Concept
Remedies for Reliance Claims
Promissory estoppel
Remedies for Reliance Claims
The last sentence of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) governs the money: “The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.”1 The section’s first sentence decides whether a promise binds, and this sentence decides what the binding promise is worth. Its verb is permissive. A court that finds a promise, foreseeable reliance, and injustice need not award the performance that was promised; it may fit the relief to the case.
That freedom departs from the doctrine’s starting point. The First Restatement rested on an unwritten premise that, once the elements of promissory estoppel were present, a contract was formed and the ordinary remedies for breach followed.2 Williston put the choice bluntly: either a contract was formed or it was not, “you have to take one leg or the other.” That rigidity very likely hindered full judicial acceptance of the doctrine, because a court facing an extremely valuable promise and only moderate reliance had to choose between full contractual recovery and nothing. Some courts broke the barrier and held that the remedy need not be as broad as the remedy for a contract founded on consideration, a flexibility worth encouraging because courts should not be compelled to choose between those two extremes.3
The Second Restatement writes that flexibility into the rule. Because the promisor’s obligation arises from a foreseeable change of position by the promisee, and not from a bargain, the remedy may be limited to the extent of the promisee’s reliance rather than the promisee’s expectation.4
A court therefore chooses among measures. Reliance damages reimburse the promisee’s actual loss. Expectation damages look toward the future and aim to put the promisee in the economic position that performance would have produced. Specific performance is a third option, though courts do not award it as a matter of course.5 The choice depends partly on how the court conceives of the doctrine. A court that sees promissory estoppel as creating contractual liability starts from expectation damages and limits relief only in special circumstances. A court that focuses on protecting reliance starts from reimbursement of actual loss and reserves fuller enforcement for cases in which justice demands it.6 The Restatement takes the first view of what the doctrine is: a promise made binding by promissory estoppel is a contract. The flexibility has led some courts to call the doctrine a free-floating category somewhere between contract and tort, and that label is both unnecessary and potentially confusing.7
The decisions sort largely by the kind of promise. Where promissory estoppel substitutes for missing consideration, courts have granted expectation damages in the overwhelming majority of cases. Reliance awards cluster in cases such as Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., Arcadian Phosphates v. Arcadian Corp., and Wheeler v. White, where the promise was too indefinite to enforce or was nonbinding for some reason other than lack of consideration.8 Empirical studies of promissory estoppel cases generally report an award of the full value of the promise in about half of them.9 The two figures count different groups of cases, so read them as tendencies and not as rules.
The injustice element is where the court’s discretion lives. The first two requirements, a promise and foreseeable reliance, present fact issues that ordinarily go to a jury. The third, that the doctrine be invoked only where necessary to avoid injustice, is a policy decision for the court and embraces an element of discretion.10 The two subsections below take the ends of the remedial range in turn: first reliance recovery, then expectation damages and specific relief.
Reliance Recovery
Most often a court uses its discretion to award the money the promisee spent in reliance on the promise, the so-called “out of pocket” expenditures, in place of the promise’s value.11 Suppose rich Aunt Yolanda, knowing that a fire has destroyed all her nephew Joe’s belongings, promises him $20,000 to replace them. Joe replaces everything for $15,000, and Aunt Yolanda reneges. A court applying promissory estoppel may well limit his remedy to the $15,000 he actually spent.12
The reason lies in the harm the doctrine repairs. The Hoffman court quoted Seavey’s argument that “[t]he wrong is not primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the promised reward but in causing the plaintiff to change position to his detriment,” so that damages “should not exceed the loss caused by the change of position, which would never be more in amount, but might be less, than the promised reward.”13 A bargain entitles the promisee to the benefit of the deal. A promise enforced because it provoked reliance entitles the promisee to repair of the damage the reliance caused, and that damage can equal the promise but cannot exceed it.
