Concept
Limits on Enforcement
Promise for a benefit previously received
Limits on Enforcement
Subsection (1) of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86 makes a promise made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.1 Subsection (2) then names two situations in which such a promise does not bind. It does not bind if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons the promisor has not been unjustly enriched, and it does not bind to the extent its value is disproportionate to the benefit.2
Both limits follow from the premise on which the section rests. A classic statement of the rule applies where the promisor, having received a material benefit, is morally bound to compensate the promisee and promises to pay; the promise then affirms or ratifies the services rendered and carries the presumption that a previous request for them was made.3 One analysis of the Sam and Benny problem puts the same idea in equitable terms: the ratifying promise shifts the equities toward the promisee by recognizing and placing a value on the benefit, and it creates a presumption that the benefit was not conferred gratuitously.4 Another account grounds the rule in the promisee’s potential unjust enrichment claim, a legal right the promisee can trade, with the promisor’s money as the price of its release: a “bargained-for exchange of legal rights.”5 Each account assumes that the promisor really received something of value from the promisee, and the measure of a restitution claim, the reasonable value of the benefit conferred, suggests that the promise can ask for no more.6 Subsection (2) tests those two assumptions.
Clause (a) has two parts: the gift, and a catch-all for any other reason the promisor was not unjustly enriched. The next four sections work through clause (a), taking the gift first and then three recurring applications of the catch-all. The fifth section takes clause (b), which limits the amount.
Benefits Conferred as Gifts
A promisee who conferred the benefit as a gift cannot enforce a later promise of payment under § 86. Clause (a) says so directly: the promise is not binding “if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or for other reasons the promisor has not been unjustly enriched.”7 Restitution supplies the logic. A person who confers a benefit as a gift (gratuitously, or as a “volunteer”) cannot assert an unjust enrichment claim for it.8 A donor therefore holds no claim to trade away, and a later promise has nothing to buy.9
The clause also guards an older rule. A person who performs unrequested services does not thereby acquire a right to compensation, even though the performance cost the one and benefited the other. If you do somebody a favor, you cannot convert your generosity into an enforceable contract claim, because services intended to be voluntary and gratuitous remain so as a matter of legal presumption.10 Section 86 reaches promises made in recognition of past benefits, and the gift clause keeps it from reaching every favor that later draws a word of thanks.
What counts as a gift depends on the intent it is reasonable to attribute to the promisee. In the Sam and Benny problem, Sam installed a tarpaulin on Benny’s roof. It is reasonable to attribute to Sam the intent to claim reimbursement for the cost of the tarpaulin, because altruistic intent may reasonably not extend to out-of-pocket expenses. His services are different. A neighbor’s services in protecting property are more likely treated as altruistic and gratuitous, even when they carry some personal risk, and a neighbor who elects to take a risk cannot claim “danger pay.”11
The Sam problem also shows what a later promise adds. Standing alone, restitution serves Sam poorly, since he did not reasonably intend compensation beyond the cost of the tarpaulin and so was a volunteer in climbing on the roof. Section 86 does better, because Benny’s ratifying promise recognizes and places a value on the benefit and creates a presumption that it was not conferred with gratuitous intent.12 A presumption is weaker than a conclusion, so the circumstances of the help still count.
Webb v. McGowin raised the same question at the pleading stage. The complaint alleged that Webb had not conferred the benefit gratuitously, apparently because he performed his services in the workplace, and the court had to accept that allegation as true on the motion to dismiss.13
Misaki, by contrast, painted Horace’s house expecting compensation. She conferred a benefit and expected to be paid, so she was no donor, and the gift clause does not stop her.14 A different limit, taken up below, does threaten her claim.
On an exam, start the gift question with the promisee’s position when she acted: what would a reasonable observer say she expected? Out-of-pocket costs and a workplace setting point toward an expectation of payment, while personal effort for a neighbor or stranger points toward a gift. Argue from the facts whether the later promise’s presumption of non-gratuitous intent holds.
