Concept
The Section 86 Rule
Promise for a benefit previously received
The Section 86 Rule
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86(1) adopts the result in Webb v. McGowin without the fiction that case needed. A promise made in recognition of a benefit the promisor previously received from the promisee is binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.1 The text asks for a benefit, a promise that recognizes it, and an injustice to prevent. It asks for no request, inducement, or bargain. Section 86 drops the legal fiction Webb used and states the doctrine as a distinct cause of action built on the promisor's unjust enrichment.2 Promissory estoppel is the principal exception to the consideration requirement, but not the only one; promises made in recognition of a past benefit form another class.3
Unjust enrichment supplies the logic. The general test asks whether the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant, whether the defendant knew of the benefit and kept it, and whether it would be unjust to let the defendant keep it without paying.4 Section 86 takes that idea and adds a promise to it. Each phrase of the rule does separate work, so it is best read one phrase at a time.
The benefit must meet three conditions. It must be previous: a completed event that came before the promise, which is why the section answers the past consideration barrier. It must have come from the promisee to the promisor, because the doctrine covers promises that recognize a previous benefit the promisee conferred on the promisor and that unjustly enriched the promisor.5 And it must not have been a gift, because a promise is not binding if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or the promisor otherwise was not unjustly enriched.6
Mills v. Wyman shows the second condition failing. The promisor's son was of full age and lived independently, so no pre-existing obligation existed, and the promisor had received nothing from the plaintiff. His promise was therefore gratuitous, a promise to make a gift.7 The third condition is where unrequested help runs into trouble. A person who performs unrequested services for another does not, as a general rule, acquire a right to compensation, and services meant to be voluntary stay gratuitous as a matter of legal presumption.8
The promise supplies what the benefit alone lacks. Standing by itself, unrequested help invites the presumption that it was a gift. A promise from the recipient changes that: it recognizes the benefit and places a value on it, which shifts the equities toward the promisee and creates the presumption that the benefit was not conferred with gratuitous intent.9 The promise also draws scrutiny of its own. It comes without new consideration, so the evidentiary and cautionary functions of consideration doctrine still matter, and the court wants assurance that the promisor made a sober, voluntary commitment, unaffected by impulsivity or manipulation.10
The last phrase, to the extent necessary to prevent injustice, gives the court a remedial judgment instead of a yes-or-no rule.11 The court takes into account all the circumstances, including those of the enrichment and of the promise, and may enforce the promise in full or in part.12 It has that latitude because the section does not protect an expectation or reliance interest. It rectifies a situation in which the promisor was unjustly enriched.13 The figure the promisor chose therefore does not fix the recovery. The court enforces only to the extent the promise is proportionate to the value of the benefit,14 and subsection (2) states the limit directly: a promise is not binding to the extent its value is disproportionate to the benefit.15 Together with the gift limit, that is the boundary the next sections examine.
Three misreadings of the section are common. The first treats it as consideration under another name. It is not. The benefit was complete before the promise, so the promise could not have induced it, and the text requires no request or bargain. One theory does reconcile such promises with consideration doctrine: a promisee with a valid unjust enrichment claim holds a legal right that can be traded, so the promise induces a release of that claim, and the arrangement becomes a bargained-for exchange of legal rights.16 Section 86 reaches enforcement without the legal fiction Webb used.17
The second misreading treats the section as promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel enforces a promise because the promisee took detrimental action in reliance on it, and a § 86 promisee usually has not, since the benefit came first. Reliance would help only to the extent the promisee acted because of the promise.18 The section enforces to rectify the promisor's enrichment, not to protect a contractual expectation or reliance interest.19 A promisee who can show only the earlier benefit and the later promise must therefore win under § 86 or not at all.
The third misreading is the most tempting, because the doctrine is called moral obligation. The name suggests that a moral duty suffices to support a promise. It does not: in most situations a promise without consideration is not binding even when the promisor was morally bound to keep it.20 Mills held that a bare promise without consideration cannot be enforced, even where refusing to perform may be disgraceful.21 Section 86 stays inside that rule because enrichment, not moral duty, triggers it. A promisor who feels bound by sympathy or gratitude but received nothing from the promisee has no § 86 problem.
The section is best understood as a hybrid. Ordinary restitution awards value-based recovery for a benefit conferred. Section 86 covers situations in which the relief claimed does not fit that recovery, and it justifies the relief by pointing to a promise made after the benefit was received. It blends restitutionary concepts and promise.22 Applied to a fact pattern, it reduces to three questions. Did the promisor receive a benefit from the promisee? Did the promise recognize that benefit? How far do the equities require enforcement? Mills fails at the first question. The limits in subsection (2) then refine the first and third.