Concept
The Section 90 Elements
Promissory estoppel
The Section 90 Elements
Section 90(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts packs its rule into one sentence: a promise that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance by the promisee or a third person, and that does induce it, “is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise,” and the remedy “may be limited as justice requires.”1
The rule answers a specific objection. A promisor who made a gratuitous promise will argue that it does not bind because nothing was bargained for, and promissory estoppel estops that argument. The formulation in § 90(1) appears in a subpart titled “Contracts without Consideration.”2 Consideration, the traditional basis for enforcing a promise, is a common-law concept that courts in the United States follow except where a statute has modified it,3 so § 90 gives a court a second route when the first is closed. Stated plainly, the doctrine enforces a promise when the promisor reasonably should understand that it will induce reliance and the promisee does rely.4
Courts usually divide the sentence into four elements, although some cut it slightly differently:5
- A promise.
- Reasonable expectation: the promisor reasonably should have expected the promise to induce action or forbearance by the promisee.
- Actual reliance: the promise in fact induced that action or forbearance.
- Injustice: injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise.
The four elements examine different people. The first two look at the promisor: whether the words amount to a promise, and whether a reasonable promisor would have foreseen that the promisee would act on them. The third looks at the promisee and asks what the promisee actually did. The fourth gives the court a final policy check, because a foreseen and real change of position still leaves open whether denying relief would be unjust. Courts also apply the elements with different strictness: some impose heightened standards that others decline to adopt.6
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. ties the elements to the question of who decides them. The court framed the doctrine as three questions, the first being whether the promise was one the promisor “should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee.” It explained that the first two requirements present issues of fact that a jury ordinarily resolves, while the third, that the remedy can be invoked only where necessary to avoid injustice, “involves a policy decision by the court” that “necessarily embraces an element of discretion.”7 A plaintiff who wins the jury’s findings must therefore still persuade the judge that enforcement is necessary. The court added that it would be a mistake to treat an action grounded on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach-of-contract action, and that fluidity in applying the concept is desirable.8
The question Hoffman quotes still carries the phrase “of a definite and substantial character,” which the Second Restatement deleted. That revision made four changes. It removed the phrase. It added a sentence permitting flexibility of remedy, so that a promise reasonably relied on need not be enforced by damages based on the expectation interest, and that sentence contributed to the deletion. It provided for reliance by a third party. And it made a charitable subscription or a marriage settlement binding without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.9 The section does not say so, but it is implicit that a breach of the promise must have caused the plaintiff’s injury.10
A study guide poses a question worth carrying through every reliance case: does the court treat promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration or as an alternative theory of liability, and would the decision change under the other view? The same guide asks readers to compare Hoffman with Goodman v. Dicker.11
A Promise
Every other element attaches to a promise, so the analysis starts there.12 The start is harder than it looks, because a promise that no exchange supports lacks the safeguards a bargain supplies. Consideration serves evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions,13 and when none was given, no act of exchange fulfills them. A court therefore must take particular care before finding a promise when the words came with little or no formality or when the circumstances suggest that the promisor acted on impulse or with rash generosity.14
An objective standard governs. The promisor must have known or reasonably should have realized that the promisee would likely understand that a promise had been made, and that conclusion holds irrespective of whether the promisor actually intended the promisee to rely.15 The question is therefore how a reasonable promisee would take the words and conduct.
Family promises show why the element needs this care. Relatives promise one another things out of affection and altruism, not in expectation of a quid pro quo, so such promises are gratuitous, and the law imposes family obligations mostly through the relationship, as with the parental duty of support, and not through contract.16 Promissory estoppel gives courts an important tool for reaching equitable resolutions of intra-family disputes.17 In Harvey v. Dow, Teresa built a house at a cost of about $200,000, and her father did a substantial amount of the construction himself, including much of the foundation work and the carpentry, and helped to get the underground electrical lines installed.18 The house stood on her parents’ land, and although the existence of a promise was contested, the reliance was substantial.19
A promise need not be stated in so many words. In Wright v. Newman, the court found that a mother relied on Wright’s implied promise to provide child support by refraining from seeking support from the child’s natural father.20
A promise reaches only as far as the promisor committed. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the reporters’ promise to treat Cohen as an anonymous source was unambiguous and undisputed, and the reporters expected it to induce him to give them the documents, which he did to his detriment. The promise applied only to Cohen’s identity, not to anything about the court records themselves.21
An alleged promise that leaves essential terms unstated can fail for ambiguity. A Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, on demurrer, of a claim that a lender was bound to make a loan, because the alleged promise was unclear and ambiguous: it omitted essential terms, including the identity of the borrower and the security for the loan.22 The court in Aceves v. U.S. Bank set that decision against the promise Aceves alleged.23
Not every assurance counts as a promise. In Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Bogard, a bank officer told a loan applicant that the application would go to the loan committee and that the applicant ought to have something ready within two or three days, and the court treated the statement as an expression of intention coupled with a prediction that could not support promissory estoppel. The objective test explains the result: a forecast of what a committee will do does not lead a reasonable listener to understand that the speaker has committed to act.