Benefits the Promisee Already Owed
A promisee who was already legally obligated to confer the benefit cannot enforce a later promise to pay for it. The source identifies this as a noteworthy situation in which an unjust enrichment might not exist: the promisee had to provide what she provided.16
The rule parallels the consideration doctrine. A promise to perform an already existing legal obligation is not consideration, and on the same reasoning a promise to pay for a benefit conferred because of an existing legal duty is not binding under § 86.17 Frank, a firefighter employed by the local municipality, shows the first half. Called to a burning house while on duty, he says, “I will fight the fire if you give me $1,000.” Even if the homeowner agreed, the deal would not satisfy the consideration doctrine, because Frank was already legally obligated, to the homeowner and to everyone else in the municipality, to fight the fire. A firefighter who worked for a different municipality, with no other law requiring involvement, might supply consideration.18 Reverse the sequence, so that Frank fights the fire first and the homeowner afterward promises $1,000, and the same duty defeats the promise under § 86.
The reason runs through unjust enrichment. A promisee who owes the benefit may have no claim in restitution to release, so the “bargained-for exchange of legal rights” that supports enforcement is missing.19 The promisor, for his part, received what the promisee was already bound to give.
The two scenes look alike: finished work, a pleased owner, and a promise made afterward. The fact that moves the result is the promisee’s prior duty. Tomas owed Ines the painting, so Ines received nothing she was not already entitled to, while Misaki owed Horace nothing.20
On an exam, ask what the promisee already owed the promisor before weighing the sympathetic facts. If the performance was owed, the claim ends there. If it was not, move on to the remaining limits.
Imposed and Unrequested Benefits
A benefit pressed on someone who never asked for it is another reason the promisor may not have been unjustly enriched. Restitution recognizes the “officious intermeddler” as a reason a claim fails, alongside the gift.22
Misaki shows how the limit works. An unemployed house painter, she searched her neighborhood, found that Horace’s house needed painting, painted it while he was on vacation, and demanded payment. She conferred a benefit and expected compensation, yet she has no unjust enrichment claim, because her intervention in Horace’s affairs was not justified under the circumstances.23 The gift limit asks what the promisee expected. This limit asks whether acting was justified at all, and a promisee can expect payment and still fail it.
The phrase “justified under the circumstances” makes the inquiry fact-specific. Misaki went looking for a house that needed paint, and nothing in the example suggests that anything required her to act before Horace came home. The limit also fits the general proposition that a person who performs unrequested services acquires no right to compensation.24
A later promise changes the analysis. Suppose Misaki painted Horace’s house thinking he would be pleased but also expecting compensation, and Horace, on his return, promised to pay her $10,000. A court may enforce his promise under § 86, because concerns about a benefit being “forced onto” a recipient are less compelling when he later makes a voluntary promise to pay for it. Depending on the interests of justice, a court may well enforce a subsequent promise even in the case of an officious intermeddler.25 The Restatement’s instruction to enforce a promise “to the extent necessary to prevent injustice” makes the question one of weighing and not of rule.26
The reasoning turns on the promisor’s free choice. The concern behind the intermeddler limit is that the benefit was forced onto the recipient, and a recipient who sees the finished work and then voluntarily promises to pay has largely answered it.27 It follows that a promise wrung from a recipient who felt cornered would carry less weight, because it would not show a free choice to pay. The sources draw no bright line here, so a problem on this point calls for weighing what the promisor said and did and whether the equities favor enforcement. For a variation in which the benefit was conferred by mistake and not by an uninvited choice to intervene, compare Drake v. Bell.
On an exam, ask two questions in order. Was the promisee justified in acting without being asked? If not, was the later promise freely made, and do the equities favor enforcement? Argue both sides and then commit to the one the facts favor.