Hoffman v. Red Owl shows the method. The court awarded Hoffman his losses on the sale of the bakery and his expenses in moving his family, and it refused the profit he hoped to make from the franchise Red Owl never granted.14 The court also tested the items one at a time. For the $1,000 Hoffman had paid toward a lot, the defendants argued that the lot may have been worth $6,000 and that Hoffman should have paid the remaining $5,000 of the price. The court found it unreasonable to require Hoffman to invest another $5,000 to protect the $1,000, and it upheld that item.15
The plaintiffs’ profit evidence shows where reliance recovery stops. They offered evidence from the buyer of the grocery store: gross sales of $44,000 in the first eleven weeks and a “profit” of $6,000, a figure the buyer conceded on cross-examination was gross rather than net. They argued that damages in a breach-of-contract action may include lost profits. The court answered that “this is not a breach-of-contract action.”16
Behind the item-by-item method stands a standard the court stated outright. Damages awarded in promissory estoppel instead of specific enforcement “should be only such as in the opinion of the court are necessary to prevent injustice,” and “[m]echanical or rule-of-thumb approaches to the damage problem should be avoided.” The court also quoted the observation that enforcing a promise does not necessarily mean specific performance or damages for breach, that the amount may be set by the plaintiff’s expenditures or change of position as well as by the value of the promised performance, and that restitution is also an enforcing remedy.17
Reliance recovery also nets out what the promisee can get back. In the familiar nephew-and-car illustration, a nephew who spends $5,000 on a car in reliance on his uncle’s promise might today be limited to the $5,000 actually spent, and if he could readily resell the car for $4,000, his reliance damages could conceivably shrink to $1,000.18 The measure asks how much worse off the promise left him, and an outlay that can be recovered elsewhere was never lost.
Reliance recovery can nonetheless equal the whole promise. In Conrad v. Fields, the court treated Conrad’s tuition payments as her reliance damages and observed that on those facts they were equivalent to her full expectation. Had Fields clearly repudiated during her first year, and had she sued then, her tuition payments up to the repudiation would have been considerably less than her expectation damages, and the court might have confined her to that lesser amount.19 The same doctrine therefore produces a small award or a large one depending on how much the promisee had already committed when the promise failed.
Reliance is not always cash. In the classic grandfather’s-note case, the granddaughter quit her job immediately after her grandfather promised her the money, and the court found it “not an unreasonable inference” that she abandoned her employment and refrained from seeking other work because of the promise.20 She “changed her position in reliance upon the promise,” and she was justified in doing so.21 A lost opportunity can be offered as part of the reliance loss, but the claimant must prove it with sufficient certainty, as Tynan shows below.
The reliance must also be of a kind the promise reasonably called for. In one option case, the court found no basis for promissory estoppel in the time, effort, and expense the promisee spent trying to interest other investors in the optioned land, because those acts could not reasonably be expected to result from extending the option promise. The promisee had chosen the form of the contract and was not obligated to do anything.22
Reliance recovery is also the natural outcome when the parties never settled the terms. In Cyberchron Corp. v. Calldata Systems Development, Inc., Grumman’s manager of procurement directed Cyberchron to proceed “as if the new set of weights was approved” and said the parties would “work out the definitization of the purchase order later.”23 The appellate court accepted the finding that from mid-July there was a clear and unambiguous promise, reasonable and foreseeable reliance, and an unconscionable injury that only promissory estoppel could remedy.24 A deal left open in that way presents the difficulty that confined Hoffman to reliance. Without agreement on the subject matter or the price, a court cannot figure out what future profit the promisee expected, and the best it can do is compensate the money spent or otherwise lost in reliance.25
Expectation and Specific Relief
The Restatement’s comment to § 90 supplies the starting point: “A promise binding under this section is a contract, and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is often appropriate.”27 The comment adds that the factors bearing on whether any relief should be granted also bear on its character and extent, so that relief “may sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or specific relief measured by the extent of the promisee’s reliance rather than by the terms of the promise.”28 Full enforcement by normal remedies is therefore often appropriate, and limiting relief is the adjustment justice sometimes calls for.
