Concept
The Section 82(1) Rule
Promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations
The Section 82(1) Rule
Section 82(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts turns the time-barred-debt exception into a rule a court can apply to a particular promise: a promise to pay all or part of an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual indebtedness owed by the promisor is binding if the indebtedness is still enforceable or would be except for the effect of a statute of limitations.1
The sentence packs three tests into one. The promise must look back to an earlier debt that the promisor owed. That debt must be enforceable, or enforceable but for a limitations bar, when the promise is made. And the promise may cover all of the debt or only part, with the creditor recovering what the debtor promised. The three subsections below take the tests in that order. Together they answer the consideration problem from the preceding section: a new promise needs no new bargain when an old exchange carries it, and when no old debt exists, nothing carries it. A later section turns to the acts that § 82 treats as a promise when the debtor never says so in words.2
The Antecedent Debt
The first words of § 82(1) fix what the new promise must look back to: “an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual indebtedness owed by the promisor.”3 Antecedent means earlier in time, so the debt must exist before the promise is made. Indebtedness means a genuine obligation to pay, not a hope or a duty of gratitude. The phrase sets two requirements: the obligation must be of a recognized kind, contractual or quasi-contractual, and it must be the promisor’s own. Those requirements make the exception narrower than the label “moral obligation” suggests, and Mills v. Wyman shows why the law insists on both.
The Massachusetts court in Mills tied the exception to the origin of the debt. Where a debt is barred by the statute of limitations, as with the debts of infants and discharged bankrupts, there was originally a quid pro quo; natural justice says the party who received should pay, and the legislature has said only that he shall not be coerced.4 A later promise lifts an impediment the law placed in the way of a debt honestly due. The court described the principle as preserved by “looking back to the origin of the transaction, where an equivalent is to be found.”5 The creditor once gave value, the debtor received it, and the legislature withheld the remedy for the public convenience. The old exchange therefore supplies what the new promise lacks, and the promise is not one to pay something for nothing.6 Where the promisor never owed anything, no equivalent exists to look back to, and the promise is exactly that.
The father’s promise in Mills had no such origin behind it. The stranger had cared for the father’s adult son, and the father owed the stranger nothing for that care. The stranger tried to supply a legal duty through a statute compelling lineal kindred to support poor relations, but the court answered that the statutory duty exists only in the cases the statute provides, and never until the party charged has been adjudged of sufficient ability.7 A duty a court might someday impose is not an existing debt. Set the father beside a customer who ordered a repair and never paid the mechanic. In both cases another person conferred a benefit, a promise to pay came later, and nothing new was bargained for. The customer owes the price under the original bargain, so his promise revives a real debt. The father owed no debt, so his promise had none to revive.
The rule’s text names two kinds of qualifying debt.8 A contractual indebtedness arises from an agreement, such as the price owed under a repair contract. A quasi-contractual indebtedness arises with no agreement at all: the law imposes a duty to pay for a benefit the recipient knowingly accepted, because keeping it free would unjustly enrich the recipient. The second kind keeps the exception faithful to its reason. The debtor received something of value and ought to pay, whether a contract or only the law of unjust enrichment recorded the obligation.
The second half of the phrase, “owed by the promisor,” ties the exception to the person who actually received the benefit. Without that limit, one person’s sympathy could revive another person’s stale claim, and the consideration problem from Mills would return in a new form.
Dana’s promise might still be enforceable on some other ground, for instance if the mechanic gave something in exchange for it, but the time-barred-debt exception is not that ground. The doctrine enforces a promisor’s own debts and leaves a promisor’s sympathies where Mills left them, with conscience.
One further point concerns what the promisor must understand. To be bound, the promisor must know or have reason to know the essential facts of the earlier transaction, but need not know their legal effect.9 The facts identify the debt being renewed; a promisor who has no reason to think the work was done or the goods delivered has renewed nothing he knew about. The legal effect, meaning that the limitations period had run and the debtor could have pleaded it, is a different matter. Requiring the debtor to grasp that effect would let anyone who made a clear promise escape it by claiming never to have understood the statute. A debtor who knows the repair was done and never paid, and who promises to pay without realizing the statute had run, is therefore bound.
A Barred Remedy, Not a Dead Debt
The second test concerns the old debt’s condition when the promise is made: it must be “still enforceable or would be except for the effect of a statute of limitations.”11 The test rests on the line between a right and a remedy. A right is the creditor’s entitlement to be paid; a remedy is a court’s willingness to compel payment. A limitations statute requires a plaintiff to sue within a set period after the claim arises, and when the period expires it ends the right to sue while leaving the claim itself standing.12 In a § 82(1) case, then, the debt is intact and only the court’s help is gone.
