Concept
Options and Firm Offers
Consideration (bargained-for exchange)
Options and Firm Offers
An offeror can ordinarily withdraw an offer at any time before acceptance, and a promise to keep the offer open for a stated period is called an option.1 At common law that promise is enforceable like any other: it binds the offeror only if the offeree gave consideration for it.2 UCC § 2-205 makes an exception for merchants. A merchant’s offer to buy or sell goods, made in a signed record that by its terms gives assurance it will be held open, is not revocable for lack of consideration during the time stated, or for a reasonable time if none is stated, and in no event for more than three months. If the assurance appears on a form the offeree supplied, the offeror must also have signed it separately.3
Courts relax the bargain requirement for options because an offeror who promises to wait is rarely making a gift. The offeror is pursuing a deal, so little remains of the usual concern for shielding a gratuitous promisor from liability.4 The offeree, meanwhile, often builds on the offer. In Drennan v. Star Paving Co., a general contractor relied on a subcontractor’s offer in computing its own bid, and when the subcontractor refused to perform, the California Supreme Court found neither an option supported by consideration nor a bilateral contract binding on both parties.5 The contractor’s remaining argument was reliance, the subject of promissory estoppel in a separate reading. The argument shows what is at stake: an offeree who builds on an offer has no contract claim unless something makes the promise to wait binding.
Where the law lets such a promise bind without an exchange, it demands form instead. A signed writing proves that the commitment was made, gives the promisor time to reflect before making it, and marks the act as a serious one, which are the jobs the wax seal once did.6 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87 makes an offer binding as an option when it is in writing and signed by the offeror, recites a purported consideration for making the offer, and proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time.7 Both § 87 and § 2-205 replace the exchange with form.
The common-law option comes first, because the UCC rule is easiest to understand as a departure from it.
Common-Law Options
A promise to hold an offer open is enforceable on the same terms as any other promise, so the bargain test of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(2) applies. The offeror must have sought something in exchange for the promise to wait, and the offeree must have given it in exchange for that promise.8 That consideration is distinct from the consideration the offeree would give in the underlying contract if the contract is ultimately formed.9 When nothing was given for the promise to wait, the so-called option is only a continuing offer, which the offeror may withdraw at any time before acceptance.10
Revocation is one of the ordinary ways an offer ends, alongside rejection, counteroffer, and lapse of time, and an option matters because it removes that power for the stated period.11 Two exchanges are therefore in play. A seller offers Alice a piano for $400 and, in exchange for $10, promises to hold the offer open until January 31. The $10 buys the promise to wait. The $400 is the price in a sale that exists only if Alice later accepts.12 Keeping the two exchanges apart resolves most problems in this area.
The rule has a boundary. A separate payment is unnecessary when the option sits inside an existing contract, because it is one of the rights that contract already exchanges. A lessee’s option to renew a five-year lease for five more years is supported by the rent the lessee pays under the lease.13
The Berryman opinion shows what happens when nothing is exchanged for the promise to wait. The option holder there had not promised to buy the land and was required to do nothing.14 He argued that the promisor expected him to raise and pay money for the land, but the court answered that such an assertion confuses motive with consideration.15 The acts he urged as consideration conferred no special benefit on the promisor or on his land.16 What remained was a continuing offer, subject to withdrawal at any time before acceptance.17
Courts ask little of the payment that buys an option. In Board of Control of Eastern Michigan University v. Burgess, a $1 payment was held capable of supporting a 60-day option to buy a house for $14,000, and in Keaster v. Bozik $5 supported a one-year option on land priced at $200,000.18 Courts tolerate disparities like these because an offeror who promises to hold an offer open is usually pursuing a deal and not making a gift, so the concern that makes courts wary of nominal consideration elsewhere presses less hard here.19
An optionee can also pay with something other than money, because the promisor may seek an act, and not only a promise, in exchange.20 In Mack v. Coker, the purchaser’s promise to make efforts to obtain a loan supported the option, and in In re Estate of Jorstad a son’s promise to stay and work on his parents’ farm supported their promise to sell it to him.21 In each case the promisor sought the performance as the price of the option. In Berryman, by contrast, nothing in the deal made the optionee’s plans to raise money the price of the promise.
Section 87 goes further than the payment cases. Because the writing need only recite a purported consideration, a signed writing on fair terms can carry an option even when the recited consideration was never delivered.22 Many courts that stay strict about nominal consideration elsewhere follow the Restatement for options, and a court that finds the recited consideration a sham will more readily read the recital as a promise to furnish it, or estop the grantor from calling it a sham.23
Reliance can sometimes hold an offeror to a promise that consideration cannot. In Drennan, the California Supreme Court held that the contractor’s reasonable reliance bound the offeror in lieu of the consideration ordinarily required.24 Restatement § 87(2) recognizes the possibility, but only a narrow range of cases qualifies, because an offeree who gave nothing for a promise to wait usually cannot show justifiable reliance on it.25 That route belongs to promissory estoppel, which supplies a different basis for enforcement from the consideration analysis in this subsection.
