Concept
Express Promises
Promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations
Express Promises
Section 82(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts does its simplest work when the debtor, after the limitations period has run, tells the creditor in words that he will pay.1 That statement is an express promise, as opposed to a promise the law implies from the debtor's conduct.2 It is the plainest case, because no one has to decide what the debtor's behavior meant. The earlier subsections supplied the other conditions of the rule: an antecedent debt owed by the promisor, a debt that is enforceable or would be but for the statute, and a promise that reaches all or part of it. With those in place, an express-promise case turns on one question: do the debtor's words amount to a promise at all?
A promise in this setting is, in the words of one California opinion applying that state's limitations statute, "an engagement to pay the debt," and the engagement may be express or implied in fact.3 An engagement is a commitment: the debtor binds himself to a future payment and gives up the choice whether to make it. The same opinion separates a promise from an acknowledgment, which is an admission or recognition that the debt exists.4 A debtor who says "I owe you that money" has admitted a fact; a debtor who says "I will pay you that money" has undertaken an act. Whether an acknowledgment alone can ever operate as a promise is a question about implied promises, taken up in the next section. Words of hope, wish, or bare possibility fall on the wrong side of the line, because they leave every decision about payment where it stood before the debtor spoke.
The creditor gives nothing new for an express promise, and § 82(1) makes it binding anyway.5 The explanation lies in the consideration principle itself. For a debtor discharged by the statute of limitations, the principle is preserved by looking back to the origin of the transaction, where an equivalent is to be found, and the law does not demand an exact equivalent.6 The creditor's original performance, and not anything exchanged for the new promise, therefore supports it.
A mechanic's claim shows the rule at work.
The mechanic recovers $1,500. The repair debt was the owner's own, it arose from a contract, and only the passage of time stands between the mechanic and a judgment on it. The signed letter is an engagement to pay part of that debt, so § 82(1) makes it binding although the mechanic gave nothing new.7 Because the owner promised $1,500, the obligation a court enforces is $1,500, not the original $2,000.
Two tempting objections to this result fail. The first is that the promise lacks consideration. Its premise is true, since the mechanic gave nothing new for the letter, but its conclusion overlooks that § 82(1) exists to bind just such a promise, and that the old debt supplies the equivalent.8 The second is that the owner had to pay something first. Section 82(2) does let conduct stand in for a spoken promise, and some statutes treat part payment as the equivalent of a written promise.9 An express promise needs no such substitute, because the debtor has already supplied the promise itself. Statutes in most jurisdictions also regulate these promises, and some require a signed writing.10 The signed letter here would satisfy that requirement, a topic a later section develops.
The same debt can fail on the first element alone.
The debt is real, and only time bars the old claim. Yet the landlord has committed himself to no sum and no date, and his remark leaves every decision about payment with him. There is no engagement to pay, and so there is no promise for § 82(1) to enforce.
The two debtors owe equally genuine debts, and the difference lies entirely in what each said. The car owner engaged to pay a stated amount, while the landlord reserved the whole question to himself. Whether some other conduct by a debtor like the landlord could stand in for the missing promise is the question § 82(2) answers, and the next section takes it up.11