Expectation damages look toward the future and aim to place the promisee where performance would have left her.29 Courts have granted them in the overwhelming majority of cases in which promissory estoppel substitutes for consideration.30 In such cases the court can usually say what performance would have been worth, so the obstacle that confines indefinite-promise cases to reliance does not arise.
Construction-bid cases show the expectation measure operating under a reliance label. In Drennan, enforcement meant compensating the general contractor’s expectation interest, measured by the difference between Star’s bid and the greater amount Drennan finally had to pay another paving contractor for the same work.31 Section 90 allows the remedy to be limited as justice requires, and Hoffman shows a case in which it was, but the bid setting rarely calls for it. A general contractor has typically built its own price on the subcontractor’s figure, so the added cost of covering is both what the reliance cost it and what performance would have saved. Other subcontractor-bid decisions, such as the Nevada case Dynalectric Co. of Nevada, Inc. v. Clark & Sullivan Constructors, Inc., work within the same comment to § 90.32
Specific relief is the most demanding remedy. Courts do not award it as a matter of course and confine it to situations in which the equities favor it and damages would not adequately compensate for the breach.33 The test turns on whether money can repair the loss, as two variations on a promise of land illustrate.
The opposite pole appears in Walser v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. Walser and McLaughlin sought approximately $7,600,000, including expected lost profits. The jury returned a verdict for Toyota on the contract and fraud claims but for Walser and McLaughlin on promissory estoppel, and it awarded $232,131 under an instruction limiting damages to their out-of-pocket expenses.34 The appellate court explained that the instruction reflected the damage they suffered from relying on Toyota’s promise. The land cost $676,864, Walser acknowledged it was worth at least $550,000, and the loss from relying was essentially the difference between the two amounts.35 Walser also frames the open question. If liability rests on promissory estoppel and the plaintiff can prove expectation damages with reasonable certainty, she may recover them, or her recovery may always be limited to her actual reliance. The Walser court chose a third path: the trial court has discretion to award the full range of remedies, expectation or reliance, as justice seems to require.36
Tynan v. JBVBB, LLC shows that discretion at work. Tynan acknowledged that it could award expectation relief but declined to, because the promises were somewhat vague, Tynan had not been employed as a consultant for very long, and the defendant had not acted unfairly. The court then gave Tynan the chance to prove reliance damages. He tried to show that he had lost opportunities for employment in reliance on the promise, but he could not prove this with sufficient certainty, and he ended up with no award.37 A reliance limit is therefore no safe harbor: the claimant still has to prove the loss.
The decisions fall into three camps on how the remedy sentence should work.
- One camp limits recovery to reliance. Wheeler v. White refused expectation damages even if provable with reasonable certainty, reasoning in part that the promisee is “partially responsible for his failure to bind the promisor to a legally sufficient contract,” and Bruce Foods follows Wheeler.38
- A second camp treats expectation as the default. If promissory estoppel creates contractual liability, the normal measure of contract damages applies, and a lesser award is appropriate only in special circumstances.39
- A third camp, the one the Restatement’s remedy sentence and Walser reflect, leaves the choice among expectation, reliance, restitution, and specific relief to the trial court, and Walser notes that a number of other courts agree.40
A useful habit when reading these cases is to ask whether the court treats promissory estoppel as a consideration substitute or as an alternative theory of liability, and whether the case would have come out differently had the court conceived of the doctrine the other way. Comparing the answer with Goodman v. Dicker and Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores shows how much of the remedy follows from that conceptual choice.41
An answer that says promissory estoppel always yields reliance damages, or always yields expectation damages, states a position some courts take and the Restatement does not. The stronger answer states that the remedy is whatever justice requires and then sorts the facts. A definite promise that can be valued, expectation damages provable with reasonable certainty, and a promisee who committed fully before the promise failed push toward full enforcement. A vague or indefinite promise, speculative profits, moderate reliance on a valuable promise, and fair dealing by the promisor push toward reliance.