Concept
Settlement of Claims
Consideration (bargained-for exchange)
Settlement of Claims
Forbearing to assert a claim or defense, or surrendering one, is not consideration under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 74(1) if the claim or defense proves invalid, unless a stated exception applies.1 A claim is a legal right to relief against another person, and a defense is a legal ground for resisting someone else's claim. Giving up either one changes who owes what to whom, so a release is the destruction of a legal relation, and § 71(3)(c) treats that as a bargained-for performance.2 Section 72 makes any bargained-for performance consideration except as §§ 73 and 74 provide, and § 74 is the second of those two exceptions.3 The preceding section asked whether the promisee was already bound to render what was promised. This section asks a different question: was the right the promisee surrendered one the law will treat as worth giving up?
Two policies pull against each other here. A settlement is a trade: one side gives up a position, and the other pays or promises something for the surrender. If the surrendered claim proves valid, the trade was plainly real. If it proves invalid, a court looking back could say the claimant gave up a right the claimant never had. Letting that hindsight undo settlements would defeat their purpose, which is to end a dispute without the cost of trial, because investigation after the deal could always show the claim to have been weak. Counting every claim as consideration, however baseless, would let a person extract payment by threatening a suit known to be groundless. Section 74(1) resolves the tension by judging the claim as it stood when the parties made the deal. The surrender is consideration when the claim or defense was in fact doubtful because of uncertainty as to the facts or the law, or when the surrendering party believed the claim or defense might fairly be determined to be valid.4
The two exceptions differ in whose view controls: the first judges the claim by its actual condition, the second by the state of mind of the party who gave it up. Doubtful claims come first, then good-faith belief. A third rule, § 74(2), governs the signed written release given by someone who asserts no claim at all.5 Courts also differ on how the first two tests fit together, and the Good-Faith Belief subsection sets out the variations.
Doubtful Claims
The first way to save a settlement built on a claim that later proves invalid asks about the claim and not the claimant. Under § 74(1)(a), the surrender is consideration if the claim or defense was in fact doubtful because of uncertainty as to the facts or the law.6 The setting is a compromise: one side gives up a claim or defense for a promise, and the claim afterward turns out to have been worthless, which is the situation in which § 74(1) withholds consideration unless an exception applies.7 Subsection (1)(a) is the objective exception, since it measures how much doubt surrounded the claim and not what its holder privately believed. Subsection (1)(b), taken up next, looks to belief. A claim that was in fact doubtful needs no inquiry into the claimant's good faith, while a claim that was not doubtful can be saved, if at all, only by (b).8
Doubtful does not mean likely to succeed. A party relying on this route need not show that the claim or defense would have prevailed in litigation; the test is whether enough doubt surrounded it to make the dispute genuine, which is so when the claim is subject to reasonable doubt because of uncertainty in fact or law.9 Uncertainty as to the facts exists when reasonable people could disagree about what happened or where something lies, as in a dispute over which driver entered an intersection first or where a property line runs. Uncertainty as to the law exists when the rule governing the facts is itself open, as when no court has construed a statute or the authorities point in different directions. Either source can make a claim colorable, and neither requires that the claim be the stronger side of the argument.
Genuine doubt keeps the exchange real. When the outcome of a dispute is truly uncertain, each side gives up something of value by settling: the claimant surrenders the chance of recovering more than the settlement offers, the other party surrenders the chance of paying nothing, and both buy certainty with that chance. That mutual surrender is what makes the compromise a real exchange under the bargain requirement, even though no one knows who would have won.10 The date of the agreement matters for a different reason. Doubt is measured when the parties settle, and not in light of later events, because a settlement exists to end a dispute without the cost of trial.11 If a later survey, verdict, or discovery could undo it, later investigation could upend any settlement, and neither side could rely on the compromise it made.
Alice and her neighbor disagree about which side of the property line a row of trees stands on, and neither knows exactly where the line falls, which is common because reasonable people often cannot say precisely where their land ends. The neighbor threatens to sue over the trees, Alice offers $500 to avoid litigation, and the neighbor agrees to forgo the suit. The claim was doubtful as to the facts, because the answer turns on where the line really runs, so the neighbor's forbearance is consideration for Alice's promise.12 Nothing in that result depends on the neighbor's being right. If a survey later places the trees on Alice's land, the claim proved invalid, but the deal is judged as the parties faced it on the day it was made, when the location of the line was open. The survey changes nothing, and Alice owes the $500.13
Later proof that a claim was groundless therefore does not undo the consideration. That proof shows how the dispute would have ended, and avoiding that discovery is what the parties paid for. The question for the court is what a reasonable person in the parties' position could see on the day they traded, and a claim that looked open then kept its value as the thing that was bought.