Reasonable Expectation of Reliance
The second element shifts attention from what the promisor said to what the promisor should have foreseen. Section 90(1) binds a promise “which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person.”25 The standard is objective and applies irrespective of whether the promisor actually intended the promisee to rely: the promisor must have known or reasonably should have realized that the promisee would likely understand that a promise had been made and would be induced to act or refrain in the way that occurred.26 The likelihood of reliance is not enough, because the general nature and extent of the response must also have been reasonably foreseeable.27 Whether a promise binds therefore depends on whether the promisor, under the circumstances, reasonably should have expected reliance in both its nature and its extent, and claims often fail on this element, especially for sophisticated parties.28
The element guards against liability for reactions no one could predict. In a bargain the promisor receives a return and can price the risk of the promisee’s performance. Here the promisor receives nothing, so the only ground for holding the promisor to the words is that they set in motion events the promisor could see coming.
Some relationships make reliance the natural response. The promisor is particularly likely to foresee that the promisee will change position, and the relationship alone makes it reasonable for the promisee to do so. The promise of a grandfather or a church member fits that description, as does a bailee’s promise to insure the goods entrusted to its care.29 A grandfather’s note to his granddaughter shows the logic. Whether or not he desired that she give up her job, he put her in a position to quit work and live off the interest on the money the note promised, and she was warranted in assuming that the promise would be kept.30 The court held the grandfather’s executor estopped from alleging that the note lacked consideration.31
Sometimes the promise is itself the reason the promisee acts, and foreseeability is then hard to dispute. Grigerik offered $9,000 for a tract “as is” but agreed to pay Lang $16,000 because Lang undertook to obtain the town’s approval of the tract as a building lot.32
The promisor’s own stake in the promisee’s reliance supplies a second route to foreseeability. In Drennan v. Star Paving Co., a general contractor building a school relied on subcontractors’ bids in formulating his own. Star Paving telephoned a bid of $7,131.60 for the paving and repeated it when asked, and Drennan, finding it the lowest, incorporated it into his bid and won the general contract.33 The court reasoned that the subcontractor had reason to expect its bid, if lowest, to be used, so that the bid induced action “of a definite and substantial character.”34 It was reasonable to suppose that the subcontractor submitted the bid to obtain the subcontract: the lower its bid, the lower the general contractor’s bid was likely to be and the greater the subcontractor’s chance of getting the paving work. The subcontractor therefore had “reason not only to expect plaintiff to rely on its bid but to want him to.”35 Reasonable reliance that produces a foreseeable prejudicial change of position also supplies a compelling basis for implying a subsidiary promise not to revoke an offer for a bilateral contract, and that promise precludes the injustice of revocation after the offeree has acted.36
The stake carries Drennan across a line that pure offers do not cross. An offeree of a bilateral contract can bind the offeror by promising to perform, so one can argue that any reliance before acceptance is at the offeree’s own risk. Section 90 applies only when the promisor should reasonably expect the promisee to rely, and an offeror of a bilateral contract has no obvious reason to expect that. If you offer to sell your piano to Alice for $400 and she buys expensive accessories for it before replying, you would not reasonably have expected her to do so, because you and she had not formed a contract.37 Compare a gift promise made with full knowledge that Alice will pass up a discounted purchase of another piano in reliance. That reliance is foreseen, and Alice may recover her damages if you fail to give her the piano.38
A request settles the question more directly than a relationship or a stake does. In Hoffman, defendants not only foresaw that Mrs. Hoffman would have to sell her joint interest in the bakery building but actually requested that she do so, and the court approved a $2,000 award for the loss both plaintiffs incurred in the sale. Ordinarily only the promisee may enforce the remedy of promissory estoppel against the promisor. But when the promisor actually foresees, or has reason to foresee, action by a third person in reliance on the promise, it may be quite unjust to refuse performance.39 The current text of § 90 now provides for reliance by a third party.40
