Concept
Statutory Limits on Revival
Promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy
Statutory Limits on Revival
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 83 binds a debtor to an express promise to pay all or part of a debt that bankruptcy discharged or could discharge, so long as the bankruptcy proceedings began before the promise was made.1 A promise that meets those elements needs no new consideration at common law. Two layers of statute now sit on top of that rule, however, and a promise that passes § 83 can still fail at either one.
The common-law rule is narrow in one respect and generous in another. It is narrow because moral obligation alone cannot be the test: every promise carries some moral obligation, so a test built on that obligation would enforce every promise.2 Section 83 avoids that result by requiring a specific earlier debt and an express promise. It is generous because the promisor must know the essential facts of the earlier transaction but need not know their legal effect.3 A debtor can therefore bind herself to repay without realizing that the discharge had freed her from personal liability.
The statutory layers work at two levels of government. The federal Bankruptcy Code regulates agreements to repay discharged debts directly.4 State law may add a formality of its own, a signed writing. Work a problem in two stages: run the common-law elements first, then check the statutory layer. An answer that stops at § 83 and declares the promise binding has skipped a layer that may control the result.
Bankruptcy Code Reaffirmation
A reaffirmation agreement is the usual way a debtor revives a debt that the discharge would otherwise reach: debtor and creditor agree that the debtor will keep paying. Like the promise in § 83, the agreement is legally enforceable even though nothing was bargained for in exchange.5 It can bind without a fresh exchange because the debt itself survives the discharge. A discharge does not cancel or extinguish the debt; it only protects the debtor from further personal liability on it.6 The old cases make the same point from the creditor's side. There was originally a quid pro quo, and the later promise restores to the creditor what the law had taken away.7 An agreement made while the bankruptcy case is open also fits § 83's timing, since the proceeding has already begun and the debt is one the discharge will reach.
Debtors reaffirm for reasons that follow from what the discharge leaves untouched. The creditor's lien survives, so a debtor who wants to keep a financed car may reaffirm the loan; the discharge will not stop the lender from foreclosing and taking the car.8 A discharge also protects only the debtor, so a debtor who wants to keep the lender away from a co-obligor, such as a parent who guaranteed the loan, has a reason to reaffirm.9
The common-law rule asks little of the debtor in these situations. It requires knowledge of the essential facts of the earlier debt, not an understanding of what the discharge did.10 The Code adds conditions. Under 11 U.S.C. § 524, the agreement must contain a conspicuous statement that the debtor may rescind within a specified time, and in certain circumstances the bankruptcy court must approve it as not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor and as being in the debtor's best interests.11 The first condition gives the debtor a stated period in which to change her mind. The second puts hardship and best interests before the court.
A student who finds an express promise, a dischargeable debt, and a proceeding already begun, and then declares the agreement binding, has finished only the first stage.
Both versions satisfy § 83, because Dara made an express promise to pay a dischargeable debt after the proceeding began. The first version does not satisfy the Code's conditions, so the common-law rule alone does not make it enforceable. The second does, and it is enforceable without consideration.12 What separates the two is not what Dara promised but whether the Code's conditions were met.
State Writing Requirements
Section 83 asks for an express promise, not a written one, so at common law a spoken promise can satisfy it.14 Some states add a formality: a signed writing. The same instinct appears elsewhere in the law of revived promises, since many jurisdictions require a new promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations to be in a signed writing.15 A state may impose the requirement through a dedicated statute or through its general statute of frauds, which makes certain categories of promises unenforceable without a signed writing. That statute works category by category, and each category has to be read on its own terms. The one-year provision, for example, turns on what “by its terms” and “cannot be performed” mean.16 Whether a particular state's statute reaches a promise to revive a discharged debt is therefore a question about that statute's text.
A writing fixes in the debtor's own signed words the two things § 83 puts in issue: whether she made an express promise, and how much she promised. A spoken promise leaves both to competing memories.
Both debtors cleared every common-law element: an express promise to pay part of a debt discharged in a proceeding that began earlier. The first debtor's signed letter also meets the state's form requirement, so her supplier can enforce the $2,000. The second debtor's promise exists only as a spoken statement, so the writing requirement is unmet and his supplier cannot enforce it. In a state with no writing requirement, the second promise would bind him to $2,000 under § 83, subject to the federal conditions discussed above.
The form requirement and the substantive requirement operate independently. A signed note that only acknowledges an unpaid debt may satisfy a state's demand for a writing, but it still fails § 83. A mere acknowledgment that the claim is valid and unsatisfied is not enough; the law requires an express and specific promise to pay all or part of the debt.17 The writing must carry the promise itself.
State law on these requirements varies, so treat the writing requirement as a check run after the common-law elements are satisfied. Whenever a party seeks to enforce an oral promise to pay a discharged debt, ask whether the jurisdiction requires a writing for that kind of promise.