Concept
The Preexisting Duty Rule
Common-law modification of an executory contract
Modification of Executory Contracts
The Preexisting Duty Rule
Parties often change a contract after they make it: a price rises, a deadline moves, or the deal ends altogether. Each change is itself a contract, because the only way to alter a legal relationship is to make new, legally binding promises. A modification therefore needs mutual assent, new consideration, and agreement on essential terms, though the last seldom causes trouble, since a modification usually builds on the terms of the original deal.1 Consideration is where modifications fail.
Under the legal duty rule, a promise to do what one is already legally obligated to do is not consideration. A modification in which one side promises only what it already owes under the original contract therefore lacks consideration. A complete termination escapes the problem, because each side gives up its rights under the existing contract in exchange for the other side's reciprocal rights.2
Suppose A has agreed to manufacture and sell goods to B for $1,500. A shift in the market means A can no longer sell at that price without a loss, and B agrees to pay an additional $500. Later B reconsiders and insists on the original price. At common law B's promise is unenforceable, because A was under a preexisting duty to deliver the goods and so gave nothing for the extra $500.3
A construction contract produces the same result. Contractor C owes Owner O a road under their original contract, and O later promises C an additional $150,000. O will argue that C incurred no new detriment and that O received no new benefit, so O's promise fails for want of consideration. Promissory estoppel does not rescue C: by doing only what he was already obligated to do, C has not changed position to his detriment.4
The rule does not forbid modification; it requires that something new move in return. Office Owner O has hired Painter P for $9,000 to paint an office by June 12. When O learns that new tenants want to move in on June 10, O obtains P's promise to finish by June 9. That promise is without consideration, because O gave P no new detriment in return. Had O promised an additional sum, or promised to pay earlier, or anything else O was not already obligated to do, a court could find consideration.5
The common-law requirement gives way for sales of goods. UCC § 2-209(1) provides that an agreement modifying a contract within Article 2 "needs no consideration to be binding," and § 2A-208(1) uses similar language for leases of goods.6 The Code substitutes other safeguards. The modification must be made in good faith, and one extracted in bad faith is unenforceable even under § 2-209(1).7 Section 2-209(2) also validates contractual clauses that prohibit oral modifications of written contracts, and § 2-209(3) requires a writing if, as modified, the contract involves goods over $500.8
The comments to § 2-209 go further and reject the preexisting duty rule as a way of policing the extortion of a modification, preferring a more direct approach. In a case that did not involve a sale of goods, Judge Posner's opinion explains why the rule is a poor fit for written modifications. The cautionary and evidential policies behind the consideration requirement apply, if at all, with much attenuated strength. The parties already have a contract, so the danger of mistaking casual promissory language for an intention to be bound is slight, and a written modification is harder to fabricate.9 To the extent extorted modifications are no longer treated as a consideration problem, the doctrine that takes over is economic duress. A threat to discharge an employee unless she releases a valid claim, for example, may vitiate the resulting contract, which is likely to be voidable at the victim's option rather than void at inception.10 Coercion and bad faith are taken up below.
Mutual rescission offers a second escape from the rule, and Schwartzreich shows both its appeal and its weakness. An employee hired as a coat designer for a fixed period at a stated salary was promised a raise after he reported that another firm had offered him more. The parties tore up the old contract and replaced it with a new one at the higher rate. The employee was later discharged and sued on the new rate. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the new contract as the product of a mutual rescission followed by a new and valid contract. Comment b to § 89 calls that rationale "fictitious" when the rescission and the new contract are simultaneous, as they were in Schwartzreich.11 The rescission route and its limits are examined below.
Outside the UCC, courts divide. Some still apply the preexisting duty rule, while many have followed the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, whose approach removes the focus on consideration.12 Section 89 makes a promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side binding in three situations: when the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances the parties did not anticipate when they made the contract; to the extent a statute provides; and to the extent justice requires enforcement because of a material change of position in reliance on the promise.13 The next section takes each in turn.