Concept
Gap-Fillers for Missing Terms
UCC open terms and open price
Gap-Fillers for Missing Terms
Contracts for the sale of goods leave gaps constantly. Some gaps are intentional and some inadvertent; some come out of the battle of the forms under §§ 2-204 and 2-207; some are nearly total and others only partial.1 Article 2 does not treat an open term as a reason to refuse enforcement. It fills the gap with a default, and its many defaults together form what White and Summers call a kind of “standardized statutory contract.”2 That is how the Code meets the demand of § 2-204(3). A sale does not fail for indefiniteness despite open terms if the parties intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy, and Article 2 itself helps supply that basis through provisions that fill gaps in an agreement.3
A gap-filler is a rule that supplies a term the parties failed to include in their contract.4 Price is the standard illustration: if the contract states no price, § 2-305(1) makes the price a reasonable one at the time of delivery.5 A court filling a gap this way substitutes a reasonable term, such as the market price at the time of delivery, and the critical finding is that the parties intended to be bound.6 The emphasis on intent over completeness reflects a difference among kinds of contracts. Land contracts call for more certainty of terms than employment or construction contracts, and common law decisions on goods required less certainty still, because market practice often involved agreements meant to bind at once despite missing terms on matters that could be quite important. The UCC carries that liberal approach forward.7
The remedy half of § 2-204(3) explains why defaults matter.8 A court that cannot tell when delivery was due cannot say whether the seller was late, and a court that cannot tell when payment was due cannot say whether the buyer defaulted. A default supplies the missing yardstick, so the court can measure performance and award relief without sending the parties back to the bargaining table.
Three defaults recur in the cases, each answering a different silence. In Apex v. Sharing World, the agreements for the sale of cottonseed omitted the place of delivery, the time of delivery, and the time of payment, and the court applied California's Code gap-fillers. Absent express terms otherwise, the place of delivery was the seller's place of business, the time for delivery was a reasonable time, and payment was due from the buyer at the time and place of delivery.9 The agreements therefore did not lack mutual assent for omitting those terms. The omissions mattered less than the parties' intent to be bound, which is the finding that makes gap-filling possible.10 The mistake to avoid is the one Apex answers: labeling the omitted term essential and stopping, without asking whether an Article 2 default already supplies it.
Intent, not completeness, anchors enforcement. A Georgia court applying its version of § 2-204(3) rejected an indefiniteness defense on facts that show how far the principle reaches. The record showed that the buyer, Unique, intended to purchase a “Mori Seiki” lathe from the seller, Pittard, for either $104,000 or $104,850, and the confusion over the price and the other open terms was not enough to negate the parties' clear intent to make an enforceable agreement.11
Reasonable time is a standard rather than a number. Courts deciding what is reasonable consider the nature of the goods to be delivered, the extent of the seller's knowledge of the buyer's intentions, transportation conditions, and the nature of the market, the factors collected in Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc.12 The standard gives a fact finder a measure for lateness, and the same delay may be reasonable for one product and excessive for another.
The defaults rank below the parties' own agreement. Article 2's gap-fillers apply to any sale of goods in the absence of contrary provisions expressed by the parties.13 The agreement is also wider than the written words. The Code defines it as the bargain in fact, found in the parties' language or inferred from circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, and it defines the contract as the total legal obligation that results from that agreement.14 Course of performance is how the parties have performed under this very contract, course of dealing is how they handled earlier transactions with each other, and usage of trade is the regular practice of their line of business. A point that one of those sources already answers is not a gap at all. Course of performance is the easiest to see in litigation: courts look to it to find what the parties intended on terms, and an agreement too vague to enforce when made may become enforceable once the parties have rendered and accepted some performances.15 A default is a standard answer to a routine silence. When the parties' own conduct or their trade shows what they wanted, the generic answer has no work to do, and applying it anyway would override the bargain they actually made.
Remove the history and the trade custom, and the answer changes. Between a seller and a buyer who have never dealt before, in a trade with no settled payment practice, the silence remains a gap, and the default makes payment due at the time and place of delivery.16 Defaults also cannot rescue a deal that was never made. If the circumstances show the parties were still negotiating, no bargain exists for a gap-filler to complete, which is why intent comes first in the analysis.17 On an exam, the usual error is to call silence on delivery or payment fatal when an Article 2 default already answers it.
Defaults are not the Code's only source of certainty, and not every certainty device is a default term. A quantity measured by a party's requirements, for example, cannot be attacked as indefinite, because the Official Comments find its certainty in the demand that requirements be asserted in good faith.18 Remedial provisions do similar work. Section 2-305(3) applies when the parties must take some action to let a third party or outside agency set the price, and it gives the aggrieved party recourse against a party who wrongfully prevents the third party from determining the price.19 Price also has its own gap-filler. Parties who so intend can conclude a sale even though the price is not settled, and the next section takes up the rule that applies when they do.20