Concept
Common-Law Preexisting Duty Rule
UCC modification without consideration
UCC Modification Without Consideration
Common-Law Preexisting Duty Rule
Parties to an executory contract, one that neither side has finished performing, may change its terms, but the change binds only if it is itself an enforceable agreement. In Recker v. Gustafson, the court noted that whether the terms of an executory contract are modified or replaced, most jurisdictions require independent consideration to support the new agreement.1 The requirement follows from what a modification is. To change their legal relationship, the parties must make new, legally binding promises, so a modification needs mutual assent and consideration, the bargained-for exchange, just as the original deal did.2 When both sides take on something new, as when one agrees to pay more and the other agrees to add work, the exchange supplies the consideration without difficulty.
The trouble starts when only one side takes on anything new. A party who promises to do what the contract already obliges it to do gives the other side nothing, so under the preexisting duty rule, also called the legal duty rule, that promise is not consideration.3 Consider an office owner with a $9,000 contract for painting, due June 12. The owner learns that new tenants want possession on June 10 and obtains the painter's promise to finish by June 9. The promise fails for want of consideration, because the owner incurred no new detriment in return.4 Had the owner promised an additional sum, or earlier payment, or anything else the owner was not already bound to do, the exchange would have supplied the missing consideration.5
The rule bites hardest when the party asking for the change wants more for the same work. Suppose the painter, after the contract is formed, announces that the job will not be finished on time unless the owner pays $2,000 more, and the owner, who cannot find another painter, agrees. The painter has promised only what the contract already required, so the owner's promise to pay more lacks consideration. The owner has a second argument: the painter's threat of nonperformance was made in bad faith, and the promise to pay was extorted.7 Later sections develop that argument.
The facts of Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico show the rule at work. Upon reaching Pyramid Harbor, where Alaska Packers had about $150,000 invested in a salmon cannery, the workmen stopped work in a body and demanded $100 for their services; unless they received the additional wage, they said, they would stop work entirely and return to San Francisco. Substitute workers were impossible to find, so the superintendent signed an agreement to pay the larger amount. When the men returned to San Francisco at the end of the season, Alaska Packers paid them under the first agreement, and they sued in admiralty for the difference.8 Notice where the leverage came from: the workmen made their demand only after the employer was committed and no replacements were available. The court rejected their claim, reasoning that to permit recovery "would be to offer a premium upon bad faith, and invite men to violate their most sacred contracts that they may profit by their own wrong." The workmen conceded that a promise to pay a man for doing what he is already under contract to do lacks consideration, and the court added that the rule was so long imbedded in the common law that only the most cogent reasons ought to shake it.9
Recker shows the same rule where no one walked off a job. The parties' September 20 agreement raised the price of 155 acres by $10,000 over their August 30 agreement, after the sellers, through their attorney, warned that unless the buyers paid the extra $10,000 a lawsuit would be needed to enforce the August 30 agreement. The court held the increase void for want of consideration, even though the parties did consent to the September terms.10 Agreement alone did not carry the modification. The sellers had promised nothing they were not already bound to give, so the buyers' extra $10,000 bought nothing. The rule applies, in the court's account of the authorities, even when the other side refuses to perform further unless the new promise is made.11
The rule answers a problem of leverage. A buyer may order a machine for a fixed date and, counting on delivery, make commitments to customers that would be costly to break. As the delivery date nears, the seller may demand a higher price, knowing the buyer will incur heavy expenses if the machine is late.12 The buyer can refuse and sue for breach, but legal remedies are costly and uncertain, and that gap opens the way to duress. Commercial reputation deters many such demands, though not all.13 By refusing to enforce a bare promise to pay more for the same performance, the law takes the profit out of the threat: the party who demands more gains nothing legally from the demand. That is the abuse the Alaska Packers court called a premium on bad faith.14
Consideration is nonetheless a poor safeguard against that abuse, because the requirement is easy to meet. Slight consideration is consistent with coercion, and to surrender one's contractual rights for a peppercorn is not functionally different from surrendering them for nothing.15
Because the rule shields so weakly and sometimes blocks fair adjustments, courts and legislatures have relaxed it. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89, a modification is binding when the parties did not anticipate the circumstances that prompted it and the modification is fair. A contractor who uncovers hazardous waste that neither side foresaw, and who obtains the developer's fair promise of $50,000 more to finish, holds a binding promise notwithstanding the legal duty rule.16 The sellers in Recker had no such surprise to point to; they simply wanted more for the same land, and the rule applied in full. Some states have rejected the rule by judicial decision. Alabama, for example, holds in Winegardner v. Burns that "an executory contract may be modified by the parties without any new consideration other than mutual consent."17 Other states have a general statute that dispenses with consideration for modifications in writing.18 A federal court applying Indiana law has gone further, suggesting that the sensible course is to enforce modifications, at least if written, regardless of consideration and to rely on the duress defense to prevent abuse. All coercive modifications would then be unenforceable, and no one would need to rely on consideration, an inadequate safeguard against duress. The court did not decide whether Indiana would take that step, because the modification before it was supported by consideration.19
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code carries the relaxation furthest for one large class of contracts: an agreement modifying a contract within the Article needs no consideration to be binding.20 The painter's promise to finish early fails at common law because painting is a service, and UCC § 2-209(1) does not reach service contracts. A furniture seller's promise to deliver earlier than agreed, by contrast, binds the seller without any new consideration from the buyer, assuming any writing requirement is met.21 The next sections explain how Article 2 reaches that result and what replaces consideration as the check on hold-ups.