject matter of their agreement.24 In one case a lease provided that at the end of its term “landlord and tenant shall agree on an appropriate rent” for a further term. The parties could not agree, and the landlord ordered the tenant out. The court held that an agreement to agree on rent does not suffice, so no renewal contract had formed, and because price is an essential term it refused to impose a reasonable rent.25 That clause fixed no benchmark, unlike the “prevailing rate within the mall” clause above, and it reserved the figure to the parties’ future agreement. A court that named a rent would have been choosing the center of the exchange. The decision sits in tension with the modern view of lease options described above. On an exam, state both views and look for the facts that push toward enforcement, such as an option already paid for or performance already rendered.