Concept
Intent Not to Be Bound
UCC open terms and open price
Intent Not to Be Bound
A missing price does not always produce a contract at a reasonable price. Section 2-305(4) states the exception: where the parties intend not to be bound unless the price is fixed or agreed, and it is not fixed or agreed, there is no contract.1 The exception is not confined to any one of the three open-price situations taught above, because in each the question is whether the parties made their commitment depend on a price they had not yet fixed. The subsection also says what becomes of performance that came before the failure, so it supplies a rule of formation and a rule of clean-up.
The formation rule follows from what the reasonable-price default is for. Subsection (1) lets the parties conclude a contract for sale though the price is not settled, but only “if they so intend.”2 The default therefore completes a bargain the parties meant to make. Applied to parties who made price a condition, it would bind one of them to a price it never accepted, and subsection (4) closes that door. Section 2-204(3) works from the same premise: open terms do not defeat a contract for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy.3 In both provisions, intent to contract comes first and gap-filling second.
The clean-up rule covers parties who begin to perform before price is settled. If the price talks fail, there is no contract to enforce and no contract price by which to measure anyone’s loss, so the statute restores each side to its starting position. The buyer returns any goods already received or, if unable to return them, pays their reasonable value at the time of delivery, and the seller returns any portion of the price paid on account.4 The valuation date matches the one the open-price default uses, a reasonable price at the time for delivery.5
Which half of the statute applies depends on the evidence of what the parties meant. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Industries, Inc. illustrates the inquiry. The trial court held that there was no contract. A three-judge panel reversed, a panel of seven judges reinstated the trial court’s decision, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided vote.6 The justices who voted to affirm stressed four points: the parties’ writings were ambiguous and left many terms open; competent evidence showed conduct inconsistent with an intent to be bound; there was no reasonably certain basis for an appropriate remedy; and the option lacked consideration.7 What carried the day for those justices was the parties’ writings and conduct, measured against the Code’s own two questions, intent to contract and a reasonably certain basis for a remedy.
Unique Designs v. Pittard Machinery Company came out the other way on a different record. The record clearly showed that Unique intended to buy a Mori Seiki lathe from Pittard for either $104,000 or $104,850. The Georgia court, applying the Code’s open-terms rule, held that the confusion over the price and the open terms in the agreement did not negate the clear intent to enter an enforceable agreement.8 The two cases differ in their evidence of intent, not in whether the price was settled. In the lathe case the intent to buy was clear; in the option case the writings were ambiguous and the conduct was inconsistent with an intent to be bound. An unsettled price proves nothing by itself, because subsection (1) exists for the very case in which the price is unsettled and the parties meant to deal.9
A signed formal document can take the place of price as the condition of commitment, and the inquiry is the same: what did the parties expect? In a dispute between Mylan and USL, Mylan contended that the parties agreed a formal written contract would be consummated, while USL disputed that Mylan expected anything more formalized than to be committed by its word. Finding a genuine issue of material fact on that point, the court recommended denying that part of Mylan’s motion for summary judgment.10 When the parties’ accounts of their expectations conflict, the question is one of fact and cannot be decided on the papers. The Illinois Supreme Court heard a bid-and-award dispute in Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281, 565 N.E.2d 990 (1990), in which Quake sued American and Jones, the company American had hired to prepare bid specifications, accept bids, and award contracts for the expansion of American’s facilities at O’Hare International Airport.11
What separates a mere formality from a condition is whether anything remains to be settled. If it is evident that further terms are to be negotiated, or if it will be hard to sort out precisely what was agreed, a request that a complete writing be drafted and signed may indicate that a further or final assent to be bound is necessary. Where the offer appears in one writing and the offeree’s assent is unqualified, no terms remain to be agreed, and the request for a formal contract does not signal that more assent is needed.12
The parties’ own condition is distinct from the statute of frauds. Except as § 2-201 otherwise provides, a contract for the sale of goods for $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made is signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by that party’s authorized agent or broker.13 The statute asks for a writing that indicates a contract has been made. It does not ask whether the parties meant a signed document to be the thing that binds them.
Open terms are evidence on the same question. In Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of America, Inc., the court did not treat Nora’s failure to complete formal contracts with the PGA subsidiaries Arrowhead, Poland Spring, and Zephyrhills as conclusive, because PGA, as the umbrella company, could well have entered into a master agreement contemplating more particularized agreements with its subsidiaries. The court nonetheless found powerful evidence, including an implicit admission by Nora’s Hbouss, that undermined Nora’s claim that the parties had reached a meeting of the minds.14 Unfinished paperwork therefore counts against a finding of commitment without settling it, and a party’s own implicit admission weighs heavily. Evidence of commitment cuts the other way: an open price in a deal the parties plainly meant to make leaves the contract standing, as the lathe case shows.
The second step does the real work, and in most disputes the evidence runs both ways. A court that skips it and sets a reasonable price whenever price is open imposes the Code’s default on parties who never accepted it. A court that treats every unsettled price as fatal ignores the rule that parties who so intend can conclude a contract even though the price is not settled.15