Concept
The Bargain Requirement
Consideration (bargained-for exchange)
Consideration and Bargained-For Exchange
The Bargain Requirement
A promise is not a contract merely because someone made it. Consideration is the doctrine that draws the line between informal, non-legal promises and legally binding ones, and in contract law the word has nothing to do with thoughtfulness or kindness.1 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the test: to constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.2 Take a piano. Your promise of a piano is enforceable if your motive in making it is to obtain Alice’s promise of $400. The same promise made out of generosity, asking nothing in return, is a gift promise that the law will not enforce. A promise of new clothes to a homeless person follows the same logic: it is enforceable only if the promisor’s motive is to remove the person from the premises.3
Long ago the law marked a binding promise with a wax seal, a signal that a legally significant event had occurred; the phrase “signed, sealed, delivered” comes from that rule. The seal lost its meaning over time, and nearly all states have eliminated it as a means of forming contracts.4 The modern reason for withholding enforcement from gift promises is protective. It shields the promisor from improvidence and, indirectly, shields the promisor’s heirs and creditors, whose claims against the promisor’s assets take priority over a promise to donate them. A contrary policy argument arises with charitable promises, because charities serve a crucial role in society and important public interests are served by sustaining them.5
The Restatement defines “bargained for” in terms that run in two directions. A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is “sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.”6 Both halves must be present. It is not enough that the promise induces the promisee’s conduct, and it is not enough that the promisee’s conduct induces the promise; without both, there is no bargain. A mere pretense of bargain, such as a false recital of consideration or a merely nominal exchange, also fails, a point later sections develop.7
Lawyers call this relationship reciprocal inducement: each side is willing to give what it has because, in exchange, it wants what the other has. The old Latin phrase for the idea is quid pro quo, “this for that.” Bargain in this sense does not require actual negotiation, haggling, or dickering between the parties.8
Bargain does nearly all the work in the Restatement’s scheme. Section 72 provides: “Except as stated in Sections 73 and 74, any performance which is bargained for is consideration.” Section 73 states one of those exceptions, denying consideration to performance of a legal duty owed to the promisor that is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute. Later sections take up both exceptions.9
Dougherty v. Salt shows a promise that lacks the bargain. Helena Dougherty made a promise to her eight-year-old nephew, but she did not make it with the motive of extracting anything from him in return, and the court held it an unenforceable gift promise.10 The reasoning reaches further. Even if the boy had performed services for his aunt or otherwise benefited her, her subsequent promise would not have been enforceable, because a benefit to the promisor does not make a promise bargained for unless the promise was made to get it.
A promise to give something “free” can still be bargained for. In Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. American Ash Recycling Corp. of Pennsylvania, American Ash promised to supply a material called AggRite free of charge for a paving project. Treating the complaint’s allegations as true and applying the Holmesian formula, the court found it a fair reading that the promise induced Pennsy to take on the detriment of collecting and taking title to the material. It also found it a fair reading that this detriment, whether assumed by Pennsy or by some other successful bidder on the paving subcontract, induced American Ash to make the promise. The allegations belied any suggestion that American Ash was offering a conditional gift for which it wanted and expected nothing in return.11 The label “free of charge” settled nothing; what mattered was what the promisor sought.
As with mutual assent, the law reads reciprocal inducement from what the parties manifest and not from undisclosed mental states. It is enough that one party manifests an intention to induce the other’s response and to be induced by it, and that the other responds in accordance with the inducement.12 Motive is not irrelevant, since it can be evidence of intent to make an exchange, and a tangible gain to a party bolsters the argument that the party bargained for the other’s detriment.13 But the question is whether an exchange was manifested, not what the promisor privately felt.
The bargain test attaches to one promise at a time, so a bilateral contract must be tested from both ends. For each analysis, the person whose promise is in question is the promisor and the person who would enforce it is the promisee.14
Run on the piano deal, the routine gives two parallel answers. If Alice sues for the piano, you are the promisor: you sought her promise of $400 as the price, and she gave it in exchange for yours.15 If you sue for the $400, she is the promisor: she sought your promise to deliver the piano, and you gave it in exchange for hers. Each promise is exchanged for, and induces, the other, which is the structure of a standard bilateral contract. To count, each undertaking must be a genuine commitment.16
Courts also describe consideration in older terms, as a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee, and the two vocabularies share a history. From the quid pro quo of the action of debt came the idea of an exchange arrived at by bargain, with its benefit to the promisor; from assumpsit came the idea of a detriment to the promisee.17 A legal detriment is the relinquishment of a legal right. It need not be a harm, and it can even be something that benefits the person who incurs it.18 The classic illustration is Hamer v. Sidway, where an uncle promised his nephew money if the nephew refrained, among other things, from drinking until he came of age. The nephew gave up a legal right, and that was a detriment whether or not abstaining benefited him. When the terms, read in context, show that the parties intended an exchange of detriments, each party’s detriment is the benefit the other receives, and the two vocabularies converge.19
The Restatement (Second) drops the older vocabulary: it defines consideration exclusively in terms of bargain and does not mention benefit or detriment.20 The shift traces to Holmes, and its principal effect is at the margin. A promise made in a family setting, or otherwise on the periphery of the marketplace, is more likely to go unenforced as a non-exchange. A promisee’s reliance, even truly detrimental reliance, fails the consideration test unless it was bargained for as the price of the promise, so it goes uncompensated unless some other theory of liability applies.21