Concept
Status and Limits
Promissory estoppel
Status and Limits
Consideration remains the ordinary route to an enforceable promise, and promissory estoppel is one of the special rules that departs from it. Restatement Section 17 states the baseline: a contract requires a bargain and a consideration unless a special rule applies, and in the common run of business and consumer dealings consideration is present virtually by definition.1 A party who can prove a bargain therefore has no need for § 90. A party who invokes § 90 must show a promise that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance, that did induce it, and that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement. That party must also accept a remedy that “may be limited as justice requires.”2
Within that frame, the doctrine has grown considerably. It came to have an independent significance, viewed not just as a subcategory of contract but as a distinct theory of action, one not necessarily grounded in contract principles or circumscribed by contract’s limitations.3 In 1981 Professor Knapp called it “perhaps the most radical and expansive development of this century in the law of promissory liability.” Almost two decades later he wrote that a “reassessment appears to be in order” and that “1980 may have been the high-water mark for promissory estoppel.”4
The empirical record does not say which Knapp was closer to right. One study found reliance claims generally unsuccessful; a later study, taking a new look at the data, challenges the claim that the doctrine fares as poorly as scholars say.5 The evidence is conflicting about how favorably courts have used the doctrine, so neither “reliance claims usually win” nor “reliance claims usually lose” is a safe premise.
Two cases mark the range of what reliance can and cannot do. In the first, a grandfather made a promise to his granddaughter, and she abandoned her employment and refrained from seeking other work because of it. The court held that she changed her position in reliance, that she was justified in doing so because the promise was made to her, and that the grandfather’s executor was estopped from alleging that there was no consideration for the note.6 The promise ran directly to her, and her reliance was concrete.
In the second, Hoffman trusted Lukowitz’s report of the home office’s position: sale of the bakery was “the only hitch.” He knew Red Owl had not yet signed a formal franchise contract, yet he thought he had a firm commitment.7 But Red Owl never offered him a franchise in terms definite or clear enough to be accepted; indeed, no offer of a franchise was made in any form.8 A sincere belief in a commitment, however reasonable it felt to the one who held it, did not supply the definite promise that an expectation claim would have required.
The remedy sentence of § 90 cuts the same way. In the paving-bid case, enforcement meant compensating the plaintiff’s expectation, measured by the difference between Star’s bid and the greater amount Drennan finally had to pay another paving contractor for the same work. Section 90, however, provides that the remedy “may be limited as justice requires,” and Hoffman made no claim for expectation damages. Had he made one, he almost certainly would have failed, even under an induced-reliance or estoppel theory.9
The first element, a promise, is also where courts diverge. The Restatement test leaves much room for interpretation over whether a person’s words and conduct reflect a promise, and claims became a small flood in the 1980s and 1990s as disappointed people began seeing “promises” in any and all situations. To stem that flood, some courts began imposing higher standards. Some now require an “express” promise, one made in words, or even an “explicit” promise, one that leaves little room for doubt about the intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way. Other courts impose no such heightened standard.10
How to classify the doctrine remains an open question. The grandfather’s case reads as a consideration substitute, because the executor is “estopped from alleging that there was no consideration.”11 Later development treats promissory estoppel as a distinct theory of action that need not accept contract’s limits.12 The question to put to any decision is which of the two the court is applying, and whether the case would have come out differently under the other.13
Flexibility is both the strength of the doctrine and its cost. Some jurisdictions have entered a third stage, the adoption of a truly equitable and flexible doctrine that amalgamates the earlier stages. Such an approach raises the question whether it produces too much uncertainty, and the honest answer is that all equitable doctrines, to some extent, increase the law’s uncertainty.14 Section 90(1) itself leaves two judgments to the court: whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement, and how far the remedy should extend.15
Some scholars would draw a line that the Restatement does not. Professors Farber and Matheson proposed enforcing any promise “made in furtherance of an economic activity.” Their reasoning was that firms commonly make promises, such as a promise to keep a plant open, for which they expect eventual economic benefit without receiving any specific bargained-for exchange. They also suggested that courts already enforce commercial promises through reliance, even where the plaintiff has shown little or no reliance at all.16 Section 90(1) draws no commercial line of its own; it applies the same requirements to every promise.17