Concept
The Preexisting Duty Rule
Consideration (bargained-for exchange)
The Preexisting Duty Rule
At common law, a promise to pay someone extra for doing what that person already owes the promisor does not bind. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 73 states the rule in one sentence: performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor is not consideration when the duty is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute, but a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what the duty required in a way that reflects more than a pretense of bargain.1 The sentence has a core and two qualifications. The core disqualifies performance of a duty the promisee already owes the promisor. The qualifications free the duty that is genuinely doubtful or honestly disputed, and the performance that differs from the duty in a real way. A legal duty, for this purpose, is any obligation the law already enforces against the promisee, whether it comes from a contract, from the promisee's office, or from the criminal law.
Section 72 sets the default that § 73 interrupts: except as §§ 73 and 74 provide, any performance that is bargained for is consideration.2 A performance is bargained for when the promisor seeks it in exchange for the promise and the promisee gives it in exchange for that promise.3 Section 73 removes one performance from the default. The promisor asked for it and the promisee delivered it, yet the promisor already had a legal right to it, so the promisee gave up nothing in delivering it. A debtor who promises to pay on the day the debt falls due shows the point: she incurs no legal detriment in exchange for her creditor's promise to wait or to accept less.4
The rule also answers a familiar maneuver. A party who threatens to stop performing unless paid more turns the existing duty into leverage, and the party who gave in may later argue that the promise to pay more was extorted by a bad-faith threat.5 Without consideration, the extorted promise cannot be enforced.
The rule bites hardest in the modification of an existing contract, where one side is already bound and asks for better terms in return for continuing to do what it promised. This section takes the core rule first, then the two qualifications, then the limit that the duty must run to the promisor.
Duties Owed to the Promisor
The core rule applies when the promisee already owes the promisor the very performance that the promisor now pays extra to receive. That performance was the promisor's by right before the new promise was made, so the promisor receives nothing new, the promisee gives up no freedom the promisee still had, and the extra promise has no price behind it. The facts below involve a duty that is clear and a performance that matches it exactly; the two qualifications come in the next subsections.
Richard's agreement was real and the garage has value, yet neither fact answers the question. Section 71(2) frames it: did the promisor seek the performance in exchange for the new promise, and did the promisee give it in exchange for that promise?6 For a duty already owed, the answer is no, because the performance was Richard's by legal right before the $1,000 was mentioned. Calling the finished garage an act does not help. An act counts as consideration when the promisee surrenders a legal freedom by doing it, and Mike surrendered none.
A pair of reward cases shows that the source of the duty does not matter. An off-duty police officer, vacationing in a neighboring jurisdiction, who captures a criminal for whom a reward has been offered has done an act he had no legal obligation to perform, and if he knew of the offer, consideration is present.7 His knowledge matters because a bargained exchange exists only when the promisee acts intending to accept the offer.8 An officer on duty who makes the same arrest was already bound to make it, and a court is likely to refuse to enforce a reward promised for it.9 The arrests are identical; the duty moves the answer. (The on-duty officer's duty runs to the public, not to whoever posted the reward, and the last subsection explains why courts still apply the rule in that setting.)
The rule matters most when a party already bound tries to raise the price. In the sailors' case, an employer consented to modify its contract with its sailors. It could in theory have sued them for breach instead, but as a practical matter it had no choice, because the sailors would have been unable to pay damages.10 The sailors offered only the work they had already promised, so their side of the modification gave the employer nothing new. That is what the rule guards against: a party who can threaten to withhold a clear duty when the other side cannot replace the performance holds leverage, and refusing to enforce the price of that leverage removes the reason to use it.
The rule is blunt, because it asks only whether the promisee gave something new and never asks how the modification came about. It therefore catches the sailors' holdup, and it also catches a reasonable modification that runs in favor of one party only and that the other side accepts freely: a strict application of the consideration requirement would prevent enforcement even though the change is reasonable and acceptable to the promisor.11 A creditor's promise to accept less than the amount owing on an admitted debt, or to extend its due date, fails for the same reason. The debtor already had a duty to pay when the debt fell due, her promise to pay over time adds nothing to that duty, and strict application of the doctrine invalidates the agreement unless the court finds some new detriment, a result that is hard to justify when the agreement was fairly bargained.12
Article 2 of the UCC softens the rule for goods. An agreement modifying a contract within Article 2 "needs no consideration to be binding," and UCC § 2A-208(1) says much the same for leases of goods.13 Good faith is the limit. A seller who knows the buyer needs timely delivery and refuses to deliver unless the buyer pays $500 more, with no legitimate commercial reason, extorts the modification and violates the duty of good faith, and even a technical consideration such as an added cigar will not support a modification made in bad faith.14 A market shift, by contrast, may supply a good-faith reason for asking more.15 The Code dispenses with consideration in other places too: a merchant's firm offer under § 2-205 is irrevocable even though the offeree gives nothing to keep it open.16 A contract for services gets no such relief, so the common-law rule still governs it.17
Doubtful or Disputed Duties
The rule's opening clause reaches only a duty that is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute.19 The limit follows from the premise the rule rests on. A promisee who already owed a performance gives up nothing by rendering it, so a promise to pay extra buys nothing. That premise holds only when the duty was clear. If it was genuinely uncertain whether the promisee owed the performance at all, or the parties honestly disagreed about it, a promisee who goes ahead under a new promise surrenders a position that might have prevailed. A doubtful duty is one whose existence or reach is truly in question; a disputed duty is one the parties contest in good faith. Either takes the case outside the rule.