The route closes when the claim's weakness was plain at the outset. A bare assertion of liability, or a flat denial of it, does not make a claim doubtful, and obvious invalidity at the time of the agreement can indicate that the surrendering party knew the claim was bad.14
The tree claim and the compensation claim both ended in defeat for the claimant, so the later outcome cannot be what separates them. The difference is that on the day of the agreement a reasonable person could treat the tree dispute as open and could not treat a tort suit as open when a statute plainly displaced it. What remains for the employee is the question of belief, which the next subsection takes up.
Courts state the objective inquiry in different words. Some ask whether the claim has some merit in fact or law and reject a claim that is obviously invalid, some require that it be reasonably doubtful in law or fact, and a few demand both a colorable basis and good faith.15 Each formulation looks at the standing of the claim, which is the idea § 74(1)(a) expresses, so an answer should state which standard the jurisdiction applies and then run the facts through it.
Good-Faith Belief
The second route by which the surrender of an invalid claim still counts as consideration asks what the surrendering party honestly believed. Under § 74(1)(b), the surrender is consideration if the forbearing or surrendering party believes that the claim or defense may be fairly determined to be valid.17 This route is subjective: it turns on what the party giving up the claim honestly thought when the settlement was made and not on whether the claim was in fact doubtful. It matters most for a claim that fails the objective route of § 74(1)(a), such as the tort suit that a workers' compensation statute plainly displaced, where no uncertainty in the facts or the law remained to make the claim doubtful. The settlement of such a claim can still stand when the party who gave it up held an honest belief that it might fairly be found valid. The route therefore reaches the mistaken party and closes against the party who knew better.
A belief requirement separates genuine compromise from purchased silence. A claimant who honestly thinks the claim is good, even if mistaken about the law, has surrendered what the claimant believed to be an asset, and the other party receives what it paid for: peace and an end to the cost of defending the suit. A claimant who knows the claim is bogus has surrendered nothing the law should recognize and is extracting a nuisance payment. The belief required is modest, only that the claim may be fairly determined to be valid, because a settlement is a compromise made under uncertainty and a claimant certain of victory would rarely accept less. A higher threshold would exclude nearly every real compromise, even though the law favors adjusting and settling controversies without resort to court action.18
The failing case is the claimant who knows the claim is false. A hotel guest named Sue did not slip on the hotel floor, yet she claimed that she had and sued the hotel for $50,000 for emotional distress and pain and suffering. The hotel could not prove otherwise, so to avoid the cost and publicity of a trial it offered $10,000, and Sue accepted. Before paying, the hotel discovered that the claim was false and refused, and Sue could not enforce the promise, because she had no right to assert a false claim and so suffered no legal detriment by forbearing from it.19 Her own knowledge that she never fell is what takes the case out of § 74(1)(b), since a person who knows a claim is false cannot believe it may fairly be found valid. The same logic applies to a vexatious defense, so a party who defends without a genuine basis for disputing the claim cannot count the surrender of that defense as consideration.20
A claim just as invalid in law can come out the other way when the claimant honestly believed in it. In Dyer v. National By-Products, Inc., an injured employee alleged that his employer promised him lifetime employment in exchange for his forbearing from a tort suit over the injury, and the employer answered that workers' compensation was his sole remedy, so that giving up an unfounded claim could not be consideration.21 The court assumed for purposes of its discussion that the tort claim was clearly invalid, and it held that the invalidity did not defeat consideration as a matter of law, because the forbearing party's good faith remained to be examined.22 It reasoned that compromise is favored and that requiring the forbearing party to assert the claim in good faith sufficiently protects the policy favoring settlement, and it overruled its earlier holdings to the contrary.23 Whether the employee actually acted in good faith was a fact issue the trial court had not resolved, so the court reversed and remanded for trial, and the employee won only the chance to prove an honest belief.24
Honest belief still has to be proved, and the weakness of the claim bears on that proof. The Dyer court cautioned that the invalidity of the claim should not be entirely overlooked, because there must generally be reasonable grounds for a belief before a court can be convinced that it was honestly held, and a bald assertion by the claimant is not enough.25 Evidence that the claim was invalid is therefore relevant to show that the claimant lacked an honest belief in it.26 The Restatement's commentary says the same from the other side: a mere assertion or denial of liability does not make a claim doubtful, and the fact that invalidity is obvious "may indicate that it was known," so in such cases subsection (1)(b) requires a showing of good faith.27 Obvious weakness is thus evidence about the claimant's state of mind and does not decide the matter by itself, because the same commentary adds that even when the invalidity should have been clear at the time, the settlement of an honest dispute is upheld.28 The weaker the claim, the more a fact-finder must be persuaded that the claimant really believed in it.
