Concept
Related Revival Doctrines
Promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations
Related Revival Doctrines
Section 82(1) is one instance of a wider pattern, in which a later promise restores an earlier obligation that the law had stopped enforcing. A promise to pay all or part of an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual debt binds if the debt is still enforceable or would be but for a statute of limitations.1 Three neighboring doctrines follow the same pattern, and setting them beside § 82(1) shows what the limitations rule requires and what it leaves out.
Consideration doctrine ordinarily asks whether a promise was made for something in return, and the mutuality cases reduce to whether that return is real or illusory.2 A promise to pay for something the promisor has already received offers no return at all. The doctrine commonly called moral obligation answers that gap with a discrete set of exceptions. Each one enforces a promise made in recognition of a previous benefit that unjustly enriched the promisor, so that the obligation to pay for the benefit justifies upholding the later promise.3
The name suggests more than the doctrine delivers. In most situations a promise without consideration is not binding even when the promisor has a moral obligation to perform it, and a person said to have a moral obligation usually has a moral responsibility but no legal one.4
The court in Mills v. Wyman marked the boundary these exceptions respect. A moral obligation does not support an express promise by itself; there must have been some preexisting obligation that positive law had made inoperative. The court's illustrations were debts barred by the statute of limitations, debts incurred by infants, and debts of bankrupts.5 The narrow exceptions share that shape: a debtor promises to pay an earlier debt that is unenforceable, and courts treat the moral obligation to pay it as enough to enforce the new promise.6
Each subsection below sets one neighbor beside the limitations rule. A discharge in bankruptcy shows how a stronger policy changes the form the later promise must take. A voidable obligation shows why the timing of the promise matters. A past benefit that never created a debt shows where § 82(1) stops.
Bankruptcy Discharge: The Promise Must Be Express
A new promise to perform all or part of an obligation discharged in bankruptcy is enforceable without new consideration, just as a promise to pay a time-barred debt is.7 The two debts part ways on the form the promise must take. For a time-barred debt, conduct can supply the promise: a part payment or other acknowledgment implies a new promise to pay, so long as the debtor has not qualified it to negate or limit that implication and has communicated it to the creditor.8 A discharged debt gets no such implication. Restatement (Second) § 83 requires that the promise be “express,”9 and a mere acknowledgment that the claim is valid and unpaid does not suffice. An express and specific promise to perform all or part of the obligation does, with no new consideration.10
The Restatement attributes the difference to policy. In its words, discharge in bankruptcy “has been thought to reflect a somewhat stronger public policy than the statute of limitations,” so a promise implied from acknowledgment or part payment does not revive a discharged debt.11 What each doctrine guards against explains why an acknowledgment can do the work in one setting and not the other. A limitations statute deals with stale claims, where the concern is recollection and available records, and a debtor's acknowledgment or part payment answers that concern. A discharge raises no such concern. The issue is not recollection and records, so an admission that the debt remains unpaid says nothing about whether the debtor has chosen to take the obligation on again.12
Federal law adds conditions of its own. Among other things, 11 U.S.C. § 524 requires that an agreement to repay a discharged debt contain a conspicuous statement that the debtor may rescind within a specified time, and in certain circumstances the bankruptcy court must approve the agreement as not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor and as being in the debtor's best interests.13 The express promise is the contract-law threshold, and the Code's conditions apply in addition to it. Some states also require a promise to pay a discharged debt to be in writing; New York's General Obligations Law § 5-701(a)(5) is an example.14
Voidable Obligations: Ratification After the Defect Ends
A party who holds the right to avoid a contract, because of a defect in it or because of contractual incapacity, can give up that right by ratifying. A second promise to perform, made after the party becomes aware of the defect or after the basis for the incapacity has ended, binds despite the lack of new consideration.16 Mills v. Wyman listed debts incurred by infants among its illustrations of obligations that positive law had made inoperative and that a later promise can support.17
The familiar example is the minor. After reaching the age of majority a minor becomes liable on any contract made during minority that the minor elects to affirm, and may affirm either expressly or by failing to disaffirm within a reasonable time.18 The capacity rules that decide when a minor may avoid a contract in the first place are taken up later.
