Concept
Judicial Reception and Statutory Alternatives
Promise for a benefit previously received
Judicial Reception and Statutory Alternatives
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 86(1) binds a promisor who promised in recognition of a benefit previously received from the promisee, to the extent necessary to prevent injustice.1 That is the Restatement's recommendation, and courts have not generally adopted it. Very few cases have put the material benefit rule in issue, and the few courts that have considered it have mostly declined to extend the moral-obligation doctrine beyond the narrow situations involving earlier unenforceable or avoidable legal obligations.2 A past-benefit answer should therefore present § 86 as one approach among several and never as the rule everywhere.
The older exceptions explain the hesitation. Three are widely recognized: a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations, a promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy, and a promise to pay an avoidable debt.3 The last category covers a debt the promisor could have escaped by rescission, as when assent was induced by a material misrepresentation, even an innocent one.4 In all three, a debtor promises to pay an earlier debt that the law had made unenforceable.5 The earlier obligation therefore sets the boundary, and a court asks only whether that obligation existed and whether the new promise revives it.
Section 86 has no such anchor. It reaches a benefit conferred for the first time, and because the later promise carries no new consideration, the court must ask for itself whether the promise was a sober, voluntary commitment, unaffected by impulsivity or manipulation. Those are the evidentiary and cautionary concerns that consideration doctrine ordinarily serves.6 A court that adopts § 86 trades a fixed boundary for case-by-case judgment, which is one reason many courts hold back.
Webb v. McGowin gives the Restatement approach its best case. The court there reasoned that the general rule against past consideration yields where the promisor, having received a material benefit from the promisee, is morally bound to compensate the promisee and promises to pay. The later promise then affirms or ratifies the services and carries a presumption that they were requested.7 Read together, Webb and Mills v. Wyman suggest that moral obligation can support a promise without traditional consideration only if the promisor was personally benefited or enriched by the promisee's sacrifice, so that a just and reasonable claim for compensation exists. Webb is the clearest case of enrichment and sacrifice. McGowin made the promised payments for the rest of his life, and his executors then refused to continue them, arguing that the promise had been made without consideration.8
Mills shows how a court that rejects the approach reasons. A promisor who received nothing from the plaintiff has made a gratuitous promise. Everyone would recognize a moral duty to keep it, but without some gain to the promisor the matter is left to "the interior forum," the tribunal of conscience. The Mills court put the protection of honest and fair-minded people who inconsiderately make promises without any equivalent ahead of relief for the promisee, even though the result excused a promisor whose behavior was disgraceful.9
Some legislatures have chosen a different route. Under a statute of the type New York enacted in General Obligations Law § 5-1105, a signed written promise is not denied effect because its consideration is past, if the writing expresses the consideration, the promisee proves it was given or performed, and it would have been valid consideration but for the timing. The statute never asks whether the promisor was enriched. It substitutes form and proof for the equitable weighing that § 86 requires, which makes it easy to apply by checking each requirement in turn.
Each requirement answers a risk that § 86 leaves to the judge. A signed writing shows a deliberate commitment and not a passing word of thanks, which addresses the cautionary concern that arises whenever a promise lacks new consideration.10 The requirement that the writing express the consideration ties the promise to a particular past act in the promisor's own signed words, so a court need not reconstruct from a disputed conversation what the promise was meant to repay. The proof requirement keeps out the invented or inflated favor. Together the three requirements let a deliberate written undertaking stand while screening out the impulsive or fabricated one.
The statute and § 86 can point in opposite directions. Suppose a stranger pays the hospital bill of a father's adult daughter, and the father later signs a letter promising to repay the amount. The father received no personal benefit, so § 86 and the enrichment reasoning of Webb and Mills give the stranger little.11 Under the statute the same stranger recovers by showing the signed letter and proving the payment. Reverse the paper trail, and a promisor who was enriched but signed nothing is not bound under the statute, however grateful the promisor was.
Because three approaches coexist, the first step on any past-benefit problem is to identify which one the jurisdiction follows. Where a statute of the New York type applies, the answer turns on the signed writing and the proof. A court that has adopted § 86 or follows Webb asks about enrichment and the limits in subsection (2). A court that applies the traditional rule finds no consideration for a later promise unless it falls within the narrow exceptions for earlier unenforceable or avoidable debts.12 When a problem names no governing statute or precedent, state § 86 as the Restatement's position, run its limits, and add that few courts have adopted it. A court applying the traditional rule would then likely reach the result Mills reached, and an answer that presents § 86 as settled majority law overstates the authority.