Honest doubt also separates a compromise from coercion. A promisee with a real claim that she need not perform, who gives that claim up, has moved off her own position, and the promisor has bought certainty that the work will be done. A promisee who knows her duty is clear and demands more anyway has only leverage.
A painter's mid-job demand shows how a duty can become doubtful. A painter contracted for $9,000 to paint, which required scraping and sanding the old paint. After starting, the painter found, to the surprise of both sides, that the old paint was lead-based and that removing it would cost the painter at least $2,000 on the contract. The painter explained this, the two agreed that the owner would pay an additional $2,200, and the painter completed the work on time. The owner then refused to pay more than $9,000.20 The owner has two arguments. First, completing the work on time was only what the painter was already obligated to do, so the owner's promise of more money lacks consideration, and because this is a service contract, UCC § 2-209(1) gives the painter no help. Second, the painter's threat of nonperformance was in bad faith, and the promise was extorted.21
The painter's reply lies in the opening clause of § 73. If the lead paint gave the painter a legal excuse, such as impossibility or impracticability, then agreeing to continue meant giving up the right to avoid the contract, and that surrender is a legal detriment incurred in exchange for the owner's promise. The excuse need not be certain to prevail. The difficulties need only be serious enough to support a good-faith claim of excuse, and settling a good-faith claim can be valid consideration: a person who holds a good-faith belief, founded on some facts, that she may terminate her performance gives consideration by agreeing to forbear from asserting that right.22 Whether the discovery would in fact have excused the painter belongs to the doctrines of impossibility and impracticability. Consideration asks only whether the claim was honest and had some factual footing.
Change the facts and the answer changes. A second painter, under the same $9,000 contract, meets no surprise. She announces that she will not finish on time unless she receives $2,000 more, and the owner, who cannot find anyone else in time, agrees. Her duty is in no doubt and no honest dispute exists, so finishing on time is only what she already owed, and the owner's promise has no consideration behind it. Both painters demand more, both threaten to stop, and both owners need the work. What separates them is whether the painter's claim that she need not continue was honest and had footing in the facts. The first painter has a position to surrender; the second has only leverage.
The same logic covers an honest disagreement about how much is owed. A buyer who pays a compromise figure on a price both sides honestly contest gives up the chance of owing less, and the seller who accepts it gives up the chance of collecting more; each has surrendered a real position.23 Where nobody honestly doubts the amount, the same payment is only part of a clear debt, and a creditor's promise to accept it fails for want of consideration.24 The section on settlement of claims takes up compromise as consideration in its own right.
Performances That Differ
The second clause of § 73 is the exit for a promisee who is already bound: a similar performance is consideration if it differs from what the duty required in a way that reflects more than a pretense of bargain.26 The clause asks two things of the new performance. It must differ from the duty in some real respect, and the promisor must have sought that difference as the price of the new promise.
The first requirement follows from the logic of the rule. A promisee who performs earlier, in a different place, or with an added commitment surrenders a freedom that the duty left intact, and the promisor could not have compelled that surrender. The difference can therefore satisfy the bargain test of § 71(2).27 The second requirement closes the loophole the first would leave. If any tacked-on trifle could rescue a demand for extra pay, a party holding up the other side could dress the demand in a formality, and the rule would protect no one. Motive supplies the test: a promise is bargained for only when the promisor's motive was to extract the performance as the price of the promise, and a promise made without that motive is a gift promise.28
Because the test is genuineness, size matters little. Section 72 treats any bargained-for performance as consideration apart from §§ 73 and 74, so a modest real difference supports a promise when the parties traded on it.29 The stakes are high, because a strict application of the preexisting duty rule invalidates a modification unless the court can find some new detriment.30
The same facts show why the governing law matters at the threshold. A painting job is a contract for services, so the common-law rule applies and fresh consideration is required; had the owner promised to pay an additional sum, or to pay earlier, or to do anything else the owner was not already obligated to do, one could find consideration.31 If the contract were for goods, UCC § 2-209(1) would let a good-faith modification bind without new consideration.32 The tenants' move-in date also makes the early deadline look sought rather than staged. If it is possible to identify a tangible gain or advantage to a party, that bolsters the argument that the party in fact bargained for the detriment the other suffered.33
A request to restructure a debt shows the opposite pole, where nothing real differs. Dana owes Carl a sum due June 1 on a loan that carries 6 percent interest. She asks Carl to reduce the balance and extend the due date. In return she offers to keep paying 6 percent interest over the longer period, says she intends to ask her other creditors for the same arrangement, and says she might have to close her business, but she promises nothing about the last two matters. Her only commitment is to pay what she already owed. She had a duty to pay when the debt fell due, and her promise to pay over time adds nothing to that duty.34 An announced intention binds no one, so it cannot be the price of Carl's concession.