Denburg v. Parker, Chapin, Flattau & Klimpl shows the route succeeding on a claim the law would not support. A law firm's partnership agreement created financial disincentives for a partner who left and competed with the firm, and the clause was void as against public policy because it inhibited clients' access to the lawyer of their choice.29 The firm sought to enforce the clause against a departed partner, the partner challenged its right to do so, and the parties settled. The former partner later argued that the settlement lacked consideration because the firm had compromised an invalid claim, and the court upheld the settlement because the firm believed in good faith that its claim was viable, which was enough.30 Denburg shows how far the subjective test can reach, and Dyer shows what a claimant must still prove, since there the invalidity of the claim fed directly into the question whether the belief was honest and the answer awaited trial. The two cases agree that honesty and not correctness decides this route, and Denburg carries its own limit: a firm in that position would have had great difficulty establishing good faith if a reasonable lawyer would have known the clause was clearly unenforceable.31
Courts also differ on how the subjective route fits with the objective one, so an answer should say which approach it is applying. The Restatement makes the two alternatives, so a claim that was objectively doubtful or honestly believed in will do.32 Some courts are stricter and require both a colorable legal basis and good faith, while others skip the objective plausibility of the claim and ask only about good faith, as Denburg did.33 A third group requires that the claim have some merit in fact or law and rejects claims that are obviously invalid.34 In many cases the tests produce the same answer, because it is hard to persuade a fact-finder that a party genuinely believed in a claim with no objective support, although the subjective test does leave room for honest ignorance.35 The either-or structure also draws criticism on policy grounds, since an honest but unreasonable claimant passes through subsection (b) and a claimant who privately knew the claim was weak can pass through subsection (a) when a reasonable person might have thought it good, which some regard as too generous to negligent and dishonest claimants.36
Written Releases
Section 74(2) offers a route to consideration that neither preceding subsection provides: the execution of a written instrument surrendering a claim or defense, by a person under no duty to execute it, is consideration if the execution is bargained for, even though the signer is not asserting the claim or defense and believes that no valid claim or defense exists.38 A release is a signed document by which one person gives up a claim or defense against another. Subsection (1) tests the surrender of a claim that proves invalid by looking at the claim itself, asking whether it was in fact doubtful or whether the surrendering party believed it might fairly be found valid.39 Subsection (2) concerns a different performance. What the promisor buys is a signed writing, and the signer supplies it, so the validity of the claim and the signer's opinion of it play no part in the analysis.
A written release gives the party who pays for it the protection it wants, a signed document it can show a court if the signer later sues. For the signer, the signature is a position the signer was free to withhold, since until the signature is given the signer keeps whatever rights the signer has, including rights the signer does not know about. Without subsection (2), the payor's protection would depend on the signer's belief. A person who signs a release without any grievance typically believes the claim is worthless, and that belief is exactly what subsection (1)(b) cannot accommodate, because it requires the surrendering party to believe the claim may be fairly determined to be valid.40 The payor would then have to prove what the signer privately thought about a claim never asserted. Subsection (2) removes that burden by making the signing itself the bargained-for performance.
The second step carries the rule's one real limit, and it is the preexisting duty rule applied to a signature. A person who must sign on request under an earlier agreement gives the other side only what it already had a legal right to demand, which is the situation § 73 describes when it denies consideration to performance of a legal duty owed to the promisor that is neither doubtful nor honestly disputed.41 The third step carries the other limit. Section 71(2) asks whether the promisor sought the performance in exchange for the promise and the promisee gave it in exchange for that promise, so a signature handed over as a favor, or one the other side never asked for, is not bargained for.42
A fact pattern that offers a signer who sees no grievance and a payor who wants peace invites an analysis of whether the surrendered claim was doubtful or believed in. That analysis belongs to § 74(1) and answers the wrong question when a signed release is the performance in dispute. Ask first whether the signing was owed and whether it was sought as the price of the promise, since those two facts decide the case.