Concept
Statutory Writing Requirements
Promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations
Statutory Writing Requirements
A debtor who clearly promises aloud to pay a time-barred debt has satisfied Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 82(1) and may still owe nothing. Section 82(1) makes a promise to pay all or part of an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual indebtedness binding if the indebtedness is still enforceable or would be except for the effect of a statute of limitations, and its text says nothing about a writing.1 Many jurisdictions nonetheless regulate revival by statute, and the most common requirement is that the new promise be in a signed writing.2 New York, for example, requires a writing for a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations (Gen. Oblig. Law § 17-101) and for a promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy (§ 5-701(a)(5)).3 Other statutes go further and define the conduct that amounts to an implied promise to pay.4 A statute of this kind sits on top of § 82 and adds a requirement of form. The substantive basis for enforcement, a surviving old debt that supports the new promise, stays as the earlier sections described it.
The writing requirement does not supply consideration, because none is needed. A promise ordinarily binds because it was made for something in return, as part of a bargain.5 A new express or implied promise to pay a barred contractual or quasi-contractual debt is the recognized exception: it is enforceable without new consideration.6 Limitations periods exist to avoid stale claims and to let people discard old records, but a debtor who has recently acknowledged the obligation and impliedly promised to pay it has not left a stale claim.7
Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones shows how one such statute works. California Code of Civil Procedure § 360 provided that no acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, by which to take the case out of the limitations title, unless it is “contained in some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby.”8 The court noted that the section states acknowledgment and promise in the alternative, so a qualifying writing needs to contain only one of them.9 The party to be charged is the person against whom enforcement is sought, and in a revival case that person is the debtor. A creditor's own signed memo of a telephone call therefore carries no signature of the debtor and satisfies nothing.
The statute's wording, “sufficient evidence,” frames the signed writing as a matter of proof. The same opinion recited the standard that results when form and substance combine: a distinct and unqualified admission of an existing debt, contained in a writing signed by the party to be charged and without intimation of an intent to refuse payment, suffices to interrupt the running of the limitations period, and the law implies a promise to pay from it.10 The requirements that the admission be distinct, unqualified, and free of any hint of refusal are the substantive rules from the acknowledgment and contrary-intent subsections. The signed writing is the form the statute adds, and both layers must be present. A signed writing also fixes the debtor's own words in a form that depends on no one's memory of a conversation. A creditor who can show only an oral promise cannot establish the revival, so the debt stays barred even though the debtor spoke the words.
On an exam, a clear oral promise to pay a barred debt in a state with a writing statute tests whether you stop at § 82 or go on to the statute.
Because these statutes vary in whether they require a writing and in how they treat conduct that implies a promise, a revival problem is cleanest to run in two layers: form first, substance second.
Check the governing jurisdiction's statute before applying § 82 to a revival problem. Where no statute applies, § 82 supplies the rule.