Concept
Other Routes Around the Rule
Common-law modification of an executory contract
Other Routes Around the Rule
Three routes around the preexisting duty rule work from inside the consideration requirement rather than beside it. Section 89 asks whether unanticipated circumstances, a statute, or reliance justifies enforcing a modification of a contract that neither side has fully performed, and it makes no demand that the promisee give anything new in return.1 The routes in this unit keep the requirement and look for the exchange in the facts. The parties may have added to or varied what each owes, they may have rescinded the original contract, or one of them may have given up a claim held in good faith. A complete answer to a modification problem tests the promise against all three as well as against § 89.
These routes matter where the common-law rule governs. That rule says a promise that modifies a contract must be supported by consideration, and a promise to do what one already owes is not.2 For the sale of goods, Article 2 dispenses with the requirement: 'An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding,' provided the modification is made in good faith, and § 2A-208(1) says the same for leases of goods.3 A contract for services falls outside Article 2, so fresh consideration is needed, which is why most of the examples in this unit involve painters, roofers, and contractors.4
The lead-based paint problem shows how the three routes overlap. A painter agrees to scrape, sand, and repaint an office for $9,000. To the surprise of both sides, the old paint proves lead-based, and the extra work will cost the painter at least $2,000 on the contract. The owner agrees to pay $2,200 more, the painter finishes on time, and the owner then refuses to pay more than $9,000.5 Section 89(a) fits these facts closely, since neither party anticipated the paint and the added $2,200 tracks the painter's loss. The three older routes put different questions to the same facts. Did the painter give or vary anything he did not already owe? Did the parties in effect replace the old contract with a new one? Did he give up a claim he held in good faith? The sections below take them in that order.
Added or Varied Performance
Added or varied performance is the simplest route: a modification is supported by consideration when the other side gives something it was not already obliged to give. Suppose an owner and a painter have a $9,000 contract, with the painting due by Friday, June 12. When the owner learns that new tenants want the office on June 10, he obtains the painter's promise to finish by June 9. The painter's promise lacks consideration, because the owner gave nothing new in return. Had the owner promised an additional sum, or payment earlier than the contract required, or anything else he was not already obligated to do, a court could find consideration.6
The same logic defeats the more familiar request, in which the party doing the work asks for more money. A manufacturer agrees to sell goods for $1,500, and a shift in the market makes the price a losing one. The buyer promises $500 more, then reconsiders. At common law the buyer's promise is unenforceable, because the manufacturer was already bound to deliver the goods and gave nothing new in exchange.7 (Because that was a sale of goods, Article 2 would now ask only whether the modification was made in good faith; the common-law analysis is the baseline, and it still governs services.) A promise to do again what the contract already requires changes nothing, since the other side is merely promising what it is already legally obligated to do.8
The test asks whether the addition is new, not whether it is large. The standard is anything the party was not already obligated to do.9
That generosity is also the route's weakness as a screen against hold-ups. A party who wants more money can attach an extra item to the demand and close the gap in consideration while leaving the hold-up untouched. Comment 2 to § 2-209 anticipates the move for goods. Extorting a modification without a legitimate commercial reason violates the duty of good faith, and a mere technical consideration cannot support a modification made in bad faith. The standard illustration is a seller who knows the buyer needs timely delivery, refuses to deliver unless paid $500 more, and throws in a cigar.10
The comments to § 2-209 go further. They reject the preexisting duty rule as a way of policing extorted modifications in favor of a more direct approach. Judge Posner defended the change on the ground that the cautionary and evidentiary policies behind consideration have little force for a written modification of an existing contract, because the danger of mistaking casual language for an intention to be bound is slight and fabricating a written promise is harder.11 To the extent that extorted modifications are no longer framed in terms of consideration, the problem moves to economic duress, which Chapter 16 takes up.12
A court that finds new consideration has therefore answered only half the question. The other half is whether the promise was extorted by a bad-faith threat to stop performing.13 A sound answer takes two steps: find the real change in what the other side owes, however modest, and then ask whether coercion taints the promise.
Mutual Rescission
Mutual rescission avoids the preexisting duty rule by ending the old contract before the new one begins, so nothing remains for the new promises to repeat. When parties terminate a contract completely, each side gives up its legal rights under the existing contract in exchange for the reciprocal rights of the other, and the legal duty rule raises no issue.15 Parties are free to rescind a contract and then form a new one, even where one side gives the same consideration as before.16 The painter in the lead-based-paint scene might argue that the $9,000 contract was rescinded and replaced by one for $11,200. The argument works only if the facts show a real rescission, as the leading case demonstrates.
In Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., an employee hired as a coat designer for a fixed period at a stated salary reported that another firm had offered him more, and his employer promised him a raise. The parties tore up the old contract and replaced it with a new one providing for the increase. When the employer later discharged him, the designer sued for damages measured by the higher salary. The New York Court of Appeals held that the new contract could be upheld as the product of a mutual rescission followed by a new and valid contract.17 The theory did real work, because on the facts reported the raise changed only the employer's side of the bargain, and the designer was already bound to serve for the stated term.
The Restatement calls the device into question. Comment b to § 89 describes the rescission rationale as 'fictitious' when the rescission and the new contract are simultaneous, as they were in Schwartzreich.18 The criticism follows from what a rescission is supposed to supply. A genuine one has each side give up the old contract, but here neither side meant to leave the relationship, and the parties were never free of obligation. If the ritual of cancelling and re-signing could by itself create consideration, any demand for a raise could be dressed as cancel-and-replace. The label would then swallow the preexisting duty rule.
The amendment fails where the Schwartzreich contract succeeded because of what the documents did. The designer's parties cancelled the old agreement and wrote a new one, while the cleaning company and the owner kept the old agreement alive and changed one number in it. A court inclined to assume a rescission has little to assume. A contract that the parties actually terminate, with each side released, raises no preexisting duty question when a new contract follows.19 The difficulty arises only when cancellation and new contract are a single act.
Schwartzreich can nevertheless be defended without the fiction. The employer's promise came without coercion. Circumstances had changed unexpectedly, because the employee's services turned out to be worth more on the market than either side had assumed. And the employee justifiably relied on the raise, at least by staying instead of breaching and possibly by working harder for his employer.20 Those are questions this chapter has already taught: whether unanticipated circumstances support the change under § 89(a), whether the promisee relied under § 89(c), and whether a threat to breach extracted the promise. On an exam, a stem that recites 'tore up the old contract and signed a new one' calls for you to raise the rescission route and then decline to rest on it when the two steps are simultaneous. The stronger answer tests the modification under § 89 and the coercion rules.
Forbearance of a Good-Faith Claim
Forbearance supplies consideration when a party gives up a claim it holds in good faith. Suppose A believes he has rights in Whiteacre, and B promises to pay him if he gives up the claim. A's surrender of his right to bring an action to establish those rights is a legal detriment, and B's promise is supported by consideration. Some jurisdictions add a requirement that A's belief rest on credible facts, which A's continuous and open use of Whiteacre would supply.22 The test looks to A's belief, and in some places to the facts behind it, rather than to whether the claim would have won. A claim honestly held but weak can therefore still be worth surrendering.
In a modification case, the claim is that the party need not keep performing. Suppose the painter in the lead-based-paint scene believes in good faith that the surprise entitles him to stop, perhaps because the contract was voidable for mistake, and suppose his belief rests on the facts he discovered. If he forgoes that claim and finishes the job in return for the owner's promise of $2,200, he has surrendered something he was not obliged to give, and the owner's promise rests on that surrender.23 What matters is that he held the claim honestly and, where required, on credible facts, and it matters little whether the claim would have won.
Accord and satisfaction reaches a similar result when the dispute concerns the amount owed. Alice owes you a sum that is genuinely in dispute. She pays $25 more than she may owe, and you accept $25 less than you think she owes. Because the amount is subject to dispute, the settlement is supported by consideration, and Alice is discharged from any obligation to pay the additional $25. You cannot preserve your rights by scratching out the full-settlement language before cashing the check.24 In both settings, surrendering a right whose existence or extent is honestly disputed is what supplies the consideration.
The good-faith requirement separates a claim from a bluff. A party with no colorable ground for stopping gives up nothing by continuing, because continuing is only what it already owed.
The painter and the contractor both asked for more money in the middle of performance, and both promised only to keep doing what the contract required. The difference is whether a claim stood behind the promise to continue. The painter held a good-faith claim that he could stop and gave it up. The contractor's threat covered nothing beyond the duty he already owed.
Clearing the consideration hurdle through forbearance answers only one of two questions. The other is whether the promise was extorted, and a bad-faith threat of nonperformance produces a promise the law may treat that way.25 Section 89(a) also remains available on the lead-based-paint facts, and it reaches the result more directly, because it asks only whether the difficulty was unanticipated and the new term fair and equitable, not whether the painter surrendered a claim.26