The distinction is older than the Restatement. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, the Supreme Court recounted that when the Constitution was adopted it was already well established that suit would lie on a promise to repay a debt barred by the statute of limitations.13 Courts explained the rule by saying the debt constitutes consideration for the promise, because the bar does not extinguish the underlying right but merely causes the remedy to be withheld. The Court quoted a Massachusetts decision that put the point in one line: “the debt remained, the remedy was gone.”14 The Mills court described the barred debt the same way, as an obligation the law had dispensed with principally for the public convenience and that the debtor’s promise voluntarily revives.15
That theory answers the consideration problem. A promise is ordinarily enforced because the promisee gave something in return as part of a bargain.16 The creditor gave nothing new for the debtor’s later promise, but the creditor’s original performance was part of a bargain, and because the debt survived, that earlier exchange stands behind the promise.
Revival also does the limitations statute no harm. The statute’s concern is the stale claim, one old and forgotten by the parties. A debtor who has recently acknowledged an obligation and promised to pay it has shown that this claim is not stale, so enforcing the promise does not defeat the statute’s purpose.17 The debtor is also the person the statute protects, and the debtor chose to give up that protection.
The clause names two situations. A promise made while the period is still running restates a debt the creditor could already sue on, so the clause is met and the statute plays no part. The clause does its real work after the period expires, when a limitations defense would defeat the creditor’s suit and the new promise supplies the basis for recovery. A promise made two years into a six-year period and a promise made a year after it ends both satisfy the clause, the first because the debt is enforceable and the second because it would be but for the statute.
Both situations presuppose a debt that actually exists, and that presupposition keeps the exception from becoming a way to enforce any promise to pay an old bill. Because the clause asks what would happen if the statute were removed, the analysis runs as a short sequence of questions about the old debt.
An exam stem usually tests this by describing a promise to pay an old bill and leaving you to decide whether the bill is still owed.
The homeowner’s promise is a promise to give something for nothing, the position the father occupied in Mills. He never owed the stranger anything, and she no longer owes the contractor. A debt that was never owed fails the first step. A debt that was paid or released fails the second. In each case the promise has nothing to revive. A debt cut off by a different bar, such as a bankruptcy discharge, falls outside this clause and under its own rule, which a later section takes up.18
The fact that moved the answer between the two scenes is whether the creditor’s right survived. In the first, payment ended it. In the second, the limitations bar took away only the remedy, so the promise draws on a debt that still exists.
All or Part of the Debt
The third test is the phrase “all or part,” which lets the new promise cover the whole antecedent indebtedness or only some of it.20 A debtor who owes $2,000 on a time-barred bill may promise $2,000 or promise $500, and either promise binds once the other requirements are met. The phrase also answers a question the first two tests leave open: how much the creditor can collect. The creditor collects what the debtor promised, because the promise is the obligation a court enforces.
The reason lies in the separate jobs the two obligations do. The surviving old debt gives a court its reason to honor a promise made without new consideration. The promise the creditor actually asks the court to enforce, however, is the new one, so the creditor’s claim is limited to the terms of that promise.21 A limitations statute hands the debtor a defense, and a promise to pay is the debtor’s decision to set that defense aside. The decision reaches only as far as the debtor made it. A debtor who promises $500 on a $2,000 debt has given up the defense for $500, and for the other $1,500 the debt still exists while the remedy is still gone. If a partial promise could reopen the whole claim, a creditor could enforce an obligation the debtor never assumed, and any gesture toward repayment would strip the statute of its force for the balance.
The amount recoverable moves with the promise, while the old debt stays the same. Had the debtor written that he would pay the full $2,000, the same caterer on the same bill would have recovered the full $2,000. A student who sees that a debt was once owed in full should not assume the whole sum revives. The old debt answers whether the promise is supported; the promise answers how much. Enforcing what the debtor acknowledges and promises to pay also leaves the purpose of the limitations statute intact, since the claim enforced is one the debtor concedes is unsatisfied, while nothing in the debtor’s words concedes the balance.22
The same logic governs any condition the debtor attaches to the promise. Because the creditor sues on the new promise, the creditor takes it as the debtor gave it, with its timing and its qualifications.
On an exam, then, the old debt tells you whether a court will honor the promise, and the words of the promise tell you the amount, the timing, and any conditions of recovery.