The element does its heaviest work when the promisee’s response lies outside what the promise invited. In a land-option dispute, the plaintiff offered evidence of time, effort, and expense spent trying to interest other investors in the land, and the court found that this evidence did not relate to acts that could reasonably be expected as a result of extending the option promise.41 The plaintiff had chosen the form of the contract, which was not one listing the land for sale with someone entrusted with duties and obligations to produce a buyer.42 The plaintiff was not obligated to do anything, and the court saw no basis for promissory estoppel in the proposed evidence.43 The acts the plaintiff urged as consideration conferred no special benefit on the promisor or on the land.44
Actual Reliance
The third element asks what the promisee in fact did. The promise must “[do] induce such action or forbearance,”46 and one treatise states the requirement as inducement of justifiable action or forbearance by the promisee.47 The causal link matters because the promisor received nothing in return. A promisee who would have taken the same step without the promise lost nothing to it, and enforcing the promise would reward a loss that the promise did not produce.
Timing gives the cleanest test of causation. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. shows reliance doing the work that consideration could not. The board’s resolution contained no language making her pension depend on continued employment, she was not required to work for the company for any period, she was told she could quit the day the resolution was adopted, and she promised nothing in return. The court therefore found the mutuality of obligation essential to a contract lacking.48 Her claim rested on reliance, and her timing helped her, because she retired soon after the board acted. Had she liked her job and worked until age 70, when Pfeiffer employees normally retire or must retire, her retirement would have followed from age and not from the pension promise, and the section 90 claim would presumably have been lost or much harder to maintain.49
The order of events decided Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co.. The employee had already decided to retire when a company officer assured him that the company would “take care” of him, so the promise could not have induced the decision, and the court rejected his claim.
Causation is tested act by act, and forbearance counts as conduct. In Thomas v. Archer, a patient who needed a medical flight claimed that her physician promised to obtain insurance preauthorization, and the court let her try to prove reliance by showing that she refrained from calling the insurer herself, even though she conceded she would have taken the flight regardless. The mother in Wright v. Newman likewise refrained from seeking support from the child’s natural father. The majority found detrimental reliance, though the dissent objected that Newman had presented no evidence that she could have obtained support from him.50
Reliance must also cost the promisee something. The text of § 90 speaks only of enforcement to avoid “injustice,” yet the section is routinely described as protecting detrimental reliance.51 Logic supports the label, because without injury there is no injustice in leaving the promise unenforced, and the promisee must incur a real cost.52 That cost differs from the legal detriment that consideration asks about. Legal detriment need not be harmful, can be of any magnitude, and must be bargained for, whereas the detrimental reliance § 90 requires involves adverse consequences such that justice cries out for enforcement.53
The cost need not be a cash outlay. In a pension dispute, Katz was struck in the head, returned to work with an impaired walk and some memory loss, and made many mistakes at considerable cost to his employer. The employer’s decision-maker, Shopmaker, concluded that he would have to work out a pension to induce Katz to retire, and Katz was then earning about $23,000 a year.54 A pension offered to induce retirement shows that the promisor expected the promisee to change position, and Katz’s earnings give a measure of what retiring would cost him.
A burden that cannot be counted in dollars can also be a cost. In Vastoler v. American Can Co., an hourly worker became a salaried supervisor, and the court observed that a jury could certainly find that he was forced to absorb additional stress and emotional trauma.55 As a supervisor of about fifty subordinate employees, he would have had additional responsibility for assigning jobs, disciplining workers, and perhaps recommending that some be fired or laid off, and the stress inherent in that role “cannot be measured in purely financial terms.”56 Detrimental reliance was therefore a sufficiently disputed issue for the trier of fact that summary judgment could not be granted to the employer.57
Where the promisee gave up nothing, recovery fails. In Pitts v. McGraw-Edison Co., the trial judge found that the plaintiff was not required by the company’s letters to do anything, that he was free to handle the products of competitors or to seek other employment, and that nothing in the arrangement circumscribed his actions.58 Findings of that kind leave a plaintiff with little to point to as a cost. Creative Demos, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. shows the same pressure from the other side: the promisee there kept earning substantially after the promise and failed to establish detrimental reliance.