An answer that stops at the observation that the promisee was already bound has applied only the first clause of § 73. The next question is whether anything in what the promisee now gives is genuinely different, and whether the promisor wanted that difference as the price of the promise.
Duties Owed to Others
The last words of the rule, "owed to a promisor," mark its edge.36 The earlier subsections involved a promisee who already owed the performance to the person making the new promise. A promisee's existing duty can instead run to a private party who is a stranger to the new promise, or to the public at large, and the two settings come out differently. This subsection takes the private stranger first and the public duty second.
The private-stranger problem arises in three-party arrangements. C has contracted with X to pave a road, and a neighbor, N, who wants the road paved, promises C an extra $1,000 if C will pave it. C does. On the traditional analysis, C did only what C was already legally bound to do, so C incurred no new legal detriment and N's promise has no consideration behind it. The most sweeping answer to that analysis would exclude duties owed to third persons from the rule altogether, and the Restatement (Second) takes that position: only a legal duty owed to the promisor is a preexisting duty that precludes a new promise or act from being consideration.37 C's duty ran to X, not to N, so N's promise survives the rule, and C can enforce it if the promise and the performance were bargained for.38 The older analysis has not disappeared, so an answer on private third-party facts should state the Restatement result and note that a court following the older view would find no consideration.
Two reasons support the Restatement position, and they work differently. The first is that the preexisting duty rule exists to stop one party from extracting a better price by threatening to withhold a performance the other side is entitled to receive. Suppose Al has contracted to sell his lodge to Ava, and Gordon, who is a stranger to that contract, promises Al $10,000. Al's duty to sell runs to Ava. Gordon's promise is an inducement he chose to offer, not the price of a threat, so the concern about extorted modifications does not arise and the preexisting duty rule is not needed.39 The second reason offers an alternative route to consideration. Al may have been free to negotiate with Ava for cancellation of the sale, and Gordon's promise can be read as buying Al's forbearance from pursuing that option, which is a legal detriment.40 The same reasoning reaches a promisee who could have rescinded by mutual agreement, or who had a good-faith claim of excuse such as impossibility or impracticability: if the promisee forbears as the bargained price of the stranger's promise, consideration can be found.41 The forbearance route is a supporting argument only. It needs facts showing that the parties to the original contract could really have agreed to rescind or that the promisee held a good-faith claim, and the first reason carries the Restatement position without it.
A duty owed to the public at large raises a different question. Suppose Uncle William promises his nephew Willie a payment if Willie stays away from conduct the law forbids. Willie owes his duty to obey the law to the public, which includes William only as one member of it. A court may decline to apply the preexisting duty rule, because the duty runs to William only indirectly and the promise advances the public interest by giving Willie an incentive to avoid proscribed activity.42 The same reasoning applies when a private party is promised a reward for obeying the law: the rule is confined to a duty owed to the promisor, the duty here is owed to the state, and a bargain that gives a private person an incentive to obey the law raises no danger of corrupting an official.43 Removing the rule leaves a second objection standing, however. Whether abstaining from unlawful conduct is a legal detriment at all remains open, and there is a strong argument that it is not.44
The outcome changes when the promisee is a public official whose job is the duty. A store owner who promises a police officer a reward for catching the robber is offering payment for what the officer's position already requires, and a court is likely to apply the preexisting duty rule and refuse enforcement.45 The officer's duty runs to the public, yet courts apply the rule here anyway, for a policy reason: enforcing such promises would let private parties influence how officials perform official duties, and so would increase the risk of corruption.46 The same arrest comes out the other way when no duty applies. An off-duty officer vacationing in a neighboring jurisdiction who makes the arrest, knowing of the reward, has done something the law did not require, and consideration is present.47 Willie and the on-duty officer both owe their duty to the public, so what separates them is who the promisee is and what enforcement would encourage. Enforcing the promise to Willie rewards lawful conduct by a private person; enforcing the promise to the officer would let money influence an official's priorities.