Concept
The Section 83 Rule
Promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy
The Section 83 Rule
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 83 states the exception in one sentence: "An express promise to pay all or part of an indebtedness of the promisor, discharged or dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings begun before the promise is made, is binding."1 "Binding" has a concrete meaning here. A creditor who sues on such a promise need not show that the debtor received anything new in return, because enforcement rests on the earlier debt and on the debtor's own decision to honor it. The common-law cases agree: an express and specific promise to perform all or part of a preexisting obligation discharged in bankruptcy is enforceable despite the absence of new consideration.2
The sentence sets two gates and one measure. The first gate is the promise: the debtor must have expressly promised to pay. The second gate is the debt and the calendar: bankruptcy must have discharged the debt or be able to discharge it, in a proceeding that began before the promise was made. The measure is the amount: the debtor may promise all of the debt or only part of it, and the creditor collects what the debtor promised. A promise that fails either gate returns to the ordinary rule that a past benefit does not support a later promise.
Each limit keeps the exception tied to the reasons that justify it. The express-promise requirement keeps an offhand remark from creating liability for a debt the law had excused. The debt-and-timing requirement ties the promise to a real earlier exchange in which the creditor gave value and went unpaid.3 The amount rule leaves the debtor in control of how much of a protection that exists for the debtor's benefit to surrender. We take the gates in order, beginning with what counts as an express promise.
Express Promise Required
The word express does the first job in § 83: only an express promise to pay all or part of a discharged or dischargeable debt is binding.4 The debtor must use words that commit the debtor to pay. Conceding that the debt exists and was never paid is not a promise, and neither is conduct that merely hints at a willingness to pay. The common-law cases require an express and specific promise to perform the old obligation, and a bare acknowledgment that the claim is valid and unsatisfied does not meet that demand.5 A creditor holding only an acknowledgment can prove the debt but has no new promise to enforce, so the case falls back on the rule that a past benefit does not support a later promise.
The strictness of this requirement shows most clearly beside the treatment of debts barred by the statute of limitations. There, a promise to pay may be implied from the debtor's conduct, so an acknowledgment or a part payment can carry it. A limitations statute exists to avoid stale claims and to let people discard old records, and a debtor who recently acknowledged an unpaid debt has shown that the claim is neither old nor forgotten. Enforcing the promise defeats nothing the statute was meant to protect.6 A bankruptcy discharge rests on a different foundation. The Restatement treats discharge as reflecting a somewhat stronger public policy than the statute of limitations, so a promise implied from acknowledgment or part payment does not revive a debt discharged in bankruptcy.7
The reason lies in what conduct can prove. A small payment after discharge is ambiguous: the debtor may mean to begin repaying, to keep a supplier's goodwill, to settle one invoice, or simply to express regret. A court that inferred a promise to pay the whole debt from such a payment would be choosing among those meanings for the debtor. The discharge protects the debtor, and only the debtor may give that protection up, so the law asks for words that leave no doubt the surrender is intended.
The two debtors stand in the same legal position: each owed a real debt that the discharge put beyond collection, and each showed some awareness of it. They differ in what they communicated. The first offered a payment and an apology, either of which could mean many things. The second stated a commitment to pay a stated amount, which § 83 treats as a conscious renunciation of the discharge. Her liability reaches $3,000, the amount she promised, a limit developed in the all-or-part discussion below.
An express promise need not be a legally informed one. The promisor must know or have reason to know the essential facts of the earlier transaction, which means understanding which obligation is being promised and what it was for, but need not understand the legal effect of those facts.8 A debtor who promises to pay a former supplier does not have to know that the discharge stripped the supplier of its right to sue, or that the promise will now bind. Knowledge of the transaction is what makes the promise a deliberate choice to pay for something received. A rule demanding knowledge of bankruptcy law would defeat the sincere promises of the very debtors least likely to have studied it. Federal law adds its own protective formalities for agreements to repay discharged debts, taken up in the next section, so the common-law rule's indifference to legal knowledge is only part of the picture in practice.9
Discharged or Dischargeable Debt
Section 83 reaches an express promise to pay an indebtedness that is "discharged or dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings begun before the promise is made."11 The clause asks two things of the facts. Is the debt one that the bankruptcy proceeding discharged or could discharge? And did the proceeding come first? Students most often miss the second question, because the line falls where the case began, not where the discharge order was entered.