A fact pattern in which an offeror “promised to keep the offer open for ten days” tempts the reader to treat the promise as binding because it names a period. A stated period creates no obligation; the exchange behind the promise does.
UCC Firm Offers
Section 2-205 of the UCC reverses the common-law result for one class of offers. A merchant’s offer to buy or sell goods, made in a signed record that by its terms gives assurance it will be held open, is not revocable for lack of consideration during the time stated, or for a reasonable time if none is stated, and in no event for more than three months.27 An offer that meets these requirements is a firm offer, a statutorily created option contract.28 The offeree need not buy an option, because the offer satisfies § 2-205 and the offeree need not give any consideration to make it irrevocable.29
The signed record does the work a seal once did. It is evidence that the assurance was given, it gives the merchant a moment to reflect before committing, and it marks the promise as one meant to bind.30 The section’s main aim, though, is to limit the offeror’s power to withdraw a firm offer once the offeree has reasonably relied on its firmness, as a prime contractor does when it computes a bid from a subcontractor’s quote.31
A firm offer needs five things: a merchant offeror, an offer to buy or sell goods, a signed record, terms that give assurance the offer will be held open, and, when the form is the offeree’s, a separate signature on the assurance. Each requirement can fail independently, so each deserves a separate look.
The offeror must be a merchant, and only the offeror need be one; the offeree’s status is irrelevant.32 Merchant status turns on dealing in goods of the kind involved or holding oneself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices involved in the transaction, and that knowledge may concern the goods, business practices, or both.33 The requirement falls on the offeror because the offeror is the party who gives up the power to revoke. Status also depends on capacity. A restaurant owner who signs a note offering to sell the barbecue grill from his home for $100, and promising to hold the offer open for five days, is not acting in his mercantile capacity, so when he sells the grill to someone else two days later, the would-be buyer who paid nothing for the promise has no claim.34 A manufacturer that occasionally sells a used piece of factory equipment presents a closer question, since it may not deal in goods of that kind yet may hold itself out as knowing the practices involved.35
The section covers an offer to buy or sell goods, and each term sets a limit. Article 2 applies to transactions in goods, so a signed promise to hold open an offer to sell land or to perform services falls outside § 2-205 and under the common-law option rule.36 The communication must also be an offer: in I & R Mechanical, Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., a court held that a price quotation was not an offer, so the section did not apply.37 Offers to buy count as well as offers to sell, as the statute’s text says, and in City University of New York v. Finalco, Inc., a buyer’s offer to purchase used computers from the university could not be revoked during the period the offer stated.38
The offer must appear in a signed record. The section once spoke of a writing, and courts read the word to reach recordings in electronic form, not only hard copy.39 The current text says record, and the definition of signed now covers records that are not writings, which may be signed by attaching or logically associating an electronic symbol, sound, or process with the record, with present intent to adopt or accept it.40 A signature is any symbol executed or adopted with present intention to adopt the writing, and a court may find one in a letterhead.41 The requirement does the formal work described above: a merchant’s oral promise to hold an offer open leaves a dispute over whether it was made and for how long, and a signed record settles both questions.
The record must also give assurance, by its terms, that the offer will be held open. A merchant’s signed offer that says nothing about staying open remains revocable at any time before acceptance, as it would at common law.42 The assurance can be as short as a statement that the offer is firm for 30 days, and its terms set how long the offer stays irrevocable: the time stated, or a reasonable time if none is stated, but never more than three months.43 The Code does not say whether the three months run from the date the offer is sent or the date it is received, or how a reasonable time is determined, so a problem that turns on either point calls for naming the gap and arguing from the facts.44 Beyond three months the statute gives no protection, so a longer promise to wait falls back on the common-law rule and needs consideration.
The separate-signature requirement addresses the one setting in which a signed record can mislead. A merchant who signs a quote on a form the buyer supplied signs to commit to a price, and a printed line elsewhere on the form declaring all offers irrevocable for 30 days is easy to sign past. The statute therefore requires the offeror to sign separately any assurance on a form the offeree supplied, which protects against entrapment of an offeror by a printed clause such as “All offers are to be irrevocable for 30 days.”45 A second signature on the assurance itself makes the offeror sign the very term that binds.
A merchant who writes on her own letterhead that her offer to sell goods is firm for 30 days, and signs it, cannot withdraw on day ten, even though the buyer gave nothing for the assurance.46 The same assurance printed on a purchase-order form that the buyer supplied produces no firm offer when the merchant signs only once, at the bottom, to quote the price. Unless the assurance was separately signed, the offer stays revocable as at common law.47
When § 2-205 does not apply, the offeree is not necessarily without a remedy. The offeree may have paid for an option under the common-law rule, may invoke promissory estoppel, or may rely on the Restatement rule that an offer the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character before acceptance, and that does induce it, is binding as an option to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.48 Some states also reach beyond merchants and goods: New York, for example, makes an offer in a signed writing that states it is irrevocable for a period, or for a reasonable time if none is stated, binding without regard to consideration, in cases outside § 2-205.49 A fact pattern describing a signed offer with a deadline therefore calls for checking each prerequisite in turn, because failure at any one returns the offer to the common-law rule.