A step the promisee can undo likewise leaves little loss to attribute to the promise. In Alden v. Presley, Presley offered to pay all the expenses of the plaintiff’s divorce, including furnishing an attorney, to advance her money to purchase her husband’s equity in the Alden home, and to pay off the remaining mortgage on the home.59 The Tennessee court found it unnecessary to decide whether Tennessee recognizes promissory estoppel, because the plaintiff failed as a matter of law to prove detrimental reliance and a loss suffered as a result of it.60
The current rule imposes no minimum size on the reliance. The first Restatement limited the doctrine to action of a definite and substantial character, and the Second Restatement deleted that language while adding the sentence that lets a court limit the remedy as justice requires.61 Removing the threshold did not make the degree of reliance irrelevant. The extent of the change of position may be the most significant factor in a court’s decision to apply the doctrine, as the substantial reliance in Harvey and in Greiner, where the plaintiff moved from another part of the state, suggests. When the reliance is unclear, a court may be less willing to apply promissory estoppel.62
The induced action must also be justifiable. The granddaughter who quit her job on the strength of her grandfather’s note was justified in doing so, because the promise was made to her and she was warranted in assuming that it would be kept.63 Reasonableness is quintessentially a fact question. In Bouton v. Byers, the court held that the plaintiff’s training and expertise did not turn reasonableness into a question that could be decided as a matter of law on that record. It found a bar of that sort particularly inappropriate in a dispute between a father and daughter, who are “not disembodied corporations undertaking a joint venture purely for business advantage.”64
Avoiding Injustice
The closing words of § 90(1) make a promise binding “if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”66 The first three elements ask about events: what the promisor said, what the promisor should have foreseen, and what the promisee did. The fourth asks what the law should do about them, so a claim can fail here even when the first three are established. The court, not the jury, answers the question. In Hoffman, the first two requirements presented issues of fact for a jury, but the requirement that the remedy be invoked only where necessary to avoid injustice was a policy decision that necessarily embraces an element of discretion.67
Because the question is one of policy, courts have not settled what injustice means. Some have ruled that it is enough for the reliance to be detrimental in the consideration sense, and others insist that it injure the promisee. Logically, injury is required, because without injury there would be no injustice in leaving the promise unenforced, and Judge Posner has said that the promisee must incur a real cost.68 The consideration sense of detriment is the wrong measure, since that detriment can be of any magnitude and must be bargained for, whereas the reliance § 90 requires was not incurred as part of any bargain and must carry adverse consequences such that justice cries out for enforcement.69
Even when a court finds injustice, full enforcement is not the only answer. The Hoffman court concluded that injustice would result if the plaintiffs were not granted “some relief” because the defendants failed to keep promises that induced the plaintiffs to act to their detriment,70 and § 90(1) itself says that the remedy for breach “may be limited as justice requires.”71
On the logic that without injury there is no injustice in leaving a promise unenforced,72 a court could conclude that Nanda’s promise need not be enforced even though the first three elements are met. With the $6,000 loss, relief to the extent of that loss would be easier to justify.
Competing interests can also enter the balance. In Cohen, the court treated the reporters’ promise as unambiguous and as one they expected to induce Cohen to give them the documents, which he did to his detriment.73 It nonetheless reasoned that a promissory estoppel analysis cannot be neutral toward the First Amendment. In deciding whether it would be unjust not to enforce the promise, the court must weigh the same considerations that decide whether the First Amendment has been violated, balancing the constitutional rights of a free press against the common-law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity.74
A charitable pledge shows the requirement at work where the doctrine often seems most natural. In one bankruptcy proceeding, a charitable medical organization sought to hold the debtors’ estate liable for promised annual gifts toward construction of a medical facility. The bankruptcy court disallowed the claim, finding that the promises were made without consideration and that promissory estoppel did not apply, and the district court, after finding no consideration for the pledge, went on to affirm dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim.75 The Second Restatement dispenses with proof of inducement for charitable subscriptions, yet it is implicit that a breach of the promise must have caused the plaintiff’s injury.76