The words "or dischargeable" mean the section does not wait for the discharge order. The common-law cases likewise enforce a new express and specific promise to perform an obligation that was discharged in bankruptcy or was in the process of being discharged in an existing proceeding.12 A case filed in March and ending in a discharge in June passes through a pending stage in which the debt has not yet been discharged but is on its way. During that stage the estate's funds pay prebankruptcy debts as far as they reach, and the balance is discharged, with creditors forbidden to collect it.13 If the section applied only after the order was entered, a promise made in May would fail and an identical promise made in July would bind, though the creditor, the value given, and the debtor's protection are the same on both dates. Covering the pending period keeps the outcome from turning on the moment the court enters its order.
The clock starts when the proceeding begins because the section lets a debtor give up a protection that bankruptcy law has already supplied or is in the course of supplying. A debtor who promises to pay in that setting makes a deliberate choice to honor a debt the law has put or is putting beyond collection. A debtor who has not yet invoked bankruptcy has no protection to renounce, since the debt is still fully collectible when the promise is made. The text therefore asks only whether a proceeding was already under way.
Both promises came after the filing, and only the first came after the discharge. Because both fall within the section, the discharge date marks no boundary. The line falls at the start of the case.
A debtor who promises before the case opens sits on the other side of that line.
The January debtor and the May debtor made much the same promise, and each preceded any discharge. The single fact that separates them is whether a bankruptcy proceeding had already begun, which is why a filing two months earlier would have flipped the January result. The section says nothing about such a promise except that it supplies no exception. A promise made before any proceeding is therefore not automatically void or unenforceable. It stands or falls on the ordinary rules of enforceability, including any bargained-for exchange the promisee can show. On an exam, say that § 83 does not apply to these facts, and avoid saying that the promise is invalid.
All or Part of the Debt
Section 83 binds a debtor who expressly promises to pay "all or part of an indebtedness" that was discharged or dischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings begun before the promise was made.15 The phrase "all or part" leaves the amount to the debtor. A debtor may promise the entire balance or only a fraction of it, and either promise falls within the section. The common-law cases agree: an express and specific promise to perform all or part of a preexisting obligation discharged in bankruptcy is enforceable despite the absence of new consideration.16
The same words settle what a creditor may collect, because a court enforces the promise the debtor made after the discharge. The old debt does real work, but only as the reason the new promise deserves enforcement. It records an earlier exchange in which the creditor gave value and went unpaid, and that history answers the objection that the later promise lacks consideration.17 It does not come back to life in its original amount. Since the promise being enforced is the new one, the claimant is limited to the terms of that promise.18
The measure follows the debtor's own undertaking for a reason tied to why the exception exists. A discharge protects the debtor, so the debtor decides how much of that protection to surrender. A debtor who pays a supplier something out of gratitude or to preserve goodwill has made a deliberate, limited choice, and enforcing the choice according to its terms honors it. If any promise, however small, reopened the whole original balance, a debtor would have good reason to say nothing at all, and an exception meant to let honest debtors keep their word would teach them to stay silent. The creditor would also collect, on the strength of one modest promise, an amount the debtor never agreed to pay.
Students are often tempted to say that a post-discharge promise "revives" the debt, and that shorthand overstates the result. When an exam stem pairs a large discharged debt with a smaller promise, it is asking what the debtor actually promised.
Had the debtor's letter promised the entire $10,000, the same suit would succeed for the full amount, since the promise itself would then be for the whole. The two letters differ only in the amount each promised, and that amount fixes the creditor's recovery.