Concept
Reliance as an Alternative Basis
Promissory estoppel
Promissory Estoppel
Reliance as an Alternative Basis
A court asked to enforce a promise needs a reason, and the law offers three. The promise may belong to a bargained-for exchange supported by consideration. A statute may make it binding without consideration; UCC § 2–209(1), for example, requires none to make binding an agreement that modifies a contract for the sale of goods. Or the promisee may have relied on the promise to her detriment.1 Most common-law jurisdictions accept only the bargain and statutory routes. Detrimental reliance is a peculiarly American concept.2
Consideration handles the two ends of the spectrum well. A conventional swap carries it by definition, and a wholly nonreciprocal gift-promise plainly lacks it. Between them lies a mixed set of “interactive dealings,” neither pure swaps nor pure gifts, and promises that induce the promisee to act without anyone having bargained for the act are the cases that fall into that middle ground. The bargain theory operates too narrowly and too inflexibly to do equity in every such circumstance.3
Courts felt that pinch before any rule addressed it. Equitable estoppel had traditionally arisen only from representations about past facts, never from promises about the future, so it could not be used to form a contract.4 Confronted with injustices like the one in Kirksey v. Kirksey, the courts stretched the estoppel concept to build an entirely new contract doctrine.5
Ricketts v. Scothorn shows the stretch at work. A granddaughter abandoned her employment and refrained from seeking other work because of her grandfather's promise, which took the form of a note. After his death, the court held his executor estopped from alleging that the note lacked consideration. She had changed her position in reliance on the promise, the court reasoned, and she was justified in doing so, because the promise was made to her and she was warranted in assuming it would be kept.6
Section 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts turns that case-by-case stretch into a general rule:
“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.”7
The first sentence says when liability exists. It requires a promise, the promisor's reasonable expectation that the promise will induce action or forbearance (a refraining from acting) by the promisee or a third person, actual inducement, and injustice that only enforcement can avoid. The second sentence governs remedy. The next section takes the requirements one at a time; this section asks only why the rule exists.
A textbook example shows the rule at work. A promisor promises Alice a piano as a gift, knowing the promise will lead her to forgo a chance to buy another piano at a significant discount. Alice forgoes it, the chance expires, and the promisor never delivers. The promisor may be liable for Alice's damages on a promissory estoppel theory.8 Nothing was bargained for, because the promisor asked nothing of Alice. Her reliance, not a bargain, supplies the reason to hold the promisor to the promise.
The rights that reliance creates are contract rights, because they arise from a promise for whose breach the law gives a remedy, and applying § 90 requires a finding that the promisee relied to her detriment.9 The remedy sentence then leaves the court a choice. It may enforce the promise to the same extent as if a bargained contract had been made, or only to the extent necessary to remedy the unfair result of the reliance.10
One court, adopting § 90 of the first Restatement, explained that the doctrine “supplies a needed tool which courts may employ in a proper case to prevent injustice.”11 The Restatement section does not itself call the doctrine promissory estoppel, but long usage has firmly fixed the name.12 A later section returns to how that label relates to equitable estoppel.
Reliance is the fact that carries the doctrine. Alice gave up a real opportunity and Marcus gave up nothing, and that difference decides which promise binds.