The timing requirement follows from the purpose of the power to avoid. A minor, or a party who does not know of a defect, has chosen without full capacity or full knowledge. A promise made while that condition lasts leaves the party where the party started, so it ratifies nothing and the power to avoid survives. A promise made after the minor reaches majority, or after the party learns of the defect, is a considered choice by someone who now has the capacity or the knowledge. The original exchange supports it, as an earlier debt supports a promise to pay a time-barred one, and no new bargain is needed. Only the party who holds the power of avoidance can give it up, so the promise must come from that party.
The same sequence governs a party who learns of a defect in the transaction. A promise to go ahead made while the party is still unaware of the defect ratifies nothing. The identical promise made after the party learns of it is a ratification. Awareness of the defect plays the role that reaching majority plays for the minor: each marks the moment when the reason for the protection has ended.
Ratification is also more forgiving about form than a promise to pay a discharged debt. A minor can ratify by silence after majority, where a discharged debt demands express words, and in that respect ratification sits closer to the time-barred-debt rule, where conduct can supply the promise. The two revive an earlier exchange by a later promise, but § 82(1) restores a debt that only a limitations bar had disabled, while ratification confirms an obligation the party could have undone until the defect ended.
Past Benefits Without a Debt: Where § 82(1) Stops
Section 82(1) reaches only a promise to pay “an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual indebtedness owed by the promisor” that is still enforceable or would be but for a statute of limitations.20 When a past benefit never created a debt, a limitations bar has disabled nothing and the new promise has nothing to revive. The wider moral-obligation exceptions stop at the same place. They do not recognize a broader basis for validating a promise made in recognition of a prior benefit that fits none of their categories. A rescuer who is later promised payment of medical costs cannot use them, the rescuer's unjust enrichment claim is itself problematic, and consideration doctrine makes enforcement of the later promise problematic as well.21
Mills v. Wyman shows the boundary from the losing side. A stranger sheltered and cared for the defendant's adult son, who had long left his father's household and fell sick among strangers on his return from abroad. The father, “influenced by a transient feeling of gratitude,” promised in writing to pay the stranger's expenses and then refused.22 The court found the promise made without legal consideration: the care was not given at the father's request, and the son was in no respect under the father's care.23 Moral obligation did not rescue the promise, because it supports an express promise only where some preexisting obligation has become inoperative by positive law.24 A debt barred by limitations is the model case, since a debt existed and positive law alone made it inoperative. The father had no earlier obligation to the stranger, so nothing had been disabled and his promise stood alone. The opinion itself calls the result an example of “particular injustice sometimes necessarily resulting from the operation of general rules.”25
Webb v. McGowin answered the same question the other way. Webb had saved McGowin from serious injury, and McGowin later promised him a life pension.26 Neither promisor owed an antecedent debt, so § 82(1) could carry neither promise. The Webb court rested on a different principle: if the consideration, even without request, moves directly from the plaintiff to the defendant and enures directly to the defendant's benefit, the promise is binding though made upon a past consideration, because the later promise is equivalent to a previous request.27 Restatement (Second) § 86 later adopted Webb's expansion of the moral obligation doctrine under the label “promise for benefit received,” which is more commonly called the material benefit rule.28 Section 86 does not use the legal fiction on which Webb relied. It creates a distinct cause of action instead: a court may enforce a promise made in recognition of a previous benefit that unjustly enriched the promisor and was not given with gratuitous intent, to the extent necessary to prevent injustice and in proportion to the value of the benefit.29 That rule has its own requirements, separate from § 82's.
Webb and Mills end differently even though neither promisor owed a debt, and the difference lies in who received the benefit. In Webb the promisor himself was saved. In Mills the care went to the promisor's son. The Webb court drew that line itself: the earlier cases refusing enforcement involved defendants who had received nothing beneficial to themselves, unlike the defendant before it, who “has received a valuable pecuniary benefit at the expense of the plaintiff.”30 The father in Mills had neither a debt nor a benefit, so nothing supported his promise. McGowin had no debt either, which is why Webb had to rest on a principle outside § 82, but he had received a benefit, which is why that principle could carry his promise.
Compare a mechanic who repaired a customer's car at the customer's request and was never paid. If the customer promises to pay after the limitations period has run, the promise rests on an antecedent debt that only the statute had disabled, and § 82(1) enforces it.31 Delay does not turn a gift promise into a revived debt, because the debt is the fact that triggers the rule.