Benefits to Someone Else
A promisor who did not receive the benefit has nothing to ratify. Subsection (1) reaches a benefit “previously received by the promisor from the promisee,”29 and clause (a) denies enforcement when the promisor has not been unjustly enriched.30 A promisor who merely learns that a third person was helped, and answers with thanks or sympathy, ends up where he began.
Mills v. Wyman, decided on consideration grounds, supplies the classic facts. The plaintiff cared for the defendant’s sick son, a man of twenty-five who had long left his father’s family. The father instantly wrote back promising to reimburse the plaintiff in the amount requested, then, apparently after reflection, changed his mind and refused.31 The court found the promise made without legal consideration: the kindness and services were not bestowed at the father’s request, and the son was in no respect under his care.32
The father also owed no duty to pay. He had no legal obligation to pay his son’s bills, the son being of full age and living independently, and having received nothing from the plaintiff he had made a gratuitous promise, a promise to make a gift.33 That is the same gap that § 86(2)(a) describes as the absence of unjust enrichment.
The court did not deny the promise’s moral pull. Everyone would recognize the father’s moral duty to keep his word, but without some gain to the promisor the matter was left to “the interior forum, as the tribunal of conscience has been aptly called,” because the security of “honest and fair-minded men, who may inconsiderately make promises without any equivalent” outweighed even a refusal that might be called “disgraceful.”34 The rule that a mere verbal promise without consideration cannot be enforced, the court added, is “universal in its application” and cannot be departed from to suit particular cases.35
The father’s lack of any duty did the work in Mills, and a family tie alone settles nothing. A parent of a young child is differently situated, because a parent is generally obliged to support a minor child, and care that supplies what the parent owed may leave the parent holding a benefit. Whether a court would treat that as the enrichment § 86 requires is a question to argue on the facts.
On an exam, ask first whether the benefit reached the promisor. The family tie, the promisee’s expenses, and the sincerity of the promise cannot answer that question. If the help went to a third person and the promisor owed that person nothing, the promise is gratitude and not enforceable under § 86.
Disproportionate Promises
Clause (b) turns from whether the promisor was enriched to how much the promise may demand. A promise made in recognition of a benefit is not binding “to the extent that its value is disproportionate to the benefit.”37 The words “to the extent” let a court enforce part of a promise and refuse the rest: the court has discretion to enforce the promise to the extent necessary to prevent injustice and to the extent it is proportionate to the value of the benefit.38
The lawn illustration shows the arithmetic. If you mow Alice’s lawn expecting compensation, and she is so grateful that she promises you $1,000, her promise is enforceable only up to the fair value of the benefit.39 The ceiling echoes the measure of an unjust enrichment claim, which is the reasonable value of the benefit conferred.40 Horace’s $10,000 promise to Misaki gets the same check, since nothing in the example says her work was worth that much.41
Two reasons support limiting the amount. First, the promise ratifies a benefit, so it reaches only as far as the benefit does. An excess has no enrichment behind it and resembles a promise to make a gift, which Mills treated as unenforceable for want of gain to the promisor.42 Second, the amount has no bargain behind it to vouch for it. In an ordinary bargained-for exchange the law permits whatever deals the parties choose and does not ask whether each side’s consideration is equal or adequate.43 A promise made after the benefit comes from one side alone, and clause (b) writes a proportion check into the rule itself.
Partial enforcement avoids two bad results. Enforcing the full sum would hand the promisee a windfall, and refusing the promise altogether would discard a promise that rests on a real benefit. By enforcing up to the benefit’s value, the court keeps what the benefit justifies and drops the rest.
The Sam and Benny problem, taken up later in this chapter, returns to the question of measure. Restitution focuses on the benefit to Benny, which does not bear a relationship to Sam’s medical expenses and lost earnings, and § 86 provides a more satisfactory basis for relief.44
On an exam, a stem that gives a value for the help and a larger promised sum calls for a partial answer. Confirm that the earlier limits are cleared, state the benefit’s value as the stem supplies it, enforce up to that figure, and explain why the court’s discretion would or would not allow more.